To the 60th anniversary of Great October.
The outstanding role of the Baltic Fleet in the preparation and conduct of the Great October Socialist Revolution was covered both in general works and in more detail in a number of special studies. 1 . These works contain extensive factual material describing the versatile work of the Bolshevik Party in the navy, the practical activities of the navy's revolutionary organizations to mobilize its forces for participation in the October armed Uprising, and the place and role of the navy and sailors in securing and consolidating its victory. However, they do not contain a generalized picture of V. I. Lenin's relations with the Baltic Fleet in the autumn of 1917, his acquaintance with the situation in the fleet and the capabilities of its revolutionary forces, the analysis of events that took place in the fleet for a number of very significant conclusions and conclusions that were important for assessing the military and political situation armed insurrection and the tasks of the fleet in it. In this article, the author tries, relying on some well-known, but not systematized or generalized, as well as on some new materials, to examine the revolutionary processes and phenomena that took place in the fleet on the eve of October, to show a deep analysis of them by Lenin in determining the role of the fleet in the uprising, its direct leadership activities in mobilization and use of the fleet forces for active participation in the October armed Uprising. To this end, attention will be focused on those facts, phenomena and events that took place in the navy, which allowed Lenin to draw appropriate conclusions and conclusions, develop concrete proposals and recommendations in describing the political and military circumstances of October Eve, determining the place and practical tasks of the fleet in the uprising.
By the autumn of 1917, the revolutionary potential of the Baltic Fleet, its growing Bolshevization, which was the result of the successful struggle of the party for the army and navy, and the daily concern of the Central Committee of the Party to strengthen the naval Bolshevik organizations, and to expand their activities among the masses, were clearly revealed. When the political situation in the country sharply worsened and the violent overthrow of the power of the bourgeoisie and the landlords became a practical task for the party, the importance of the navy increased even more, and the attention of Lenin and the Central Committee of the party to the navy, its condition and revolutionary possibilities increased.
1 P. Z. Sivkov. Sailors of the Baltic Fleet in the struggle for Soviet Power in 1917, Moscow, 1946; A.V. Bogdanov. Baltic sailors in 1917, Moscow, 1955; N. F. Izmailov, A. S. Pukhov. Centrobalt, Moscow, 1963; V. V. Petrash. Sailors of the Baltic Fleet in the fight for the Victory of October, Moscow, L. 1966; S. S. Khesin. The October Revolution and the Fleet, Moscow, 1971, et al.
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This was largely due to the fact that, as Lenin wrote, the victory of the revolution "requires the strength of the revolutionary classes willing and able to fight, and a force that would crush the hostile force at the decisive moment and in the decisive place."2 One of these forces, which was in a crucial place, was the Baltic Fleet.
Hiding in August-September 1917 in Finland, where the main forces of the Baltic Fleet were stationed, Lenin closely followed the development of revolutionary events in the fleet, maintaining close, albeit secret, ties with the leading employees of the Helsingfors Bolshevik organization, which worked among the sailors, and regularly read newspapers published in the naval bases. 3 Matros N. A. Khovrin, a member of the Helsingfors Committee of the RSDLP(b) and the Central Baltic, recalled: "Neither on the ships, nor in the Central Baltic even suspected that Vladimir Ilyich Lenin is very close, lives in one of the city houses. But some leaders of the Helsingfors Committee of the Bolsheviks, of course, knew about this. Already after the October Revolution, Boris Zhemchuzhin said that he visited Vladimir Ilyich more than once in a safe house, reported to him about the state of affairs in the navy. Lenin asked him for a long time about the mood of the sailors, about the balance of power in the Helsingfors Soviet and the Central Baltic, about the opportunities available to the Baltics in the upcoming battles for the revolution. " 4
While in Helsingfors, Lenin most frequently met with I. T. Smilga, who was sent by the decision of the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b) to direct the work of Russian Bolshevik organizations in Finland - in the garrisons located there and in the Baltic Fleet .5 At these meetings, Lenin, as G. S. Rovno wrote, asked Smilga "about the mood of the sailors of the garrison, about the newspaper, printing house, and so on." 6 V. A. Antonov-Ovseenko, an active member of the Bolshevik organizations in the Baltic, also noted that Lenin "communicated with us in Finland from underground mainly through Smilga, the chairman of the Finnish Regional Committee."7 This was confirmed by Smilga himself. He was remembering: "At that time, I often met with Vladimir Ilyich, talked with him about the current situation and received instructions from him not only for work in Finland, but also for the entire Central Committee." 8 After moving from Helsingfors to Vyborg, Lenin continued to take a keen interest in the situation in the navy. So, at the end of September, in one of his letters to G. S. Rovno, he asks to send him a set of the newspaper of the Helsingfors Bolsheviks "Surf", in which materials about the fleet occupied a large place .9
Being well aware of the situation of the fleet, its moods and capabilities, Lenin, when developing a concrete plan for an armed insurrection, gave a prominent place to the fleet, determining its tasks, and using naval forces in the upcoming struggle. It was no accident that one of Lenin's most important documents, which set out a number of considerations for the preparation of the insurrection and assessed the political and military possibilities of its victory, was addressed to the chairman of the Regional Committee of the Army, Navy and Workers of Finland, a member of the Central Committee of the par-
2 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 34, p. 124.
