The article examines several paradigms of relations between various cultural and civilizational communities, including those that generate conflict and violence. The myth-symbol complex and stable historical memory have an impact on the policy that is formed in ethnic and religious terms. Various examples are used to analyze the problems of identity that have become more acute in the modern world. The article provides a critical analysis of individual theories that offer explanations for various aspects of complex relations between ethnic and confessional groups. Individual manifestations of the crisis of nation-states, especially those formed after the collapse of the colonial system, and disputes between advocates of hyperglobalization and supporters of the sustainability of nation-states are evaluated.

Keywords: civilization, identity, religion, ethnic group, myth, violence, nation-state.

"Civilizational" topics in the light of the transformations taking place in the modern world are becoming more and more popular and interesting for both research authors and publicists, as well as for readers. The issues of cultural and civilizational identity, the nature of relations between the values of various regional and cultural clusters, and the ways of evolution of nation-states in the context of increasing hyperglobalization are becoming increasingly acute and require scientific and theoretical understanding.

THE PROBLEM OF IDENTITY SELECTION

Russia, especially in the last years of Vladimir Putin's presidency, has increasingly positioned itself as a State of a special civilization. Within the framework of this project, Russia is seen as a civilization based on spirituality, adherence to traditional norms and values, among which the individual's responsibility to society and the state (along with his rights), religious ideals (as opposed to the aggressive secularism of Europe) occupy a significant place. The popularity of this project, however, does not stop the struggle between adherents of various concepts and models of civilizational identity of Russia. Despite all the heterogeneity and multiplicity of various constructions, the philosophical paradigms of soil scientists (in the past, Slavophiles) and Westerners, which are traditionally opposed to each other in the Russian intellectual community, stand out among them, no matter how they call themselves in different epochs. To a certain extent, the dichotomy "conservatism-liberalism" can be considered as a reflection of the above.

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We are witnessing how sometimes the controversy surrounding the identification choice becomes very acute, spilling out into the mass media. Some adherents of "neo-semitism", usually positioning themselves as representatives of" patriotic nationalism "(despite all the group and individual differences between them), demand to oppose Russia in civilizational terms to the West, sometimes almost to isolate themselves from it again with the help of the"iron curtain". For example, the always conceptually minded General L. G. Ivashov put forward the idea of a Euro-Asian Civilizational Union (a modern analogue of the Slavophil project) based on the development of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization "as a balance and alternative to the West and the transnational community" (Ivashov, 2012). However, the sanctions war waged by the West, primarily the United States, to isolate Russia after the adoption of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol as new subjects of the Russian Federation, makes Moscow's turn to the East a natural response to unprecedented Western pressure.

There are also supporters of the "neo-imperial" project, among which stand out critics of the current government for its "orientation to the West", for the "European choice". Even more blunt is the deputy of the State Duma from United Russia and a member of its political council, E. A. Fedorov, who says about the Russian government (to the top of the party to which he, by the way, belongs) that it is "managed through the mechanisms of corruption, which is why corruption today is an unsolvable problem. The Americans forbade us to solve it" [Fedorov, 2012]. He believes that Russia now has a dual power: "on the one hand, there are proteges of the Zionist occupation administration (the Government), and on the other, President Putin, who relies on the support of a part of the people and some reasonable people" [Fedorov, 2013]. It should be noted that the rapid growth of Vladimir Putin's popularity after the adoption of the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol into the Russian Federation shows that the deputy clearly underestimated the support base of the Russian president.

Neozapadnik liberals also criticize the government, but they are dissatisfied with something else. L. F. Shevtsova, a political scientist at the Carnegie Moscow Center, believes that the philosophy of Russian identity under Putin is just a "model of power". This model, as she believes, "presupposes countering the influence of the West both within Russian society and in the post-Soviet space", and within its framework Russia's claim "to play the role of a defender of traditional moral values from Western decadence and degradation" is justified [Shevtsova, 2013, p. 2].

Similarly to Russia in the Islamic world, which also builds its development models in a sharp confrontation between supporters of conflicting concepts, it is the thesis of the moral degradation of the West that underlies the rejection of its cultural expansion by defenders of national and religious identity.

Is the age-old dispute between proponents of different models of Russia's development evidence of the identity conflict that it has not yet outlived, or is it an integral feature of its civilizational two-face ("Eurasianism")? It is no coincidence that in the debate about the main threats to Russian statehood, some speak of a "network war" against Russia from the "jihadist international" 1, while others speak of a similar war, but from the "global West".

I would like to note that all societies face the identification challenge in one way or another. I will cite as an example the thesis about "Eurabia" (Eurabia)2, which appeared in Western Europe not so long ago, which reflected the fears of Europeans before the possible civilizational transformation of Europe under the onslaught of a wave of non-assimilators-

1 Kazan political scientist Rais Sulsymanov, for example, speaks about the desire of foreign Muslim centers to include the territories of the Volga region and the North Caucasus "in the global geopolitical redistribution in Eurasia" [Sulsymanov, 2014].

2 In particular, A. Allawi writes about it in detail [Allawi, 2009, p. 182-185].

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migrants from the Arab East and the Muslim world. At the same time, the term "Londonistan" emerged, reflecting the very widespread (including in Russia) opinion that the British capital has become the center of activity of underground jihadist groups of all stripes. There was also a theory of an "Arab-Islamic conspiracy" to blow up Europe. The theory, as noted by Ali Allawi (formerly an Iraqi minister, now an American professor), is no less absurd than the Protocols of the Elders of Zion (Allawi, 2009). There is a whole school of authors who predict the "civilizational death of Europe" (the United States is excluded from this forecast due to the favorable demographic situation and a special "melting pot" model). This discourse dates back to the predictions of Oswald Spengler, who predicted the civilizational and cultural transformation of Europe, the more general arguments of Nikolai Berdyaev about the crisis of modern culture, as well as some other constructions.

