Introduction.
The question of why the United States periodically resorts to the violent elimination of leaders from other states has returned to the center of global attention following the dramatic events of early 2026. In January, US special forces abducted Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, and in late February, a joint US-Israeli strike led to the death of Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. These actions, characterized by many experts as unprecedentedly open violations of international law, compel an examination of the history of this issue and an attempt to understand the logic guiding Washington in making such decisions.

I. Historical Retrospective: From the Cold War to the Church Committee.
The practice of US interference in the internal affairs of other states with the aim of removing undesirable leaders has a long history dating back to the Cold War period. Declassified documents and numerous studies show that US intelligence agencies developed operations against Fidel Castro in Cuba, Patrice Lumumba in Congo, Ngo Dinh Diem in Vietnam, and other leaders. Methods ranged from poisoned cigars and exploding seashells to collaboration with local conspirators and direct support for military coups.

The culmination of awareness regarding the scale of these activities came with the Church Committee report, published on November 20, 1975. The Senate investigation led by Frank Church presented the public with evidence of CIA involvement in plots to assassinate foreign leaders for the first time. The committee concluded that assassination is incompatible with American principles, international order, and morality, and must be rejected as an instrument of foreign policy. In response to the report, President Gerald Ford signed an executive order prohibiting US government employees from participating in political assassinations, and subsequent presidents have reaffirmed this ban.

II. Legal Mechanisms for Circumventing the Ban: Doctrine and New Justifications.
Despite the formal ban, the instrument of eliminating undesirable leaders has not disappeared from the arsenal of US foreign policy. In the case of Venezuela, the administration used a legal construct by declaring Nicolás Maduro a "narco-terrorist" due to his alleged connection with a criminal network. After adding this organization to the list of foreign terrorist groups, Washington received formal grounds for coercive actions against individuals associated with it.

In the case of Iran, the justification was built on the concept of "preemptive self-defense" and combating the terrorist threat. Notably, the killing of Ali Khamenei represents the first instance in modern history of one state launching a direct missile strike against the legitimate leader of another sovereign state. Even in the situations with Muammar Gaddafi and Saddam Hussein, death formally came at the hands of internal forces or by verdict of a national court.

A particularly significant role is played by the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, proclaiming the Western Hemisphere as a sphere of exclusive US interests. Actions in Venezuela represent a direct continuation of this doctrine, according to which the United States considers itself entitled to act as a police force in the region and intervene in the affairs of any state.

III. Strategic Logic: Regime Change as the Goal.
Behind the forceful elimination of leaders always stands a broader strategic objective—changing the political regime to one loyal to Washington. The killing of Ali Khamenei was the first stage of a multi-step plan designed to decapitate the Iranian leadership and lead to the collapse of the system along Libyan or Syrian lines.

The calculation is based on the premise that in authoritarian systems where power is personalized and the future of the state is tied to a single individual, the removal of that leader can paralyze governance and open the way for internal opposition or negotiation processes on terms favorable to the United States. In Iran's case, it was assumed that after the destruction of the top leadership, remaining elite representatives would prefer to negotiate guarantees of personal safety, and popular protests would complete the regime change.

In Venezuela, the bet was placed on demoralizing security forces and the transition of the general staff to the US side, similar to what occurred in some previous interventions.

IV. International Community Reaction and the Problem of Impunity.
One of the most troubling aspects of contemporary events is the virtual absence of reaction from the international community and, consequently, the encouragement of the United States to further actions. The killing of Khamenei constitutes an open act of aggression against a UN member state, yet no sanctions against the violators of international law have followed.

Significantly, even traditional US allies in Europe refrained from direct criticism. This impunity creates a dangerous precedent: each successful act of violence will generate new violence, and the governments of other states undesirable to Washington may come under threat.

What is occurring is often characterized as a return to the law of the strong, where international rules serve merely as an instrument for hegemonic powers to protect their own interests. In these conditions, the sole deterrent factor becomes not international law but the military might of the potential victim.

V. Selectivity and Pragmatism: Why Some Are Killed and Others Are Not.
An important question arising in the analysis of US policy is why some leaders are targeted for elimination while others are not. US actions are distinguished by selectivity based on pragmatic calculation rather than ideological consistency. In the rhetoric of the American administration, Iran and Venezuela are treated as separate targets, not as part of a unified axis.

Even the killing of Khamenei, a key ally of Russia, did not lead to a rupture in Russian-American contacts, as Washington does not view Tehran and Moscow as a single entity. Moreover, overly energetic support for Iran by Russia could jeopardize the Kremlin's valuable US neutrality in the Ukrainian conflict.

Thus, the decision to use force against a foreign leader is made based on a complex balance: the existence of a legal justification, military capability, the absence of risk of disproportionate response (especially nuclear), and willingness to tolerate reputational costs. In the case of Russia, possessing nuclear deterrent potential, even the boldest strategists do not consider the possibility of repeating the Venezuelan or Iranian scenario.

VI. Russia's Reaction: Between Allied Obligations and Pragmatism.
The killing of a key ally placed the Russian leadership in a difficult position. The Kremlin's reaction to Khamenei's death was deliberately restrained: the official telegram of condolences did not name those responsible, with direct accusations against the American administration voiced only at the level of the foreign ministry.

This caution is explained by pragmatic calculation: Moscow has bet on special relations with the new American administration and places hope in US neutrality regarding the Ukrainian conflict. Openly siding with Iran against the United States would jeopardize these calculations. At the same time, complete silence would undermine Russia's image as a defender of allies and a voice of the Global South.

Experts note the mechanism characteristic of the Kremlin of using several political languages, where officials at different levels may express opposing positions, allowing the supreme authority to maintain room for maneuver. However, the situation vividly demonstrates the contradiction between the image of a strong leader and the real dependence on relations with the United States.

Conclusion.
Analysis of the practice of eliminating foreign leaders by the United States shows that, despite the formal ban introduced after the scandalous revelations of the 1970s, this instrument continues to be used in American foreign policy. Under new legal justifications—combating drug trafficking, terrorism, protecting national security—Washington carries out targeted killings and forceful regime change operations.

The dramatic events of 2025–2026 in Venezuela and Iran mark a qualitative shift: the open abduction and killing of acting heads of state by external forces without UN sanction and with the tacit consent of the international community. This returns the world to the law of the strong, where the sovereignty of weak states ceases to mean anything, and the sole guarantee of a leader's safety becomes their country's capacity for retaliatory strike.

Russia's reaction to these events demonstrates the limits of pragmatism even in relations with key allies, when one's own geopolitical interests outweigh principles of defending international law. The question of how far the new US administration will go in its desire to "impose order" around the world remains open, but it is already evident that previous norms and rules have ceased to function.

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