3 " Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. Biographical Chronicle", vol. 4, Moscow, 1973, pp. 335-336 (hereinafter - " V. I. Lenin. Biochronics").
4 N. A. Khovrin. The Baltics are going to storm. M. 1966, p. 162.
5 "Minutes of the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b). August 1917-February 1918", Moscow, 1958, p. 13, 251; " V. I. Lenin. Biochronics", Vol. 4, p. 336.
6 "Lenin in October". Memoirs, Moscow, 1957, pp. 265-266.
7 "The October Armed Uprising in Petrograd". Collection of Memoirs, L. 1956, p. 100.
8 p. Golub. Partiya, armiya, revolyutsiya [Party, Army, Revolution], Moscow, 1967, p. 209.
9 See V. I. " Lenin. PSS. Vol. 49, p. 452.
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tii Smilge 10 . Lenin took into account that by that time (late September 1917) this committee had become the de facto authority in the Russian army and navy units located in Finland. He had no doubt that his letter to Smilga would inform the members of the Central Committee that the thoughts and suggestions expressed by him to Smilga would quickly become known to the Bolshevik active of the fleet and would be implemented. Lenin attached great importance to this letter and was concerned about its timely delivery to the addressee. At the same time, he sends a note to Exactly, in which he asks the latter to " send the attached letter to Smilga (only in person, not by mail)", and a few days later asks Exactly: "Did you receive my letter with the attachment of the letter to Smilga? and did they give him the letter?", - adding that he was worried about Smilga receiving the letter and was waiting for a response from him 11 .
After returning to Petrograd at the beginning of October, Lenin, remaining deep underground, takes direct leadership of the preparation of the uprising into his own hands. During these busy days, he continues to pay great attention to the navy and the mobilization of its forces for participation in the uprising. During his repeated meetings with the leading workers of the party and its military organization, Lenin always kept the fleet in his field of vision and consulted with representatives of the naval organizations when discussing the preparations for the insurrection. Thus, Antonov-Ovseenko, the head of the Helsingfors Bolsheviks, and P. E. Dybenko, the chairman of the Central Bank, participated in one of these meetings, which took place on October 14 in the apartment of Yalava. 12 At Lenin's suggestion, V. I. Nevsky was urgently sent to Helsingfors "to establish contact with the local military forces." 13 On the night of October 20-21, Lenin met at the apartment of the worker D. A. Pavlov with the leaders of the Military Organization attached to the Central Committee of the RSDLP(b), discussed with them the course of preparations for the uprising in Petrograd, paying special attention to military issues. Among them, the use of the fleet forces in the uprising took one of the central places .14 After this meeting, the military preparations for the uprising intensified dramatically. "On the same night," wrote N. I. Podvoisky, " all the assets of the Military Organization were brought to their feet. As one, they immediately set about carrying out Comrade Lenin's instructions. We started with the fleet's combat readiness." In the following days, Lenin continued to pay great attention to the fleet. According to Podvoysky, he received numerous notes from Lenin at that time, in which he demanded detailed information about the course of preparation for the uprising, including how the matter was handled "in naval crews and on warships." 15
In developing and refining the plan for the October Uprising, and carefully considering the possible vicissitudes of the struggle, Lenin invariably defined the tasks of the fleet in all his works devoted to this question .16 But his connections with the navy were not one-sided: Lenin was not only well informed about the situation in the navy, but also the revolutionary asset of the fleet, and through him the broad masses of sailors, knew Lenin's main conclusions on the preparation and conduct of the October Uprising, his main works describing the situation in the country-
10 See V. I. Lenin, PSS. Vol. 34, pp. 264-268.
11 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 49, pp. 451-452.
