PARTICIPATION OF BASHKIRS IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF FORTRESSES AND MILITARY OPERATIONS ON THE TERRITORY OF WESTERN SIBERIA AT THE END OF THE XVI-XVII CENTURIES.*

The article examines military actions and other events during the annexation of Western Siberia to the Russian state, in which Bashkirs, as well as military detachments formed from Siberian service Tatars, took part on the initiative of the Russian authorities. Special attention is paid to the participation of Bashkirs in the construction of fortresses and military service to protect the borders of Russian possessions, as well as in military events in the southern Urals and Siberia. Separate groups of Bashkirs fought in the ranks of supporters of the restoration of the Siberian Tatar Khanate, supported by the rulers of the western Mongols-Oirats.

Keywords: Western Siberia, Bashkirs, military Tatars, Russian Cossacks, Dzungars, military actions.

An important factor in preserving the Siberian lands within the Moscow Tsardom in the first decades after their annexation was the involvement of the local Turkic-speaking Tatar population and some other Turkic-speaking peoples in state and military service. Separate attempts to attract Siberian Tatars to Russian service as guides and interpreters were made during the first campaign of the Cossack detachment under the command of Ataman Ermak to Siberia (Miller, 1999, p. 218). In the following decades, military Tatars were actively used to protect Russian possessions in Western Siberia and to conduct military operations against Khan Kuchum, his heirs and supporters [Tychinskikh, 2010, pp. 46-51]. Sometimes representatives of other Turkic peoples who were already Russian citizens, including Bashkirs and Kazan Tatars, were involved in the construction of fortresses and military service in Siberia. In some cases, conflicts arose in the relations between the Siberian administration and the service Tatars and Bashkirs, as a result of which some groups of the Tatar and Bashkir population tried to leave the Russian possessions and go to the steppes. Sometimes they went over to the side of Khan Kuchum and his heirs and took part in military operations against Russian Cossacks and service people. During the period under review, there were cases when military detachments consisting of Russian Cossacks and serving Tatars made campaigns to the Urals, to the lands inhabited by Bashkirs, and attacked Bashkir settlements, although their inhabitants were already Russian citizens. At the same time, Russian possessions inhabited by Siberian Tatars and Bashkirs were repeatedly subjected to military attacks by supporters of the restoration of the Siberian Khanate and the Nogais and Dzungars who supported them [Khudyakov, 2013, pp. 64-66].

* The article was prepared with the financial support of the Russian State Scientific Foundation, project N 13 - 01 - 00049 "Warriors of the Siberian peoples in the Russian service in Siberia in the XVI-XVIII centuries".

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Information about the participation of Bashkirs in military operations in the Trans-Urals and Western Siberia is contained in the Russian Siberian chronicles and in the reports of some Europeans who visited Siberia in the XVII century.

In the travel notes of a German officer who came to serve in Siberia as part of a group of European military specialists to train Russian servicemen in military affairs under the command of Colonel I. Egrat in 1666, whose name remains unknown, it is said about the Bashkir raids in the Tura River valley during this period. According to this foreigner, the town of Verkhoturye was built on a steep cliff on the bank of the Tura River, it is well fortified, surrounded by a wooden wall and "built against the Bashkirs" (Alekseev, 1941, p.338). In another fragment of his essay, he rather negatively assessed this people, who, according to his ideas, inhabited the lands southwest of Tobolsk, but next to the western Mongols, Dzungars and Kalmyks. In his opinion, their hostility towards the Russians is explained by the fact that they were previously subjects of the Siberian Tatar khans, the ancestors of the Tatar "tsarevich" who did not name them, who continued to fight for the restoration of the Siberian Khanate in the second half of the XVII century.

According to this foreign military expert ,the "tsarevich" - the heir of Khan Kuchum from the Sheibanid family, had "a few people with him, namely Bashkirs." Sometimes, before making another raid on Russian possessions in Siberia, he "manages to win over the Bashkirs to his side, then he makes a big noise out of it" [Alekseev, 1941, p. 348]. " Before, he always used these people for his service; they are in the field, riding horses that run fast they are very clever with their bows and arrows, and they shoot very accurately." According to his descriptions, Bashkir horsemen made sudden raids, then returned to the steppes and repeatedly attacked again and again [Alekseev, 1941, p. 362-363].

