In the third period of the Great Patriotic War (January 1944-May 9, 1945), the Soviet Armed Forces faced the task of completing the expulsion of the fascist invaders from Soviet soil, liberating the countries of Europe from occupation, and ending the war with the complete defeat of the armed forces of Nazi Germany and its allies. The internal troops of the NKVD of the USSR also contributed to the solution of this problem in close cooperation with the troops of the Active Army. If in the first and second periods of the war some of these troops were directly involved in combat operations, then after 1943, due to the major successes of the Red Army in expelling the fascist invaders, the internal troops performed mainly service and combat tasks. One of these tasks was to protect the rear of the Active Army. The head of the NKVD troops for the protection of the rear of the front was subordinate to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR, and in operational terms - to the Military Council of the Front. Border units and internal troops were involved in its implementation. Each department of the NKVD troops for the protection of the rear of the front, depending on the length of the front line, had three to five regiments, which usually consisted of three rifle battalions and one motorized maneuver group as a reserve for the regimental commander. The battalion usually consisted of six outposts. In all ranks - from the battalion and above - there was a counterintelligence apparatus. The NKVD troops operated directly behind the line of the army rear, 15-25 km from the front edge. They sent out patrols, secrets, ambushes, reconnaissance and search teams, set up checkpoints, combed through woodlands, and checked settlements.
By the end of 1944, a number of border units involved in protecting the rear of the Active Army began serving to protect the western border borders of the USSR, and the internal troops, in connection with the entry of Soviet troops into the borders of East Prussia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, were assigned to protect communications and maintain order in the territory between The state border of the USSR and the border of the front-line rear, on December 18, 1944, the GKO adopted a corresponding resolution, on the basis of which six divisions of 5 thousand people were formed and transferred to the disposal of the NKVD of the USSR. 25-30% of the composition of each division was replaced by regular military personnel of the internal troops who had experience in Chekist-military work1 . Since all divisions were intended mainly for the protection of railway lines, they were transferred to the Command of the NKVD Troops for the Protection of Railways. Three divisions began performing their tasks in January 1945 on the territory of East Prussia, Poland and Czechoslovakia at the height of the Vistula-Oder and East Prussian strategic operations, the other three-in the second half of February 1945 on the territory of Romania and Hungary. Together with other formations, they reliably ensured the security of the front-line rear and communications of the Red Army. Thanks to the efforts of counterintelligence agencies and troops, according to the evidence of enemy documents, 90% of the fascist agents sent to the rear of the Active Army were identified and detained .2
1 Krasnaya zvezda, 6. II. 1975.
2 Pogranichnik, 1975, N 2, p. 33.
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During the war with Japan, the rear of the fronts was mainly protected by field troops, and the rear of the 1st and 2nd Far Eastern Fronts was also protected by the 3rd Rifle Division of the Internal Troops, as well as some border units. Units of the 3rd Infantry Division of the Internal Troops destroyed and captured more than 1,200 Japanese soldiers and officers .3
Thus, the system of protecting the rear of the Active Army, created in the process of preparing the USSR to repel the aggressor and improved during the war, ensured that the internal troops performed the complex and responsible tasks assigned to them. On October 13, 1945, the Main Directorate of the NKVD Troops for the Protection of the rear of the Active Red Army was disbanded, and its subordinate units were transferred to the internal troops.
Another task that faced the internal troops at the final stage of the war was the fight against banditry. It was conducted primarily by political measures, by means of ideological influence, and was directed everywhere by party committees. Part of the population deceived by the fascists managed to tear off by these measures from the bourgeois-nationalist underground. However, it was necessary to conduct an armed struggle against the enemy's accomplices - bourgeois nationalists, not only during the Great Patriotic War, but also in the post-war period. It should be emphasized that organizations of bourgeois nationalists often appeared under the guise of" opposition " to German fascism. In fact, all of them were closely connected with the Nazis.
During the war years, Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists actively collaborated with the German military command, the Gestapo and the Abwehr, participated in punitive operations against partisans and underground anti-fascist organizations. On February 12, 1944, General Brenner of the Wehrmacht signed a secret decree on the treatment of members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). It indicated that an agreement had been reached between the OUN leadership and the occupiers, by virtue of which members of the organization of bourgeois nationalists would not attack German units, but would also hand over Red Army soldiers and partisans they had captured to the Fascists and send scouts to the areas occupied by the Red Army; in turn, the fascists would freely allow OUN soldiers to pass through on the planned routes, without taking away their weapons. Under the false slogan of fighting for an "independent" Ukraine, the OUN members aimed to carry out terrorist and sabotage activities against the Soviet Union. Their bandit groups were a motley collection of assassins and spies. So, in the bandit groups operating in the territory of the Lviv region, by August 1944. These included local bourgeois nationalists, deficient members of the SS Galicia division, former policemen, people from the forcibly mobilized local population, and criminals released from prison by the Nazis. Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian bourgeois nationalists also actively collaborated with the fascists.