ISLAMIC EXTREMISM AND ISLAMOPHOBIA

Russia has not been affected by the virus of Islamophobia, because for centuries our multi-ethnic and multi-confessional country has been an impressive example of cohabitation, cultural enrichment and respect for each other by many ethnic and confessional groups, primarily Orthodox and Muslims, within a single social organism. However, the acute conflict between the West and the Islamic world, the waves of Islamic extremism that have affected Russian regions, as well as large-scale and uncontrolled migration processes have worsened relations between these groups. Supporters of the Eurasian choice were supposed to build bridges between Russia and the Islamic world, but they, and not only nationalists, who generally have a negative attitude towards all "outsiders", often show a biased attitude towards Muslim civilization as such.

However, even within the framework of this discourse, adherents of "groundlessness" tend to blame the West, and primarily the United States, for all the ills of the world, not excluding radical Islamism. Answering a question about the activities of Islamic terrorists in Syria on the air of Voice of Russia, the head of the St. Petersburg branch of the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, an expert on the Ancient East, A. L. Vassoyevich, clearly exaggerating the capabilities of Washington, claims that "radical Islamist groups are controlled by the United States of America" [Vassoyevich, 2014]. With a very noble intention to expose the fundamentalists, the St. Petersburg professor not only attributed the creation of Al-Qaeda to the United States (which is partly not without reason), but also raised the rating of British intelligence, saying that it was it (and not Sheikh Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab, as is usually believed) that created Wahhabism in the XVIII century.

By the way, I note that in the 1920s, as our foreign policy archives show, Russian diplomacy was sympathetic to the Saudi-Wahhabi expansion in Arabia. But, of course, not out of love for Wahhabism, but because she saw in the Puritanical movement of the Bedouin tribes of Nejd a force independent of the colonialists and set the task of uniting Arabia within a centralized (contrary to the British project "divide and rule") independent state education. In a letter to the Russian representative in Hijaz, K. A. Khakimov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR G. V. Chicherin noted: "Our interests in the Arab question are reduced to the unification of Arab lands into a single whole." He wrote in this regard about the possibility of Turkish-Wahhabi rapprochement (how relevant this thesis is today!) "in a certain Muslim movement directed against Western imperialism" [Chicherin, November 1, 1924]. At the same time, it was not at all excluded that Ibn Saud might turn out to be an "English protege", but still as such

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Moscow saw Ibn Saud's opponent, the Meccan Sherif Hussein, for good reason. Later, after the capture of Mecca and Medina by the Wahhabis, Chicherin wrote to the Soviet ambassador in Tehran: "One of the means of putting pressure on Ibn Saud is the campaign now being led by Britain in Muslim countries against the Wahhabis for allegedly destroying Mecca and Medina. In an effort to isolate Ibn Saud..., British agents use the fanaticism of the Muslim masses against the Wahhabis in order to weaken Ibn Saud and force him to agree to an agreement with the Hejaz and to accept English proposals" [Documents..., 1961, p. 61].

The Saudi Kingdom, which was the first to be officially recognized by the USSR, and not by Great Britain at all, was not in fact a nation-state, since it arose on a religious basis (in combination with a tribal one). By the way, another rare example of such an education, only created at the end of World War II, was Pakistan, where even the official language was proclaimed not Bengali or Punjabi, which is spoken by the largest autochthonous ethnic groups, but Urdu - the language of Muslim immigrants from India. As for Saudi Arabia, all these years there has been a process of forming a national identity based on a strange-sounding marker - "Saudi", after the name of the ruling clan.

In the 1920s, during the period of active Soviet nation-building in Central Asia, local leaders not only favored the appearance of a Salafi preacher called al-Shami at-Tarabulsi ("The Syrian from Tripoli"), but also helped him agitate against local Sufis.3 There is even a version that the authorities specifically invited him from abroad in order to use him to their advantage. This was explained by the fact that at that time it was the local "traditional" Sufi sheikhs who were the main opponent for the authorities in the struggle for the minds of local Muslims, and Salafism or Wahhabism could not pose any real threat. In the 1930s, an ethnic Russian named al-Kyzyljari, who converted to Islam, actively promoted fundamentalism in Uzbekistan. Some modern Uzbek imams claim that even the head of the Spiritual Administration of Central Asian Muslims after World War II, Mufti Ziauddin Babakhanov, who was one of the first students to study in Saudi Arabia, actually promoted the spread of Wahhabism, issuing fatwas condemning some folk customs incorporated by local Islam.

The situation has changed dramatically over time. Wahhabism, relying on the huge financial resources accumulated through the sale of oil, began an aggressive expansion outside the kingdom, causing rejection by the majority of Muslims. One of the essential features of the situation in the world, especially in the last decade and a half, has been the acute conflict between the West and the Islamic world. A conflict in which some authors tend to see exclusively civilizational, others - political roots.

This, of course, does not exclude the use of radical Islamists by certain Western circles, primarily American ones, in the interests of weakening the positions of states that they see as rivals that threaten US dominance on the world stage. This policy is not new: recall the first decades of the Cold War, when the West began to actively use Islamists (in particular, the Muslim Brotherhood groups), who during World War II collaborated with the Nazis, in the fight against the Soviet Union and communism.