In an essay by another member of the same group of officers, Captain A. Dobbin, who served for many years as part of the Russian troops in the Siberian region, it is said that a certain "ruler of Siberia", wandering along with the Kalmyks, "is waging a great war with the Muscovites." According to him, "the loyal people of this sovereign, whom he has with him, are called Bashkirs" [Alekseev, 1941, p. 395]. The Bashkir Horde is mentioned as one of the provinces of the "vast Asian Tartary" in the work of another German military specialist, G. A. Schleusing, who, according to him, traveled "for military affairs" to Siberia in the 1680s. Some researchers doubted that he visited Siberia. They thought that he described it from the words of one of the German officers who had previously served in this region of Russia (see, for example: [Alekseev, 1941, p. 487, 496]).

According to the European Kommersant and. Ides, who was in the Russian diplomatic service and made a trip to Siberia at the head of the Russian embassy going to China in 1692-1695, during this period, the western regions of Siberia were frequently raided by Dzungars and Kazakhs, as well as "many raids are made by Ufa and Bashkir Tatars" [Ide, Brand, 1967, p. 82].

According to Russian sources, ethnocultural contacts between Bashkirs and Siberian Tatars existed even before the annexation of the Urals and Western Siberia to the Muscovite Kingdom. In his fundamental essay on the history of Siberia, G. F. Miller noted that the Bashkirs call the Tyumen and Tobolsk Tatars "turals" - residents of cities and fortified settlements (Miller, 1999, p. 189, 256). The presence in the Bashkir language of a special term for several groups of Siberian Tatars indicates rather long contacts with the Tatar population of the Trans-Urals. According to other sources received from the Bashkir nomads themselves, during the existence of the Siberian Khanate, they "were under the rule of Khan Kuchum" (Miller, 1999, p. 194). Probably, during the reign of the Siberian Tatar Khans, some groups of Bashkirs were in vassalage from them.

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When in 1594 a detachment under the command of Prince A. Yeletsky was sent from Moscow to build a fortress on the Tara River, the main stronghold in the confrontation with the supporters of Khan Kuchum during this period, Bashkirs were included in it. In addition to the Moscow archers, this detachment included "Mamley Maltsev from Kazan and Ufa with a hundred Kazan and Sviyazhsk Tatars, three hundred Bashkirs and four boyar children, each of whom was at the head of a detachment of 100 Tatars and Bashkirs", as well as groups of "captured Poles" and "Polish Cossacks". In total, M. Maltsev's detachment consisted of 554 Tatar, Bashkir and Polish soldiers (Miller, 1999, p. 282). A. Yeletsky's detachment in Siberia additionally included "40 men of Lithuanian cavalry, Circassians and Cossacks, 50 men of Tyumen, Verkhotursky, Andreevsky, Belakovtsy and Zyryantsov Tatars, from whom amanats were kept in Tobolsk and Tyumen and whose loyalty could therefore be relied upon, 30 people of Tabarin Tatars and 20 people of Koshuks" [Miller, 1999, p. 282]. According to the mural contained in the tsar's decree, there were "300 Bashkir soldiers" in M. Maltsev's detachment (Miller, 1999, p.351). In addition to these people, 100 people from among the prisoners of Lithuania, Circassians and Cossacks were taken in Tobolsk, "100 people of Tobolsk service Tatars under the command of ataman Cherkas Alexandrov and two Tatar heads - Bayazet and Baybakhty." In addition to them, 300 people of Tobolsk Yasach Tatars and another 150 Yasach Tatars were taken to work on ships.

According to G. F. Miller, these Yasach Tatars, like the Moscow Streltsy, "served on foot, but were equipped with firearms," while all the others had to serve on horseback. According to G. F. Miller, "it is impossible not to be surprised that they decided to take such a large number of Tatars to be sent to dangerous Tatar places, where one could constantly expect a hostile attack by the exiled Khan Kuchum." He noted that the invitation to the service of Siberian Tatars was a continuation of the policy characteristic of Ataman Ermak. Russian authorities in Tyumen, Tara, and Tobolsk were already recruiting Siberian Tatars during this period [Miller, 1999, pp. 282-283]. According to the tsar's order, as soon as the army under the command of Prince A. Yeletsky "retakes and drives out" Khan Kuchum, it was ordered to "let the Kazan and Sviyazhsk (Tatars-Yu. K.) and Bashkirs go back to their homes, so that they can reach their homes before the frost and not starve to death" [Miller, 1999, p. 349]. According to these reports, already in the first years after the annexation of the West Siberian lands inhabited by different ethnic groups of Siberian Tatars, the Russian authorities began to actively attract the local Tatar population, as well as the Turkic-speaking Kazan Tatars and Bashkirs, to build prisons and perform military service. Service people from Turkic ethnic groups were entrusted with firearms. At the head of individual detachments were their own commanders - "Tatar heads".