12 " V. I. Lenin. Biochronika", vol. 4, p. 386; "Krasnaya letopis", 1934, N 1 (58), p. 93.
13 "On the days of October". Collection of Memoirs, Moscow, 1957, p. 30.
14 " V. I. Lenin. Biochronika", vol. 4, pp. 396-397; V. Antonov-Ovseenko, In revolyutsii, Moscow, 1957, pp. 132-134; N. I. Podvoisky. Year 1917. Moscow, 1958, pp. 96-104.
15 N. I. Podvoisky. Op. ed., pp. 105, 113.
16 See V. I. Lenin. PSS, Vol. 34. p. 264 - 268, 278, 281 - 282, 341, 348 - 350, 382 - 384, 386, 389, 390 etc.
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not, and acted in the spirit of Lenin's installations. In September-October 1917 alone, no less than 12 Lenin's works were published in the pages of the navy's Bolshevik newspapers , 17 written in those days, and the general direction of Bolshevik publications in the navy fully corresponded to the party's political line. It is not by chance that on October 12, the Minister of the Navy, D. N. Verderevsky, asked the Provisional Government to increase allocations for the production of anti-Bolshevik publications in the navy, arguing that "there was an urgent need to counteract the extreme trends of literature distributed among sailors." 18
Lenin's specific instructions on the preparation of the uprising were well known to the Bolshevik active members of the fleet. Its representatives participated in a number of party meetings and meetings that took place in September-October 1917, discussed Lenin's letters, proposals and outlined ways to solve the tasks set out in them. Senior officials of the Bolshevik organizations of the naval bases participated in the party conference during the days of the Democratic Conference, in the plenums of the St. Petersburg Committee of the RSDLP (b), and others. Representatives of the Kronstadt and Helsingfors Bolshevik organizations V. A. Antonov-Ovseenko, B. A. Breslav , L. N. Stal, and I. P. Flerovsky participated in the third conference of Petrograd Bolsheviks held in early October to discuss Lenin's letter to the conference delegates. 20 Following Lenin's suggestion in his letter, the conference decided to send representatives to agitate for the necessity of an insurrection to overthrow the Provisional Government in a number of locations near Petrograd, including the largest naval bases: Helsingfors, Kronstadt, and Reval .21
Of great importance for the preparation of the uprising and the implementation of Lenin's instructions was the Northern Regional Congress of Soviets, at which the representation of the fleet and its bases was very broad. Lenin wrote a special letter to the Bolshevik delegates to the Congress, asking them a number of crucial questions about the political and practical preparation of the uprising. On the morning of October 11, Lenin's letter was discussed by the Bolshevik group of Congress 22. At the same meeting of the faction, Dybenko made a "detailed report" on the situation in the Baltic Fleet .23 In addition, representatives of the fleet and the Soviets of naval bases spoke in support of the Leninist line at the congress: V. A. Antonov-Ovseenko, A. L. Sheinman, P. I. Shishko, I. V. Rabchinsky, I. M. Sherstobitov, B. A. Breslav, S. D. Kudinsky and P. E. Dybenko .24 The latter concluded his speech by stating that "the Navy expresses its distrust of the Provisional Government and demands that power be transferred to the Soviets." 25
Taking into account such a resolute position of the sailors, when considering the preparation of the uprising, the party activists invariably paid attention to analyzing the situation in the fleet and the possibilities of its participation in the uprising. At the same time, some party officials expressed certain hesitations and doubts about the effective participation of the fleet in the uprising. So, on October 5, at a meeting of the St. Petersburg Party Committee
17 See " V. I. Lenin. Biochronics", Vol. 4, p. 340, 344, 352, 354, 364, 372, 374, 380, 382 393 395
18 TSGAVMF USSR, f. 410, op. 4, d. 135, l. 144.
19 See V. I. Lenin, PSS. Vol. 34, pp. 347-350.
20 "The second and Third Petrograd Citywide Conferences of the Bolsheviks in July and October 1917", Moscow, l. 1927, pp. 128-129.