The debate over the role of the Arab states of the Persian Gulf is an integral part of the conflict of interests, which focuses on assessing the factors of the terrorist threat to Russia. E. Y. Satanovsky, ex-president of the Russian Jewish Congress, expressed solidarity with A. L. Vassoyevich.: "Russian terrorists, according to

3 For more information, see Naumkin, 2005, pp. 40-43.

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in their opinion, we have already won." This happened "in Afghanistan and during the first Chechen War." "In their opinion, it is not difficult for them to finish off Russia. Moreover, their cells operate throughout the territory of the Russian Federation" (cit. by: [Mikhailov, 2013]). The author in his numerous interviews accuses Saudi Arabia, Qatar and some other countries of supporting terrorism.

Writer and editor-in-chief of the Russian scientific and publishing center Ladomir Yu.A. Mikhailov categorically disagrees with these accusations, noting, in particular, important modernization processes in the kingdom: for example, in 2013, 30 thousand local citizens who graduated from Western universities returned to the kingdom. "These people returned to their own country to develop it, and it is known that the Saudis invest a lot of money in higher education" [Mikhailov, 2013]. Yu. A. Mikhailov qualifies the views professed by E. Ya. Satanovsky, A. L. Vassoyevich and their associates as a manifestation of Islamophobia. As for the governments of Russia and Saudi Arabia, they are actually developing cooperation in countering terrorism, which is sponsored by many non-governmental organizations in the Arab world, primarily Saudi ones.

As the debate about extremism, Salafism, or Wahhabism continues unabated in Russian society, accusations of belonging to these groups are often used as a weapon in the struggle for influence in the Russian Muslim Ummah, where dozens of muftiats vie for control over the parishes of believers.

Today, Russia is civilizationally united with the Islamic world not only by the fact that its indigenous population is more than 15 million people (with immigrants - more than 20 million), but also by its attitude to religion and its role in society. Terrorists and extremists who hide behind Islam and arbitrarily assume the exclusive right to interpret the Muslim faith, of course, cause great damage to the harmonious coexistence of religious communities in Russia. Perhaps the Muslim clergy could have done more to counter the extremist virus. However, manifestations of Islamophobia and attempts to portray Islam as a religion of intolerance and aggressiveness also harm interfaith harmony. One of the lessons of the 2014 Ukrainian crisis is that the threat of extremism to our societies does not necessarily come from Muslim communities. "Non-Islamic jihadists" threaten to destabilize the situation along with radical Islamists. Another lesson is that, unfortunately, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church as a whole, weakened by the schism, was unable to curb the wave of violence that swept through the confessional and ethnically closely related Russian republic. It is significant that after the change of power in Kiev, Vladyka Stefan from the "spiritual rada of Maidan" as one of the "authoritative protest organizations"was included in the so — called People's Trust Stake-the representative body of the Maidan. The current acute socio-political crisis in Ukraine, among other systemic causes, was caused by a deep identification rift within the country, and the need to make a choice in favor of Europe or Russia only served as a kind of trigger.

RELIGIOUS TRADITIONALISTS AND "RENOVATIONISTS"

We can agree that the watershed between the civilizations of the West and the Islamic world is the role of religion in society and the state and the attitude of people to this role. However, it should be borne in mind that, first of all, even in the bosom of Western civilization, there are countries with a fairly high level of religiosity, although with a secular system of statehood, such as the United States. And secondly, there were "tides" of atheistic thought in the Islamic world (especially in the 1920s, largely influenced by the October Revolution in Russia and the communist parties created in the East) and regimes built on secular principles appeared (Turkey

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under Atatürk and his followers, Tunis under Bourguiba). The Egyptian Ismail Mazhar (1891-1962) founded the Dar al-Usul publishing house in Cairo to promote atheism; he published in translation Charles Darwin's hated work " The Origin of Species "(see ['Abd Al-Rahim, 2005, p. 118-119]) and Bertrand Russell's equally alien book" Why I'm not a Christian "(Why I Am Not a Christian). Another active propagandist of atheism, who was educated at Moscow State University, Ismail Adham (1911-1940), created an association for this purpose, first in Turkey, then in Egypt. He drowned himself in the Mediterranean Sea, leaving a note asking for his body to be cremated and not buried in a Muslim cemetery.

From the late 1920s and into the 1930s, there was a renewed attraction to Islam, and atheist and secularist propaganda began to lose popularity. An Egyptian intellectual, graduate of the Sorbonne, Muhammad Hussein Heikal (1889-1956), who began by publishing a three-volume study on J.-J. Rousseau, now famous for his classic Life of Muhammad, published in 1935. An even sharper turn towards Islam in the same period was made by Abbas Mahmud al-Akkad (1889-1964), who began by singing the praises of English romantic poets, among whose students was perhaps the most famous preacher of radical Islamism, executed in Egypt during the reign of GA Nasser, Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), who began, like his father, with the same name. to the teacher, as a poet and literary critic. His writings (along with those of the Pakistani Abu al-Ala al-Mawdudi) are still one of the sources of inspiration for many modern jihadists.

In the works of modern Islamic thinkers, one can find a polemical discourse that is quite comparable to the Russian disputes between Westerners and soil scientists. Mahmoud Haidar, reviewing Taha Abd ar-Rahman's book on the spirit of "Islamic modernity" (Ruh al-Hadasah al-Islamiyyah), draws particular attention to the distinction he makes between the two categories of Islamic authors. First of all, they are" avant-gardists " who replace traditional Islamic concepts with modern Western ones: instead of the Shura - democracy, instead of the Ummah-the state, instead of usury - profit, etc. Secondly, it is their antipodes - "traditionalists" who reject the concepts transferred from the West in favor of traditional Islamic ones: not secularism ('ilmaniyya), but knowledge of the world (al -' ilm bi-d-dunya is an Arabic term that has a common root with the term secularism, but is derived from the dictum of the Prophet Muhammad: "You know more about your world" - "Antum a'lam bi-umur dunyakum"), not a religious war-al-Harb ad-diniyya, but a discovery (the Arabic term Fatah, which is used in reference to medieval Arab-Muslim conquests) [Haidar, 2012, p. 161 et seq.].