But not everything in the relations between the Russian authorities, Siberian Tatars and Bashkirs was successful. Siberian administrators sometimes had conflicts with former Tatars and Bashkirs. One of these episodes occurred in 1595. It is described in a letter to the Tyumen voivode, Prince G. Dolgoruky, written by the clerk T. Osipov. According to this document, 50 Tatars escaped from Tyumen, including residents of the Kinyr town "Kinyrtsy and Bashkirs" (Miller, 2000, p.15). Judging by this episode, not all Bashkirs were released, as promised in the royal decree, "until frost", but were detained in the service for an indefinite time. After this escape, only 20 serving Tatars remained in Tyumen. After them, the voivode sent a serving man, the Vyazmin family, along with whom the serving Tatars Kakshara, Maitmas and Bakhturaska were sent. The messengers were to scout out the direction in which the fugitives were heading. At the end of June 1595, they returned "on foot" and "plundered". They reported that they found about 30 Bashkirs and Kinyr Tatars, led by a certain Kildeman,

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on the island on the river. Iset. When they asked for horses for themselves, they were captured and wanted to beat them. Only thanks to the eloquence of the Vyazmin Family, the prisoners were spared their lives.

During the conversations, it was found out that the service Tatars left the Russian possessions because they heard threatening news from the interpreter who was part of the service Tatars, "interpreter Miti Tokmanaev". He said that soon new voivodes should arrive, who should choose and beat 12 best people from among the Bashkirs and Kinyr Tatars, and send others to Tara. The remaining "thin" people are planned to be made farmers, who will have to sow and supply the authorities with "5 fours of rye" (Miller, 2000, pp. 174-175). However, some of the fugitives reported that they heard the threatening news not from the translator, but from the Tatar Eltur, who was threatened by the same interpreter. According to the author of the letter, the initiator of these events was this interpreter, translator Mitya Tokmanaev, who with his messages provoked the flight of service and yasashny Tatars [Miller, 2000, p.175]. According to these reports, a group of former Tatars and Bashkirs left the service and went to the r. Iset is influenced by disinformation spread by some Tatar service members.

According to G. F. Miller, the Bashkirs sought to go to their native places in the Urals, and the Kinyrs-to the area of the Kinyr town on the Tura River [Miller, 2000, p. 15]. The scientist assumed that the Tyumen authorities made other attempts to return the escaped servicemen from among the Siberian Tatars and Bashkirs. Judging by the description of events, the overwhelming majority of the service Tatars and Bashkirs did not speak Russian and depended on information received from translators, who in some cases could misinform Tatar soldiers and provoke them to speak out against the Russian authorities. In this case, the idea of the translator M. Tokmanaev was quite successful. Fleeing service Tatars and Bashkirs were frightened by the prospect of becoming farmers and regularly paying taxes on the harvest to the Russian authorities. Later, in the 17th century, some groups of the Siberian Tatar population repeatedly appealed to the Russian authorities with requests to release them from farming. They stated that they would prefer to pay yasak to the Russian authorities with furs [Miller, 2000, p. 23].

In the following year, 1596, a campaign was launched from Tyumen against the Bashkirs of the Ufa uyezd. During this campaign, many Bashkirs "were beaten, and their wives and children were taken captive and brought to Tyumen" [Miller, 2000, p. 15]. Probably, this campaign was made in revenge for the flight of the Bashkirs from Tyumen, committed a year earlier. The attack on the Bashkirs was unexpected not only for them, but also for the Ufa voivode M. Nogoy, who sent a "reply" to the Tyumen voivode L. Shcherbatov and reported this event to Moscow. In this reply, it is said that the "yasash Bashkir" Kanai Kudaiberdeev told the Ufa voivode about the earlier campaign to the Karabatynsky volost of a detachment of "50 Streltsy and Tatars, and all sorts of people" from Tyumen, who captured the village of Igibakhtinu and "took de from them a lot: wives and guys from 30 people" [Miller, 2000, p. 185]. Other "yasash Bashkirs Momgotai and Utemysh Kombarovs and Yakshaulo Belyakov" from the village of Televo, Kipchas volost, also reported to the voivode about the same campaign of a detachment of Tyumen archers and serving Tatars to the Ufa uyezd in order to capture prisoners. According to these people, Bashkirs from villages attacked by a group from Tyumen had to buy their wives and children out of captivity. Some residents of Bashkir villages were so impoverished that they could not raise a ransom and asked for protection from Tsar Boris Godunov (Miller, 2000, p. 186).