The actions of the bandits were particularly cruel. In the instructions to the OUN participants, one of its leaders, S. Bandera, stated:: "Our power must be terrible" 4 . Another suggested that those who supported the Soviet government should be " liquidated by all available methods (shooting, hanging, and even quartering)." On the night of November 30, 1944, bandits burned 30 buildings and killed 15 residents in the village of Sytsyanka, Lviv region. They threw old people, women and children into burning houses. In the same month in der. Levans of the Lithuanian SSR bandits brutally dealt with those who encroached on the landowner's land. 16-year-old P. Stepaitis was subjected to savage tortures. They cut his chest, twisted his arms, pierced his stomach and throat with bayonets, then killed him and left a note: "Killed because a Komsomol member and the son of a policeman" 5 .
In battles with bandits, the personnel of the internal troops constantly demonstrated examples of courage, heroism and selfless performance of military duty. In June 1944, bandits captured a wounded, unconscious foreman
3 Internal troops in the Great Patriotic War, Moscow, 1975, p. 689.
4 Pogranichnik Publ., 1959, No. 22, p. 74.
5 Internal troops in the Great Patriotic War, pp. 643-644, 648.
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273rd Rifle Regiment of Internal troops I. A. Klimezko. They tried to get secret information from him, but seeing the failure of their attempts, they gouged out his eyes, cut a five-pointed star on his chest, and cut off his hand. Without breaking the persistent chekist, the enemies shot him. In November 1944, in a battle with a gang, Sergeant Kuryachy from the 230th separate rifle battalion of the Internal Troops was wounded in both hands. Despite the pain, he continued to fire the machine gun. The bandits crawled up to him at a distance of 15-20 m and offered to surrender. Kuryachy returned fire. When the bullets ran out, he snatched a grenade out of his bag and shouted "Chekists do not surrender!" and threw it at the bandits. Kuryachy kept the last grenade for himself, but by this time his comrades came to the rescue of the brave warrior.
The fight against the OUN continued to intensify. In the resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine of February 26, 1945, in particular, it was noted: "The internal troops of the NKVD of Lieutenant-General Marchenkov are successfully fighting banditry, they have become better prepared and planned operations, they act much bolder, more organized and faster, linking military and chekist activities with party-political ones." 6
Mass-political explanatory work among the population of the liberated areas was carried out on a daily basis and everywhere. Officers delivered lectures and reports at party and Komsomol meetings, meetings of residents, workers, poor and farmhands, intellectuals, and women. Conversations were held in gymnasiums and schools, in cinemas before the show, at railway stations and markets. Special importance was attached to conversations with clergymen, given their popularity among the religious part of the population. Often, after such conversations, they preached sermons condemning the outrages of bandits and calling for support for the activities of the Soviet government. In a report of the political department of the 4th Division of the Internal Troops in January 1945, it was reported that there were more frequent cases when residents turned to the command of the units and reported where the gangs were hiding, where their weapons and food were stored, and openly declared that honest people had nothing to fear from the NKVD troops. 7 A significantly larger number of citizens began to report to conscription centers, and the implementation of state supplies improved.
According to incomplete data, in the first half of 1945, the population of the western regions of Ukraine received about 1,500 reports, more than 110 lectures, almost 3,000 group and more than 37,000 individual conversations, more than 2,000 general meetings of citizens, more than 200 rallies, and more than 40 amateur concerts .8 All this contributed to the involvement of citizens in public life, their gradual release from the influence of nationalists and from fear of enemies. Political organizations, political apparatuses and party organizations of the internal troops were aimed at taking into account the peculiarities of the mores and customs of the population, respecting the religious feelings of citizens, preventing abuse of power and violations of socialist legality, not replacing local party and Soviet bodies, but helping them to expand political work among the population and establish correct relationships with it.
The active struggle against banditry in the western regions of Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltic Republics helped to strengthen the influence of the Communist Party, strengthen Soviet power, and involve broad masses of working people in socialist construction, who hated bourgeois nationalist renegades. The elimination of gangs was completed in the first post-war years.