The ongoing controversy surrounding the compatibility of Islamic doctrinal norms with democratic values is well known. Islam and democracy - this topic is actively discussed at many conferences and symposia, at meetings of religious figures, experts and politicians. According to one point of view, the very formulation of the question of the possibility of combining the values of an Islamic civilization with democratic principles is fundamentally wrong, since this civilization is inherently democratic and does not need to borrow any values from other systems. Supporters of a different point of view accuse Islamic societies of authoritarianism, violation of human rights, lack of freedoms, etc. There are also supporters of the concept of convergence.

Here is an example of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Arab world was directly involved in its creation by a well - known Lebanese political figure at that time, Christian Charles Malik, who later, during the 1975-1990 civil war, was the "ideological mentor" of the Lebanese forces-the right-wing Christian militia [Allawi, 2009, p.189]. Only later did the Islamic world reject certain provisions of the Declaration, in particular:

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Article 18, which guarantees the freedom to choose and change one's faith, contradicts the basic provisions of Sharia law. As a result, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) developed the Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in opposition to the Universal Declaration, which was adopted at the OIC summit in Cairo in August 1990 (let me remind you that Russia has observer status in this structure, which is now called the Organization of Islamic Cooperation). It is not difficult to guess that in the Cairo Declaration there were no basic contradictions with the norms of Sharia, first of all, the provisions of article 18 of the Universal Declaration.

But how irreconcilable are the concepts of human rights in Sharia and in most countries of the world? Is it even possible today to talk about the absolute universality of any concept in this area? Is it possible, in particular, to assume that in the foreseeable future the modernization process in Islam will lead to the abandonment of the ban on the conversion of a Muslim to another faith?

MODERNIZATION AND CULTURAL CONVERGENCE

The success of the modernization project will largely depend on how relations between different cultures and civilizations will develop in the future. According to I. N. Peters [Pieterse, 2009, p. 44], we can talk about three globalization-cultural paradigms, or prospects for the development of these relations: cultural differentialism, or continuing differences; cultural convergence, or growing similarity; cultural hybridization, or constant mixing. The key here is the attitude to cultural and civilizational differences: whether globalization will lead to their erasure by absorbing one another, homogenizing (convergence), whether, on the contrary, they will be strengthened, perpetuated (differentialism, which is the basis of Samuel Huntington's theory of "clash of civilizations") or whether they will be mixed (hybridization). It should be noted that the discourse based on this concept of hybridization, known in the 19th century, was developed in the West in the literature devoted to the phenomenon of migration. This discourse is the antithesis of essentialism, "border fetishism" and "cultural differentialism of racist and nationalist doctrines" (Pieterse, 2009, p. 4). 55, 102], whose key concepts are ethnicity and identity. Hybridization in a certain sense can be interpreted as a potential loss of both. Fetishization of cross-cultural borders is contrasted with the thesis of their inevitable erosion. The key concepts characteristic of the hybridization concept are mixing and syncretism. Its proponents analyze such processes as" creolization"," mestizization", and" orientalization " of Western society. In this context, the Muslim East here serves as an agent of hybridization.

There have been many examples of hybridization in the history of the Islamic world and in the past. I recall one almost forgotten fact today. The Muslim Ottoman sultans did not mind when Europeans called their capital Constantinople in the old way, and they themselves used various names, including such a well-known one as "High Port", and the Arabs more often called the city by the name "al-Istana "(from the word that migrated from Persian to Old Ottoman language, meaning "Place of Power").. In Republican Turkey, it was not until 1930, with the adoption of the Postal Service Act of March 28, that everyone was required to refer to the capital exclusively as Istanbul. It seems to me that the actual preservation of the old name appealed to the desire of the Ottoman sultans to transfer the greatness of the imperial Byzantine capital to themselves, to show themselves as the heirs of its culture. Double identification here worked for the image of the state. It is significant that the word "istana" in Malay and Indonesian languages has acquired the meaning of "palace", and today they are called not only the residences of Malaysian sultans and the Indonesian president, but also the residences of the president and Prime Minister

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Singapore. The symbolic chain of names stretches from Byzantium to the name of the new capital of Kazakhstan.

To some extent, this approach can be likened to the new interpretation of the relationship between the Russian principalities and the Golden Horde, which is now being voiced by a number of prominent Russian historians, which emphasizes civilizational and cultural mutual influence, and not hostility. But can we speak in this context of a civilizational rapprochement, for example, between Arabs and Jews - carriers of two Abrahamic religions that are close in spirit?

ARABS AND JEWS: A BREAK OR A RAPPROCHEMENT?

Today, this possibility is clearly blocked by the unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict and the continuation of the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories. The Palestinians, losing faith in the possibility of creating their own State, are increasingly turning to the idea of creating a single democratic Arab-Jewish state. However, they realize that there is no alternative to the two-state concept, and talk of a single state is doomed to remain talk.

At the same time, this concept is gaining support from a number of individual Western critics of Israel, who are becoming more numerous, including among the US Jewish community. Even the critical reaction of Western leaders to the harsh statement of Turkish Prime Minister R. T. Erdogan, who compared Zionism with fascism, although not long in coming, was still relatively mild. On the contrary, it was after that that B. Obama forced B. Netanyahu to apologize for the attack on the Turkish flotilla heading to Gaza, which killed 9 Turkish citizens.