21 "The Bolsheviks of Petrograd in 1917". Chronicle of Events, L. 1957, pp. 601-602.
22 " V. I. Lenin. Biochronics", vol. 4, p. 383.
23 B. A. Breslav. October Eve, 1917, Moscow, 1934, pp. 22-23.
24 V. V. Petrash. Op. ed., p. 239.
25 "Rabochy put", 13. X. 1917.
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During the discussion of Lenin's letter to the Central Committee, MK, PC and members of the Soviets of Petrograd and Moscow-the Bolsheviks, a special report by I. A. Rakhya was heard about the situation in Finland and in the navy. During the debate, V. Volodarsky said that " the fleet cannot support us, we cannot count on the fleet." He was supported by M. M. Lashevich, who believed that in connection with the Battle of Moonsund, "our fighting force left the fleet." But they were sharply opposed by other members of the Central Committee. M. M. Kharitonov said that " the sailors... they will take power here together with us." M. I. Latsis believed that " now the moment is more convenient for taking power than when our Bolshevik fleet will be destroyed." Rakhya, Smilga, and other participants in the 26th session indicated that the fleet was ready for an uprising . At an enlarged meeting of the Central Committee of the party on October 16, which discussed the question of an uprising, some speakers again questioned the readiness of the fleet for an uprising. G. I. Bokiy, for example, stated that "the mood in Kronstadt has fallen and in the combat sense the garrison there is no good"27 . Such statements were echoed by G. E. Zinoviev, who argued his objections to the uprising, in particular, by saying that " reinforcements from Finland and Kronstadt cannot be counted on."28
These vacillations and doubts were the result of the fact that their bearers, as Lenin wrote, "put subjective impressions of the mood in place of a political account of the development of the class struggle and the course of events in the whole country and in the international situation as a whole."29 Such subjective impressions were convincingly refuted at the same Central Committee meeting on October 16 by party officials who were well aware of the situation in the navy. Ya. M. Sverdlov noted the growth of Bolshevik influence among soldiers and sailors. JV Stalin stated that "the fleet has already rebelled, because it went against Kerensky"30 .
It was especially important for the navy to familiarize its assets with the tasks set by Lenin in the aforementioned letter to Smilge. These tasks were immediately brought to the attention of the naval revolutionary activity31 and formed the basis for preparing the fleet for participation in the uprising. Many active participants in the revolutionary struggle in the Navy confirm the Bolsheviks ' good knowledge of the Leninist line, specific instructions and the most important party decisions on the preparation and conduct of the uprising. Thus, D. N. Kondakov, a member of the Kronstadt Bolshevik Committee, wrote: "Lenin's instructions on the preparation of an armed insurrection were known to the Kronstadt Bolshevik Committee. In accordance with these instructions, he began to conduct intensive preparatory work on the ships of the fleet, in the military units of the fortress, and among the workers of the Steamship Factory and port workshops. " 32 N. F. Izmailov, one of the leading employees of Centrobalt, also noted that Lenin's instructions "were thoroughly introduced to us, the members of Centrobalt." 33 Rabchinsky, an active member of the Bolshevik organization in Reval, wrote that after the Northern Regional Congress of Soviets (of which he was a participant), "we went to our places, and each of us knew what he had to do."34 Convincing evidence of the sailors ' excellent knowledge of Lenin's instructions for the preparation and conduct of the uprising, and their support for the war-
26 "The First Legal Petersburg Committee of the Bolsheviks in 1917", Moscow, l. 1927, pp. 292-303.
27 " Minutes of the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b)", p. 96.
28 Ibid., p. 98.
29 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 34, p. 411.
30 " Minutes of the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b)", pp. 94, 100.
31 " V. I. Lenin. Biochronics", vol. 4, p. 363.
32 "Military seamen in the struggle for the victory of the October Revolution", Moscow, 1958, p. 310.
33 "The October Armed Uprising in Petrograd", p. 346.