Along with participating in the protection of the rear of fronts and the fight against banditry, the internal troops continued to perform other operational and service tasks. The most important of them was the performance of garrison service in the liberated cities, participation in ensuring public order there. Units and subunits assigned to garrison duty moved directly behind the Red Army's battle formations and entered cities immediately after their liberation, and often themselves
6 Ibid., p. 656.
7 Ibid., p. 647.
8 Ibid., p. 658.
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actively participated in the battles. Depending on the size of the city, the garrison consisted of a company or a battalion. He was charged with the protection of objects planned jointly with the territorial bodies of the NKVD; in addition, he was supposed to assist the internal affairs bodies in neutralizing enemy elements. In cities, at the entrances and exits, checkpoints were set up to check documents. On the streets, soldiers of the garrison conducted patrols, checked documents, and identified mined streets, houses, and squares. In a number of units of the internal troops, there were special sapper units that carried out mine clearance work. Komsomol youth detachments from local residents provided considerable assistance to the garrisons. They were created by the decision of the Central Committee of the Komsomol of April 12, 1942,9 These detachments took part in patrolling, protecting such objects that did not require military protection, collecting weapons and other military equipment, inspecting forests, ravines, etc., where people who were hostile to the Soviet government often hid.
The 5th Infantry Division of the Internal Troops did a lot of work to combat enemy agents and criminal elements in the cities liberated by the troops of the Leningrad, Volkhov, North - Western, 2nd and 3rd Baltic fronts. In addition, parts of this division only in the North-Western Front strip removed and neutralized more than 20 thousand people. mines and land mines. By September 1944, 42 soldiers and division commanders were awarded government awards for performing operational and service tasks; 238-for courage in battles .10
During the Great Patriotic War, the internal troops carried out a great deal of work to relocate a significant number of the most important industrial enterprises from the territories that were threatened by occupation, and vigilantly guarded the objects entrusted to them. The clarity of their actions greatly contributed to the improvement of the production process and timely provision of the necessary products to the needs of the front. Enemy aircraft dropped a large number of land mines and lighters on many enterprises protected by internal troops. On the territory of objects protected by the internal troops of Leningrad in 1943 alone, more than 2 thousand shells exploded. Once, incendiary bombs fell on the warehouse of the plant, where there were up to 20 cars of explosives. Boxes started to light up. But thanks to the dedicated actions of the security guards, the explosion was prevented, products for the front were saved, and the plant continued to work.
In difficult conditions, the NKVD units for the protection of railway facilities served. The enemy heavily bombed the railways. In two months of 1944, enemy aircraft carried out 120 raids on railway facilities guarded by units of the 32nd NKVD Division in the rear of the 1st Belorussian Front. On June 27, 1944, about 50 aircraft conducted a massive raid on the Bryansk-2 railway junction, which was guarded by the 24th Division of the NKVD. They dropped 160 high-explosive and incendiary bombs, some of which were delayed-action 11 . Internal troops took measures to save protected objects. The maximum increase in vigilance of military detachments and the establishment of a strict access regime on the railways required the enemy's actions to throw out paratroopers-saboteurs both in the front line and in the deep rear. In addition, in addition to protecting bridges and tunnels on railways, the internal troops were now also assigned to protect station and line railway structures, cargo, cash registers, and escort wagons with the most valuable cargo. Among the goods that were subject to the protection of the NKVD troops were food, matches, coal, non-ferrous metals, cars, tractors, textile and leather products, shoes, ready-made clothes, underwear, etc. In the settlements adjacent to the railways, brigades were created to assist the NKVD troops from the local population, mainly communists and Komsomol members, as well as non-party youth.
In connection with the successful offensive of the Red Army, the military guard on a number of
9 Ibid., pp. 559-560; Central Archive of the Komsomol, f. 1, op. 3, d. 82, ll. 56-62.
10 Internal Troops in the Great Patriotic War, pp. 576-57, 613.
11 Ibid., pp. 602, 616.
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By the beginning of 1944, the construction of railways in the eastern regions of the country was removed and transferred to the western railways. The load on personnel remained high: from 12 to 15, often for 16 to 18 hours every day 12 . Despite the difficulties, the troops successfully coped with the assigned tasks for the protection of railways. By the beginning of 1944, they had detained 221 spies and saboteurs, many deserters, and others, prevented 477 wrecks and accidents, 839 fires, 10,285 attempts to steal goods, and discovered 134,354 different railway track damages. They provided security for 645 fleets of freight cars, as well as about 10 million cars en route.
Armored trains of the internal troops showed high efficiency during the war years. They were intended for the protection and defense of railway sections, structures, junctions and stations; support of garrisons that were guarding railway structures when repelling enemy attacks, as well as assisting them in battle; fighting sabotage groups and enemy air paratroopers in the railway line; transferring reserves and supporting their actions; escorting letter trains and important cargo actions as part of the NKVD and Red Army troops directly on the fronts. The crews of armored trains, participating in combat operations, showed great courage and dedication. Near Leningrad and in Karelia, six armored trains of the 23rd NKVD Division conducted about 200 battles and fire raids .13 The 31st separate division of armored trains, formed as part of the NKVD troops for the protection and defense of lettered government trains, completed more than 46 combat missions in just one year. So, two platoons of armored platforms, accompanying the trains of Marshals of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov and K. E. Voroshilov on the Volkhov front, successfully repelled enemy aircraft attacks and shot down an enemy plane. Skilfully neutralized the enemy's actions by the crew of an armored train accompanying a letter train with members of the government and a group of generals to the North Caucasus Front. Enemy aircraft in the Krasnodar region repeatedly raided the train, but all the raids were successfully repelled 14 .