My attention was drawn to an article published in the New York Times by Joseph Levine, a professor of philosophy at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. The author questions the usual interpretation of the denial of Israel's right to exist as a manifestation of anti-Semitism. He writes: "My point is that it is necessary to question Israel's right to exist and that to do so does not mean to be anti-Semitic." But he adds:"...if we are talking about its existence as a Jewish state "[Levine, 2013]. According to Levin, the right of Jews to live in the land of their ancestors should be recognized unconditionally, but it does not entail the right to a "Jewish state". By the way, in the 18th and 19th centuries, when Jews fought for emancipation by breaking down the ghetto walls, they considered any denial of their right to be loyal citizens of the European state in which they lived anti-Semitic. Levin urges not to replace the concept of the people in the civil sense with a concept based on ethnicity (which is similar to the discussions that are taking place in Russia today about the "Russian nation"). The people in the ethnic sense, emphasizes J. R. R. Tolkien. Levin, must have a common language, culture, history, and attachment to a common territory, which makes the applicability of this concept to Jews difficult. The people in the civil sense are united by common citizenship and residence in a territory with defined borders. However, 20% of Israel's residents are non-Jews, and most of the world's Jews do not live in Israel. In the civil sense, one should speak of an "Israeli state" rather than a Jewish one.

I will not cite all the arguments of J. R. R. Tolkien that are unusual for Western discourse and irritating in Israel. Levin on this topic. I will only mention his conclusion that excluding non-Jewish citizens (mostly Palestinians) from full membership in Israel violates the democratic principle of equality of all its citizens. The researcher speaks of "an inevitable conflict between the concepts of the Jewish state and the democratic state." Recently, there has been an outcry in Israel about the exclusion of ultra-Orthodox parties from the ruling coalition, but no one there notices that no Arab party has ever been excluded from the ruling coalition.

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I wasn't invited to join the government. I note that the authors of such statements in Israel are usually branded as self-hating Jews, i.e. "self-hating Jews". These include such well-known personalities as George Soros, Woody Allen, Uri Avneri, Sandy Berger, and others who criticize Israel for certain aspects of its policies [Corrigan, 2009, p. 6]. This is a manifestation of the same identity crisis, as well as the "encirclement mentality" characteristic of the Israeli ruling circles, which is noted by many authors (see, for example: [Siniver, 2012, p. 37]).

One cannot but agree with researchers who note the typological similarity of the positions of Palestinian Arabs living in Israel and Mizrahim Jews who came from the Middle East and North Africa. Both consider themselves to be "victims of Ashkenazi Zionism" and are discriminated against, which makes them marginalised, albeit in different ways. As Atalia Omer concludes, if Palestinian Arabs base their protest on the human rights paradigm, "Mizrahim's argument raises the systematic inequality characteristic of the Israeli 'state' to its exclusive ethno-Republican understanding of 'nation' "[Omer, 2013, p.268].

HISTORICAL MEMORY FUNCTION

The identity crisis is closely linked to historical memory. In some nations it is strong, in others it is weak. The second category includes not only the so-called new nations. There are considerable differences in this respect between nations with a long history. For example, among the peoples of the Middle East, historical memory is so strong that it has a powerful impact on the mentality, on the attitude to other peoples and to life in general. We can also mention a kind of" genealogical memory", which has a different length depending on ethnicity. It is enough to ask a statistical Russian and Arab youth how many generations of their ancestors they know. You can be sure that the Arab knows much more. Certain historical facts become sacred for some nations (the Holocaust for Jews, the Armenian Genocide). Especially bitter is the memory of defeats in wars. For Arabs, the memory of defeats in several wars by Israel is unbearable, it creates an inferiority complex, which requires a sense of dignity and even superiority in something else.

Religion gives not only comfort, but also hope, and in combination with the idea of being chosen, this very feeling of dignity and superiority. As the well-known Lebanese intellectual Amin Maaluf writes, "Islam is a haven for both ethnicity and dignity" (Maaluf, 2012, p.200). Since Arab societies were constantly lagging behind other countries (except in some cases), their armies were defeated after defeat, their territories were occupied, and their people were humiliated, "the religion they gave to the world became the last refuge for self-respect" (Maaluf, 2012, p. 201). There is no doubt that these circumstances to some extent gave rise to the "Arab Spring" and rampant violence in the escalated inter - and intra-religious and inter-ethnic clashes in the Middle East. Before our eyes, the Middle East gangrene is spreading beyond the region, including in the northern direction.

Let me once again turn to A. Maalouf, who also mentions "cultural (civilizational) dignity", which is directly related to the desire of any ethnic group to preserve its language and religion (while noting that religion is exclusive, language is not). The author introduces the concept of "globalized communitarianism", which is one of the most harmful consequences of globalization, when a sharp increase in the role of religious affiliation is combined with the unification of people into "global tribes" through all-pervading flows of information exchanges. This is especially noticeable in the Islamic world, where "an unprecedented wave of communitarian (communal) particularism, which is finding its brightest expression in the world, is taking place."

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the expression in the bloody conflict between Sunnis and Shiites "(I will add: and between different trends in Sunnism), rises along with"internationalism". The latter means that "an Algerian voluntarily goes to fight and die in Afghanistan, a Tunisian in Bosnia, an Egyptian in Pakistan, a Jordanian in Chechnya, an Indonesian in Somalia" (Maaluf, 2012, p.208-210). The only thing I disagree with the author about is that it doesn't always happen voluntarily.

The transmission of historical memory, including beyond the borders of an ethnic group, which has a direct impact on politics and sometimes causes violent political conflicts, is facilitated by modern powerful information flows. It is not by chance that researchers of various specialties turn again and again to the theory of "six degrees of separation"4, which, despite all its naivety, looks in general like a fulfilled prediction.

Memory extends to events that are very far removed from us in time, especially if the ethnic groups that participated in them are still preserved in our time, having certain relationships with other participants in those events. It is enough to mention in this context the Battle of Kulikovo for the Russians and Tatars, the Battle of Kosovo Pole for the Serbs, etc.