The Moscow tsar sent a decree to the Tyumen voivode V. Bakhteyarov-Rostovsky demanding the return of the Bashkir prisoners so that they could return to their homes. However, the Tyumen voivode evaded the execution of the decree under the pretext that

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many Bashkir prisoners had already died by this time, "and some were sold out." In 1598, only one Bashkir family managed to return [Miller, 2000, p. 15]. It was the family of the very "Bashkir Kanai Kudaiberdeev" who, after his return, told the Ufa voivode about his misadventures [Miller, 2000, pp. 185-186].

As G. F. Miller noted, later Tyumen administrators "denied all events connected with the campaign and withdrawal to Polon Bashkir" [Miller, 2000, p. 16]. Judging by these events, the Tyumen administrators did not disdain to attack the Bashkir population, despite the fact that it was in Russian citizenship, in order to capture the inhabitants and sell them into slavery or get a ransom for them.

A few years later, traces of former Tatars and Bashkirs who had fled from Tyumen were found in the camp of supporters and heirs of Khan Kuchum. In 1600, the headquarters of Kuchum's eldest son and successor, Khan Ali, and his brothers Kanai, Azim, and Kubei-Murat included 250 people, "Syrians and Tabyns", as well as "Tatars and Bashkirs who escaped from the Tyumen and Ufa counties". They took part in the struggle against the Russian authorities and raided the environs of Tobolsk and Tyumen [Miller, 2000, p.32]. At this time, the Kuchumovites were inclined to recognize the supreme power of the "White Tsar"under certain conditions. But Tsarevich Kubey-Murat, who arrived at the location of the Russian authorities as an ambassador, was detained and sent to Moscow, which caused fears on the part of his brothers. Therefore, reconciliation between the Kuchumovichs and the Russian authorities did not take place during this period. They continued to fight for the restoration of the Siberian Khanate, relying in the future on the help of the rulers of the Turkic and Mongolian nomadic peoples of the Central Asian steppes, Nogais, Kazakhs and Dzungars.

In 1603, the Nogai murza Urus arrived at the headquarters of Khan Ali, bringing with him 700 soldiers, among whom, in addition to Nogais, were groups of "Tatars and Bashkirs of the Ufa Uyezd" (Miller, 2000, p.34). After that, the number of combined troops of the Siberian Khan increased to 1,100 people. Khan Ali planned to attack the Tyumen Uyezd in the fall of this year, but refrained from this intention, because he learned that his relatives had been released from Moscow and were supposed to come to Siberia. In the following years, the Russian authorities were very afraid of attacks by Tatar troops, which included Bashkirs. However, in 1606 Khan Ali sent his son Arslan to Moscow for negotiations. Therefore, he did not dare to start military operations before his return [Miller, 2000, p. 35].

At this time, the Dzungars appeared in the steppes of the Ob region, which the Russian authorities in Siberia were very afraid of. In 1606, the Dzungars appeared in the Yasach volosts of Tarsky Uyezd and claimed to collect tribute from the Barabinsk and other Siberian Tatars. The voivodes of Tara, Tobolsk and Tyumen received orders from Moscow to provide armed resistance to the Dzungars and detain them at some distance from the Russian possessions in Siberia. In 1607, the army, composed of Russian Cossacks, military and yasachny Tatars, opposed the Dzungars. It was able to inflict significant damage on the Dzungars and delay their progress to the borders of Russian possessions. During this campaign, an army sent by Siberian voivodes attacked the headquarters of Khan Ali, who was an ally of the Dzungars. The Russian army, consisting of Tobolsk and Tyumen Cossacks, serving and yasach Tatars, defeated Khan Ali. As a result of the defeat, Ali's mother, wives and children, as well as some other Khan's relatives were captured [Miller, 2000, p. 36].