The personnel of the 56th armored train under the command of Senior Lieutenant P. K. Ishchenko destroyed an enemy bomber, two artillery batteries, several tanks, armored tractors, anti-tank guns, armored vehicles, mortars, motorcycles and up to 700 infantry during the month-and-a-half battles near Kiev at the beginning of the war. For courage, bravery and heroism, more than 70 of its soldiers were awarded orders and medals, the commander of the armored train P. K. Ishchenko and military commissar V. A. Kazarin were awarded the Order of Lenin. The movie "Fortress on Wheels"is dedicated to the glorious military deeds of this armored train, awarded the Order of the Red Banner. In 1980, a monument in honor of this armored train was erected in Kaniv (Cherkasy region). The crew of the 46th separate armored train under the command of Captain G. F. Firsov conducted more than 100 battles in the Caucasus and showed high combat skill and bravery. He destroyed a lot of enemy manpower and equipment. The 46th separate armored train was awarded the Order of the Red Banner for its exemplary performance of combat missions at the front and its valor and courage shown at the same time. The 73rd separate armoured train under the command of Major F. F. became the Red Banner train. D. Malysheva.
At the final stage of the war, due to the need to escort a large number of prisoners of war, the volume of tasks of the convoy troops sharply increased. The first group of Nazi prisoners was taken under guard by the 229th Convoy Regiment on June 24, 1941. On July 17, 1944, Nazi soldiers and officers captured in Belarus were escorted through the central streets of Moscow by NKVD troops.: about 58 thousand 15 .
The growth of their party ranks and the activation of party and political work were of great importance for the successful performance of their tasks by the internal troops. In the units for the protection of important industrial enterprises, the party stratum on the
12 Ibid., c, 616.
13 Ibid., p. 119.
14 Ibid., p. 567.
15 The warrior's Calendar for 1984, Moscow, 1983, p. 195.
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On September 1, 1942, it was 14%, on January 1, 1943 -16.2%, and on January 1, 1944 - 21%; in the operational troops of the NKVD, from 11-12% at the end of 1941. it increased on average to 24-26%, and in some compounds - to 27-29%. The number of Communists in relation to personnel in the convoy troops increased from 11.9% in 1941 to 25.2% in 1944. "By their personal example," the resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the 30th anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War noted, "the Communists raised the morale of the masses, led them to feats, and instilled firm confidence in complete victory over the enemy." 16 Patriotic and international education of soldiers, propaganda of the glorious labor and combat traditions of the Communist Party, the Soviet people, and the Armed Forces of the country were given an important place in the party's political work.
The soldiers of the internal troops did not stand aside even when the campaign to raise funds for the Defense Fund, for the production of military equipment and weapons, to purchase tickets for the money and clothing lottery, to help children of front-line soldiers, to subscribe to state military loans, etc. was launched all over the country. Only in parts of the 23rd Army About 1 million rubles were collected and deposited in the State Bank of the NKVD division. for the construction of tanks, planes, and other types of weapons. Commanders and political workers of the 82nd regiment of this division contributed 108,270 rubles from their personal savings for the construction of the aircraft. The personnel of the 110th regiment handed over 44,605 rubles to the State Bank. for the creation of the Chekist artillery battery, 51st regiment - 216,673 rubles. for the construction of the Chekist tank 17 . From 1941 to July 1944, soldiers of the NKVD operational troops purchased 93.3 million rubles 'worth of state military loan bonds, 8.7 million rubles' worth of cash lottery tickets, 6.3 million rubles 'worth of cash and 4.5 million rubles' worth of bonds, and more than 2 million rubles ' worth of money collected for the Fund to Help Children of Front-line Soldiers .18 The personnel of the convoy troops collected about 47 million rubles for this purpose. The same income" from soldiers of the NKVD troops for the protection of railways in 1943 alone amounted to about 34 million rubles, from soldiers and commanders of NKVD units for the protection of important industrial enterprises-37 million rubles.
More than 100 thousand soldiers of these troops were awarded orders and medals, more than 200 pupils of the troops were awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union .19 On the whole, the internal troops made a significant contribution to the heroic struggle of the Soviet people against the enemy at the front and in the rear. Their work is appreciated by the Motherland.
16 Thirtieth anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War, Moscow, 1975, p. 5.
17 Internal Troops in the Great Patriotic War, pp. 583-584.
18 At the combat post, 1975, N 11, p. 76.
19 We serve the Fatherland. Moscow, 1968, p. 68,
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