All this is directly related to the formation of ethnic groups ' idea of themselves, what is called self-image in English. I would like to note that in our literature they often speak about the "image of the Other", which has already become a kind of cliche, and the concept of the above-mentioned "self-image", or "self-image", as a rule, remains outside the framework of scientific discourse, is taken for granted.

I cannot but agree with Lamont D. King, who pointed out that a nation is also a type of ethnic group. But "if an ethnic group is defined by others (other-defined), the nation defines itself (self-defined)" [King, 2002, p. 359]. People who belong to a certain ethnic group by other people can't get away with it, even if they want to, but it is possible to give up belonging to a nation. Moreover, a nation "also differs from a more general (generic) ethnic group in its desire to control the state." Historical memory is instrumental here, its function is to maintain national solidarity and cohesion.

myths and symbols

Elements of historical memory are almost always mythologized. To understand this phenomenon, it is useful to refer to the tools of the theory of symbolic choice (TSV), whose central idea for understanding ethnicity is the idea of the myth-symbol complex. According to Murray Edelman, a myth is "a belief shared by a large group of people that gives events and actions a certain meaning" (Edelman, 1971, p. 14). With this understanding, it does not matter whether an event that performs the function of a myth actually took place or was fictitious or constructed. The symbol, in turn, is understood as an " emotionally charged reference to a myth." Stuart Kaufman, one of the authors who work in the genre of TSV and have made a significant contribution to its application to the study of specific ethnic conflicts, including in the post-Soviet space, writes that the "myth-symbol complex" is a "network of myths and related symbols" (Kaufman, 2001, p. 16). (The myth-symbol complex is considered in one of the works of Anthony Smith; the role of symbols is considered in the work of Zdislav Mach.) In other words, people make political choices not so much out of calculation as out of emotion and in response to the symbols that are offered to them.

4 This theory (translated into English - six degrees of separation) was that any two people in the world can be connected to each other through a maximum of six steps in the chain. It was first described in the short story "Chains" (Láncszcmck) by the Hungarian writer Frigycs Karinthy (1887-1938), and its famous popularizer was the American playwright John Guarc (born in 1938).

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According to Donald Horowitz [Horowitz, 1985], emotions, such as fear of the group's disappearance, are the direct drivers of ethnic violence, and Crawford Young focuses on the important role of stereotypes (myths) and symbols in maintaining identity and promoting group mobilization [Young, 1976; Young, 1993]. Thus, the paradigm of the emergence of ethnic conflict, which, in line with the theory of symbolic politics, is proposed by the authors of the article. According to Young and D. Horowitz, fear of the destruction of a group (or the destruction of its identity) leads to feelings of hostility, and then to group violence. According to Young, the atmosphere of hostility and threats increases group solidarity and encourages people to view events in ethnic terms.

Within the framework of this theoretical discourse, the concept of identity occupies a prominent place, while it actually acts as a factor of world politics (it is no coincidence that since the 1990s this concept has also been developed by the science of international relations). Once again, the paradigm of religious-based conflict can also be considered in the context of symbolic politics. In any case, the fear of the disappearance of the Islamic civilizational and cultural identity and, consequently, the loss of positions of socio-political groups that base their legitimacy on it can also obviously generate aggressive hostility and violence. Let us recall the harsh reaction of a part of the population of the Islamic world to the publication of insulting cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad in a Danish newspaper.

Through the "myth-symbol" complex - by inciting hostility based on various kinds of constructed historical and historical-religious myths - the weakness of identity and the difficulties of implementing a mobilization policy can be overcome. Such myths, in turn, are based on the interpretation of politics in ethnic terms. Similarly, mythologizing, for example, the events of the first centuries of Islam through symbols can lead to viewing events, including modern ones, in religious terms. We are not talking about the fact that some events did not happen or they were not as they are interpreted today, but that they are given a certain symbolic meaning that encourages political action. At the same time, let's not forget that ethnicity and religion are so closely linked that ethnic mobilization can appeal to religious motivations, and vice versa. Saddam Hussein referred to his war against Iran as "his Qadisiyah", drawing an analogy with the battle in which, in 636, he was killed. the Arabs prevailed over the Persians, who later converted to Islam: here ethnic and religious motives are combined, although the Iran-Iraq war of the XX century was already fought between co-religionists. The" myth—symbol " of Qadisiya, however, did not work, and it was not possible to attract the Arab population of Iran to the side of Iraq.

A vivid example of the use of religious mythologization is the mobilization of suicide bombers by modern network transnational structures of "global jihadism", which are fighting for the creation of a "world caliphate". A more detailed discussion of this phenomenon is not part of the purpose of this article, but I will limit myself to reminding you that the use of suicide bombers to commit terrorist attacks for political purposes on the basis of religious and ethnic "myth-symbolic" mobilization is known in one way or another to all faiths and many ethnic groups.5
5 I will give one example - Japanese kamikaze pilots. Among the few survivors was a Samurai pilot named Nakagawa, who miraculously survived and, in accordance with the samurai code of honor, committed hara-kiri to avoid capture. A nearby Soviet surgeon managed to sew up his wound, but the Japanese man survived and still lives in Kalmykia. Even today, the old man categorically refuses to return to Japan, explaining this to guests (including Japanese diplomats) by the fact that he has long been Russified and has no one left in his homeland. However, in reality, he believes that by not being able to die with dignity for the motherland and the emperor, he lost his honor and lost the right to return home.