In May 1608, a Tatar detachment under the command of three brothers of Khan Ali-Azim, Ishim and Kanchuvar-together with the Dzungars captured the Tatar Kinir town, whose population was a subject of the Moscow tsar. They captured the wives and children of the Kinyr Tatars and took them to the steppe. In pursuit of the Kuchumovichs, a military detachment was sent from Tyumen, led by the Cossack ataman D. Yuryev, with

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"as many Russians and Tatars as could soon be gathered." After some time, a Russian detachment led by "comrade voivode" M. Godunov, "head" K. Izvetdinov, was sent to campaign against the Tatar princes. He attacked the Kuchumovich nomads at a time when the Tatar soldiers were on a campaign against the city of Tara. Ali Khan's wife and two sons, Azim's two wives and two daughters, and Ali's sister were captured [Miller, 2000, p. 37]. The returning Tatar army rushed in pursuit of the Russians, "caught up with them near Lake Kibyrly and fought with them for two days from morning to evening, and after that they followed for three more days," but could not recapture the prisoners.

In 1607 and 1608, two more Tatar princes, Dudu and Altanai, surrendered to the Russian authorities. In 1608. They were sent from Siberia to Moscow. It should be noted that this was a period of acute crisis in the Russian state itself, when the roads to Moscow were occupied by Poles and supporters of False Dmitry II. The prisoners were part of the Russian army, made up of Russian and Swedish soldiers. Under his "protection, they finally reached Moscow" [Miller, 2000, p.37]. In the same year, a Nogai detachment under the command of Murza Urus attacked the Tyumen Uyezd and ravaged "all Russian and Tatar dwellings" 20 versts from Tyumen. The news of the impending attack came to Tyumen from "one Ufa son of Boyarsky, who was among the Bashkirs." After this attack, a detachment of military personnel led by ataman D. Yuryev was sent in pursuit of the Nogais, who "overtook the Nogais across the Iset River", defeated them and recaptured the prisoners [Miller, 2000, p.38].

As noted above, at this time the Muscovite Kingdom was in a state of prolonged turmoil. The central government of the state could not provide any assistance to the Siberian voivodes. In a number of areas of the taiga zone of Western Siberia, uprisings of Ugric tribes broke out. In 1609, an uprising of the Tobolsk, Tyumen, Turin, Verkhoturye and other West Siberian Tatars and Ugric tribes was being prepared. The Tyumen Tatars especially hoped for the help of the Dzungars. Some of the participants in the planned uprising were aware of the events that were taking place in Moscow at that time. However, the Russian authorities in Siberia were able to learn in advance about the upcoming uprising, and its instigators paid with their lives for their plans [Miller, 2000, p. 39]. In 1610, the Nogais attacked the Bashkirs who lived in the Miass River valley, and then brought "terror to the Tyumen Uyezd". Probably, this campaign was directed to the Urals and Western Siberia. Several Yasach Tatars from Tarsky Uyezd fled to the Dzungars, who began to raid the Tarsky uyezd. In the following year, 1611, a successful campaign was made from Tara against the Dzungars, who refused to " recognize the sovereign power over themselves." According to G. F. According to Miller, "the enemy's weapons, consisting only of arrows and bows, were not dangerous" for Russian soldiers armed with firearms and artillery [Miller, 2000, p. 40]. Throughout the entire period of troubles, the Russian authorities in the Urals and Western Siberia, despite the lack of help from the Moscow tsars, were able not only to keep the Bashkirs and Siberian Tatars in Russian citizenship, but also successfully resist attacks from the Dzungars and Nogais.

In 1616, after the death of Khan Ali, he proclaimed himself Khan Ishim, who led those groups of Siberian Tatars who sought to restore the Siberian Khanate. He tried to negotiate with the Russian authorities, but later made a bet on an alliance with the Dzungars, concluding a dynastic alliance with Taisha Ho-Urlyuk [Miller, 2000, p.109]. At this time, relations between the Dzungars and the eastern Mongols in Central Asia were strained. The Dzungars, defeated by the troops of the Altyn Khans, were forced to migrate westward, trying to escape from persecution in the Russian possessions in Western Siberia and the Urals, inhabited by Siberian Tatars and Bashkirs.