34 S. S. Khesin. Op. ed., pp. 448-449.
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Their attitude to the most important political events of those days and the work that was carried out in the navy are important features of the Bolshevik line. Thanks to her, the sailors performed the role of one of the shock forces of the October Uprising with honor.
Analyzing the sharply aggravated situation in the country in the autumn of 1917." At the end of September, Lenin came to the conclusion that "history has now made the military question a fundamental political question." Therefore, he made it one of the most important practical tasks of the Bolshevik Party to "prepare its military forces for the overthrow of Kerensky."35 Among these forces, he assigned a significant place to the fleet, assigning it a number of responsible tasks in the plan of the uprising developed by him. Lenin's close attention to the navy and its use in the upcoming uprising was due to two main circumstances.
First, the geographical location of the fleet: the Baltic Fleet was based in the immediate vicinity of Petrograd, and its significant forces were located in the capital itself. And according to Lenin's plan, "near St. Petersburg and in St. Petersburg-that is where this insurrection can and should be resolved and carried out." 36 For the success of the insurrection, it was essential to launch a combined offensive against Petrograd from both inside and outside, and to secure the revolutionary rear of the insurrection. Lenin wrote that his victory required "a simultaneous, perhaps more sudden and rapid attack on St. Petersburg, without fail both from outside and from inside, from the workers' quarters, from Finland, from Revel, from Kronstadt, and an offensive of the entire fleet. " 37 Most of the points and areas designated by Lenin to play a decisive role in the success of the uprising were the home areas of the Baltic Fleet. Undoubtedly, Lenin also took into account the combat strength of the Baltic Fleet and its military capabilities. By the autumn of 1917, the Baltic Fleet consisted of 690 warships and auxiliary ships, including 7 battleships, 9 cruisers, 68 destroyers and 606 other vessels .38 In addition, it had a powerful coastal artillery and 88 aircraft. As of January 1, 1917, the fleet consisted of 83870 sailors and conductors and several hundred officers and officials. To this we must add 78,914 men who were part of the land units subordinate to the Baltic Fleet 39 and lived a common political, military and social life with it. Thus, the total number of military personnel in the Baltic Fleet exceeded 160 thousand people.
Secondly, in assigning such a large and responsible role to the navy in the uprising, Lenin proceeded from an analysis of the situation in the navy, relying on the rapid Bolshevization of the sailors, the rapid growth of decisive revolutionary sentiments in the fleet. By the autumn of 1917, thanks to the daily attention of the central party organs, Bolshevik organizations on ships and in units of the Baltic Fleet had significantly grown and strengthened. At the end of September, there were about 9,000 party members in Finland, more than 4,000 in Kronstadt, 3,000 in Reval, 700 in Arensburg, 500 in the Abo-Oland position, etc.. Ad impressions-
35 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 34, p. 264.
36 Ibid., p. 390.
37 Ibid., p. 383.
38 V. V. Petrash. Baltic sailors in October days. "The October Armed Uprising in Petrograd", Moscow-L. 1957, pp. 185-186.
39 TSGAVMF OF the USSR, f. 410, op. 4, d. PO, l. 43, 101; f. 716, op. 1, d. 130, l. 284.
40 M. H. Kiuru. Battle reserve of revolutionary Petrograd in 1917. Petrozavodsk. 1965, pp. 147-148; "Petrograd Bolsheviks in the October Revolution", L. 1957, p. 322; " Correspondence of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b) with local party organizations (March-October 1917)", M. 1957, p. 505; V. V. Petrash. Sailors of the Baltic Fleet in the struggle for the victory of October, p. 184.
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In this respect, the results of the Constituent Assembly elections in the Baltic Fleet are significant. As a result of the elections, the Bolsheviks received more than 58% of the vote here, and in Kronstadt - more than 80%. If we take into account the votes cast for the left Social Revolutionaries, who then collaborated with the Bolsheviks, then about 85% of voters voted for the Bolshevik platform in the revolution in the Baltic Fleet .41 Lenin and Dybenko were elected deputies of the Constituent Assembly from this fleet.
