The thirty-day war in Iraq in May 1941, which ended with the second, so-called peaceful occupation of the country by British troops, has received many interpretations in the scientific literature. Researchers identify a whole range of reasons that led to the rapid and unconditional military triumph of Great Britain: This is its military, political and moral superiority, a series of tactical mistakes of the Iraqi military command, weak military training of the Iraqi army, limited and belated assistance of the Axis powers to the regime of R. A. Gailani, etc. The role of German participation in the events under consideration should also be identified in this context. On April 1, 1941, a coup d'etat took place in Iraq, as a result of which the nationalist opposition led by R. A. Gailani came to power. The coup was driven by a crisis in Anglo-Iraqi relations, the dominance of nationalist groups in Iraq's political and military elite, and the threat of World War II expansion to the Middle East in light of Germany's military successes in North Africa and the Balkans. The current situation forced England to act quickly and harshly. Most authors agree that the decision to send troops to Iraq was not motivated solely by the desire to remove the Gailani regime and restore the regent's power. First of all, Great Britain was guided by the principles of its military strategy, in which it sought to strengthen the security of the air base and port in Basra, as well as protect the oil fields of Iraq and Iran [Silverfarb, 1986, p. 125-126; Shikara, 1987, p. 190-196; Kirk, 1952, p. 68 Hirszowicz, 1966, p. 144; Warner, 1974, p. 90, 110; Schroder, 1975, p. 141, etc.]. The materials of the British archives fully confirm this point of view. As follows from interdepartmental correspondence that allows you to trace the decision-making process of the British military cabinet, it was planned to organize a rapid transfer of troops through Basra between Egypt and India or India and Palestine (i ... Read more