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In 1621, the Dzungars attacked Ufa Uyezd in the Urals and inflicted a "strong defeat" on the Bashkirs living in this area. The conflict was caused by the death of an Oirat boy who was accidentally shot by a Bashkir hunter while hunting. The Dzungarian taisha Kuralai agreed to take "two horses, ten foxes and two arrows" for the dead man (Miller, 2000, p.109). Another Dzungarian "minor" prince, Uruslan-taisha, who roamed in Ilet Karagai near the Tobol River, began to demand yasak from the Bashkirs on the grounds that they had previously paid tribute to the Nogais. As a threat, he promised to "go to war" together with his ally, the Siberian Tatar Khan Ishim [Miller, 2000, p. 111]. The sources do not provide information about the implementation of these requirements. In 1624, the Dzungars tried to sell their horses in Ufa, but because of the deep snow, they could not get there and were forced to spend the winter on the lands inhabited by Bashkirs [Miller, 2000, p. 113].

Judging by these events, the Russian authorities were not always able to protect the Bashkir population that had previously accepted Russian citizenship from attacks by Western Mongols and other wall nomads.

During the second half of the 17th century, the Siberian Tatars and Bashkirs, who were accepted into the service of the Russian troops for border protection, as well as some other nomads, Kazakhs and Dzungars, mastered the use of firearms. Important historical evidence of this is contained in the Russian written sources cited in the work of E. A. Bagrin. When assessing the armament of the serving Tatars of the Irbitskaya Sloboda in 1662, he noted that they have out of four hundred soldiers "kuyachny de luda fifty people, and de weapons they have thirty squeakers." Former Tatars took part in the Russian military operations against the Kazakhs, who at that time used firearms [Bagrin, 2013, p. 203]. The military danger from the Kuchumovichi, who relied on the support of the Dzungars, persisted until the third quarter of the 17th century, as evidenced by German officers who served in Siberia during this period [Alekseev, 1941, p. 327].

Firearms were also used by many Bashkirs: "across the Urals, from the city of Ufa in distant places, many Bashkirs showed up with squeaky rifles, and on the city side of Ufa, the Bashkirs also squeaked, and they studied squeaky shooting, but left archery." Another text says that the Bashkirs "have a lot of guns, every person has two or three squeaks" [Bagrin, 2013, p. 203]. But, as further events showed, the use of firearms and ammunition, which were purchased mainly in Central Asia, could no longer change the balance of power and delay the annexation of the steppe regions of the Urals and Siberia to the Russian state.

In the future, active resistance to the Russian authorities from the descendants of Khan Kuchum, who sought to restore the Siberian Khanate, significantly weakened and gradually ceased. As a result of the involvement of Bashkirs and Siberian Tatars in military service and the implementation of a skillful yasach policy, the steppe regions of the Urals and Western Siberia were finally incorporated into the Russian state.

list of literature

Alekseev M. P. Siberia in the news of Western European travelers and writers. Irkutsk: OGIZ Publ., 1941.

Bagrin E. A. Voennoe delo russkikh na vostochnom pogranich'e v XVII v.: Taktika i oboruzhenie sluzhilykh chelovek v Pribaikalie, Zabaikalie i Priamurye [Russian Military Affairs on the Eastern Border in the 17th Century: Tactics and armament of serving People in the Baikal Region, Zabaikalie and Priamurye]. Saint Petersburg: Nestor-Istoriya, 2013.

Ides I., Brand A. Zapiski o russkogo posolstve v Kitay (1692-1695) [Notes on the Russian Embassy to China (1692-1695)]. East lit., 1967.

Miller G. F. Istoriya Sibiri [History of Siberia], 2nd edition, supplemented, Moscow: Vostochny lit., 1999, vol. 1.
Miller G. F. Istoriya Sibiri [History of Siberia], 2nd edition, supplemented, Moscow: Vostochny lit., 2000, vol. 2.
Tychinskikh Z. A. Service Tatars and their role in the formation of the ethnic community of Siberian Tatars (XVII-XIX centuries). Kazan: Publishing House of FENG AN RT, 2010.

Khudyakov Yu. Participation of Tatar warriors as part of Russian troops in military operations in Western Siberia at the end of the XVI-beginning of the XVII centuries. 2013. N 4.

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