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Henry Tudor believes that "myth in its modern sense is a collective project of a social group" [Tudor, 1972, p. 127], and Tirzah Hechter of Bar Ilan University in Israel argues that although the Holocaust was a "tragic historical event", it also played a "constructive role" [Hechter, 2003, p. 440], which served as a means of "universal legitimization of the founding of the state of Israel" [Hechter, ibid.]. Charles Liebman explains that "the myth of the Holocaust" (again, I remind you: not in the sense that it did not exist, but on the contrary, that it was the most tragic and traumatic event in the history of Israel). history of the Jews) speaks of "a collective attempt to find meaning in the deaths of six million people" (Liebman, 1993), op.cit. according to [Hechter, ibid.]. This collective project has served as a powerful tool for national mobilization. It is significant that Israeli scholars do not have a taboo to discuss the symbolic role of the Holocaust. The collective project of the genocide in the Ottoman Empire, an equally traumatic and tragic event, serves a similar function for Armenians.

CRISIS OF NATION-STATES

The identity crisis discussed above is inextricably linked to the shattered stability of the modern system of nation-states. In recent decades, a number of such states have collapsed in various regions of the world (the USSR, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Sudan), and new ones have been formed. The phenomenon of the" Arab Spring " has led some experts and politicians to talk about a crisis in the post-colonial configuration of the Middle East [Ayad, 2013] or the end of the Sykes-Picot system created after the First World War. Historians can tell you how randomly and in what a hurry the offices of the French and British colonialists drew the borders between the parts of the Arab vilayets conquered from the Ottoman Empire. At some international conferences, the topic "the end of Sykes-Picot" has become the title of sections (for example, at the highly respected Istanbul Forum in 2013).

At the same forum a year earlier, a well-known Turkish author, speaking about the reasons for the "Arab Spring", mentioned as one of these reasons that the Arab countries allegedly did not know their national statehood, but were created "from the fragments of the Ottoman Empire." In this statement, he ignored the fact that, for example, the extended Egyptian statehood, despite periods of foreign domination, has, unlike Turkey, several millennia. Of course, this statement is based on the neo-Ottoman discourse that is popular in Turkey today, which, in turn, also indicates that the post-Imperial national statehood of Turkey is not yet fully rooted in the minds of Turks. I think that Ankara's policy towards the Syrian crisis was partly dictated by the fact that part of the Turkish political elite is inclined to consider Syria as the aforementioned "fragment" or, at least, one of the components of the "strategic depth", according to A. Davutoglu6.

The French author, former Ambassador Jean-Pierre Filiu, believes that the system of postcolonial borders and the state entities outlined by them has outlived its usefulness [Filiu, 2011]. In the countries of the Middle East, such a discourse is not less common. Iranian researchers Seyed Abdoulali Ghavam and Mohammad Gheisari argue that the very concept of nation-state, like the ideology of nationalism, was imported to the Middle East from the West [Ghava, Gheisari, 2013, p. 11-36]. And research-

6 In 2001, the current Turkish Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, published the book "Strategic Depth", which was later translated into several languages, in which he, inter alia, argued that Turkey is capable of playing a global role, since it has a strategic presence simultaneously in the Middle East, Central Asia, the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Caspian and the Mediterranean regions.

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Phanar Haddad, a professor at Sinapur National University, even speaks of "a century of failed nation-building" (Haddad, 2013).

Of course, other points of view are widely spread in the scientific literature. The well-known author of the concept of the capitalist world system, Immanuel Wallerstein, states: "There is nothing new in what is now commonly called globalization, and there is no evidence that the world economy is more 'globalized' today than in earlier periods" (Wallerstein, 2001). In the polemic of two economic geographers, Dani Rodrik and John Agnew, the former, despite some nuances, can be ranked among the supporters of "nation-state" concepts, the latter-among the advocates of hyperglobalization. D. Rodrik proves the stability of the nation-state, since, in particular, the world needs it: "... without it, we will lose what we need. It was the main tool for organizing, directing, and limiting the power of markets" (cit. according to [Agnew, 2012, p. 22]). J. Agnew sarcastically notes that the search for the revival of the nation-state is similar to the "waiting for Godot"7. One of his arguments is noteworthy: "The territories of states have always been far from safe. In most places, not only do the borders of nations not coincide at all with the state borders, but the borders of most States have been penetrated for a long time by stronger states, which often manage to repel attempts to subject them to local regulation" (cit. by: [Agnew, 2009]). In his turn, D. Rodrik points out that most of the economic failures are caused not by the inefficiency of global institutions, which his opponent says are omnipotent, but by the fact that nation-states fail to pursue policies that meet their interests [Rodrik, 2012].

By the way, it is precisely the discrepancy between the borders of nations and states that is, if not one of the natural factors of conflict, then, in any case, its background, in which the main conflict-causing function is performed by ethnopolitical fragmentation, a complex composition of the population. The Ukrainian tragedy that occurred in the year of the centenary of the First World War is a vivid confirmation of this. It is no accident that the thesis of the need to federalize the state structure of Ukraine has become an imperative. Analogies with the Syrian crisis, despite situational and civilizational differences, do not look out of place in this case.

I believe that supporters of both polar points of view on nation-states in the modern world could come to a consensus, recognizing that this model is somehow undergoing evolution. The turbulent transformation processes that have engulfed the modern world political system will inevitably correct any generalizations made by researchers. The question of the fate of nation-States is linked to the question of national sovereignty. Consideration of this issue, which causes even more fierce disputes due to its politicization, also lies outside the scope of this article, but in connection with its main topic, it makes sense to give a classification made by the American author Philip Bobbitt.

Summing up the existing views, he speaks about three concepts of sovereignty in the community of states. The first is the traditional concept of "opaque" sovereignty, in which everything that happens within the borders of states is completely their internal affair, regardless of the judgments of others (for example, States that profess this point of view, China and Israel). The second is the concept of "translucent" sovereignty, developed on the basis of European integration and ideas about human rights, in which international agencies, primarily the UN Security Council, can declare that a particular state violates basic international norms and infringe on its sovereignty. An example of supporters of this point of view is France and Germany. The third concept of "transparent"

7 Based on the famous play by Samuel Bskkst.

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(transparent) sovereignty, based on the assumption that sovereignty is based on a compact contract between the state and the people, so if a state uses violence against its own citizens, illegally produces weapons of mass destruction, or supports international terrorists, its borders can be invaded [Bobbitt, 2009, p. 469-470]. The author sees the United States as the bearer of such an understanding of sovereignty. In fact, the United States often only uses the norms laid down in its historically formed idea of sovereignty for unprovoked direct interference in the internal affairs of independent states for its own geopolitical purposes. You don't need to go far for examples.

NATIONALISM AND THE STATE

The purpose of this article is not to consider the relationship between the state and the nation. However, when talking about the crisis of nation-states, it is worth at least briefly touching on this issue. J. Plano and R. Olten emphasize the territory factor in the definition of the state, it is "a legal concept describing a social group that occupies a certain territory and is organized within common political institutions and effective government" [Piano, Olten, 1988, p. 227]. A nation is seen as "a social group united by a common ideology, common institutions, customs, and a sense of homogeneity" (Piano and Olten, 1988, p. 33). This and similar explanations are contrasted, for example, by R. Lowie's understanding of the state as a "universal feature of human culture" (Lowie, 1961) (cit. by: [King, 2002, p. 358]). This interpretation is not widely supported by researchers today, just as the concept of ethnic groups as cultural units has given way to the current prevailing understanding of ethnicity as a social organization.

In the words of the already mentioned I. N. Peters, only the era from 1840 to 1960 was the era of nations, and " the dark side of nation-building was marginalization, exile, expropriation, oppression of foreigners, as well as the policy of national cleansing. Turkey (Armenians and others), Germany (Jews), Uganda (Indians), Nigeria (Ghanaians), Bulgaria (ethnic Turks), India (Muslims) are familiar examples... but these are just the tip of the iceberg" [Pieterse, 2009, pp. 34-35]. In recent decades, the "pathos of nation-states" has somewhat diminished, and it is being replaced by globalization, regionalism and the era of ethnicity. The role of diasporas becomes universally recognized, national identities are seen as mixed, and the preservation of cultural diversity becomes a universally recognized imperative.

Nevertheless, it is precisely the attitude towards immigrants that has become one of the dividing lines between supporters of various models of Russian development, but here soil scientists and Westerners often unite in an effort to limit the influx of "strangers" to Russia. And this is despite the fact that we are talking about former compatriots from the Soviet Union, who also come here to work. In general, any restrictions on the movement of people represent a resistance to globalization, in which of the three flows of free global circulation (capital and goods; information; people), only the first two can be stopped by no one (economic and cultural protectionism in general does not succeed). However, even with these two streams, not everything is clear.

It is appropriate to mention Dani Rodrik's thesis about the" trilemma " of the incompatibility of globalization, democracy and national self-determination in the third ep, based on the fact that the former is essentially global, the latter is the lot of states, and self-determination is national by definition [Rodrik, 2011].

Back in the 19th century. Ernest Renan described the nation as a "daily plebiscite" (Renan, 1882). The French philosopher undoubtedly meant that the unity and cohesion of the nation were ensured only in so far as belonging to the state of the state was guaranteed.-

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the people in this community believed that. If this belief is not present, the heterogeneity increases, the level of internal conflict increases, which can spill out into violence.

THE "UNIVERSALITY" OF VIOLENCE

In connection with the frequently discussed topic of the high level of violence in the convulsions of the "Arab Spring" that are directly related to the problems of inter - and intra-confessional, interethnic relations, identity choice and the fate of nation-states, I note that there are many examples of bitterness outside the Arab and Islamic world. American author Christopher Hitchens writes with some sarcasm that he cannot deny the Dalai Lama "some charm and attractiveness", but the same can be said about the English queen, which, however, does not prohibit anyone from criticizing the principle of hereditary monarchy. "In the same way, the first foreign visitors to Tibet were frankly horrified by the feudal subjugation and terrible punishments used to keep the population in a state of slavery to the parasitic monastic elite" (Hitchens, 2009, p.200). The author draws attention to the fact that among the adherents of such seemingly peaceful religions as Hinduism and Buddhism, there are many murderers and sadists. Such facts are widely known. The island of Ceylon has been badly damaged by violence and repression during the long-running armed conflict between Buddhists and Hindus. Hitchens. Even the replacement of the island's name by Sinhalese Buddhists with Sri Lanka (Sinhalese for "Sacred Island"). It alienated the minority of Tamil Hindus who prefer to call it Ilam in their own way [Hitchens, 2009, p. 199]. At the same time, discrimination against Tamils is in no way an excuse for the widespread use of suicide attacks or suicide bombings (they were trained by the rebel movement Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam).

In today's Burma, renamed Myanmar (or Myanmar), despite the beginning of the process of democratization, the Rohingya Muslim minority (up to 800 thousand people) is subjected to severe persecution, as a result of which the authorities of this country and its Buddhist community (especially Arakans living side by side with Muslims) have become the object of irreconcilable hatred. critics from virtually the entire Islamic world, including calls for jihad by certain radical groups. In today's Africa, some adherents of Christian sects are responsible for the brutal murder of Muslims.

* * *

All this makes it even more urgent to call for respect for the civilizational identity, cultural diversity and national sovereignty of independent states, some of which are experiencing a crisis of statehood under the pressure of the challenges of hyperglobalization and the need for identification choice. Inter-civilizational dialogue is an indisputably important tool for preventing the hostility of ethnic and religious groups, nations and States of the era of hyperglobalization generated by this crisis from escalating into bloody wars.

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