The Bolshevization of the Baltic Fleet in the run-up to October found its expression both in the correct attitude of naval units and ship crews to a number of political events of those days (the convening and work of a Democratic conference, a Pre-Parliament, etc.), and in the resolute support of Bolshevik demands, and in the transfer of leadership of the democratic organizations of the Although the Bolsheviks did not have a numerical preponderance of deputies in the Soviets of the main bases of the Baltic Fleet, their influence in the Soviets was dominant. In the Kronstadt Soviet, according to the head of its Bolshevik faction, Flerovsky, "there was no case when the decision of our faction, although it did not constitute a majority, did not pass in the Council."42 The situation was much the same in the Soviets of other bases of the Baltic Fleet, where the Soviets actually concentrated all power in their hands. This circumstance was of great importance for the use of the fleet's forces in the upcoming uprising.
A similar situation has developed in other naval democratic organizations. The Third Regional Congress of the Finnish Army, Navy, and Workers ' Soviets, held in Helsingfors on September 9-12, was held under Bolshevik influence. The resolution proposed by the Bolsheviks to the effect that "power must pass into the hands of the proletariat and the poorest peasantry" and to implement the basic demands of the RSDLP(b)was adopted by an overwhelming majority .43 The Congress elected a new composition of the Regional Committee of Finland, which included 37 Bolsheviks, 26 left SRS and 2 Menshevik internationalists .44 On the ships and in the units of the fleet, a network of sailors 'and soldiers' committees was formed, expanded and strengthened, covering the entire fleet. By October 1917, according to incomplete data, there were more than 500 naval units, at least 70 coastal units, and more than 80 military formations of ships and units in the Baltic Sea . Almost all of them were under Bolshevik influence and leadership. One of the Baltic Fleet staff officers, I. I. Rengarten, stated in his diary on September 13: "The resolutions in the committees are purely Bolshevik." 46
On September 25, the Second Congress of Representatives of the Baltic Fleet opened in Helsingfors, all the work of which was clearly Bolshevik in nature. Concluding its work, the Congress adopted a proclamation "To the oppressed of all countries", calling on them to "rise up against their oppressors"47 . The Congress decided to introduce elective command staff in the navy, establish control over its actions, and appoint commissars with broad powers in headquarters, formations, and units-
41 S. S. Khesin. The Navy votes for Lenin's policy. "History of the USSR", 1970, N 1, pp. 119-120.
42 I. P. Flerovsky. Bolshevik Kronstadt in 1917, L. 1957, p. 85.
43 TSGAVMF USSR, f. r-2094, op. 1, d. 16, ll. 88-89.
44 M. H. Kiuru. Op. ed., p. 132.
45 A.M. Blinov. Sailors ' Committees of the Baltic Fleet in the October Armed Uprising. "Lenin and the October Armed Uprising in Petrograd", Moscow, 1964, p. 309.
46 "Baltic Seamen in the preparation and conduct of the Great October Socialist Revolution", Moscow-L. 1957, p. 212 (hereinafter - " Baltic Seamen...").
47 Ibid., pp. 238-239.
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mi. These decisions essentially placed the entire leadership of the fleet in the hands of the revolutionary-democratic organizations that were under Bolshevik influence. The Congress not only demonstrated the sailors ' commitment to Lenin's party and its policies, but also served as a congress of practical preparation of the fleet for insurrection. Closing the congress, Dybenko said: "As we go to our places, we will work tirelessly to rally the entire mass in a ring of steel and, at the first call of our true leaders of the revolution, march to the barricade and give open battle to our eternal oppressors." 48
After the congress, based on its decisions, the Central Committee of the Baltic Fleet (Centrobalt) was re-elected in the fleet. As a result, the absolute majority of Centrobalt members were Bolsheviks and their sympathizers. Among the six members of its presidium, five were Bolsheviks49 . The new (4th) staff of the Central Baltic Fleet was the headquarters that led and ensured the preparation and participation of the Baltic Fleet in the October Uprising. The entire extensive network of revolutionary organizations created in the navy, directed by the Central Baltic and in the hands of the Bolshevik Party, meant, in essence, the fulfillment of the task set by Lenin as early as mid - September 1917 - "to organize the headquarters of the insurgent detachments "in relation to the navy .50
As a result of Bolshevization, the Baltic Fleet actually went out of obedience to the Provisional Government and its appointed command, and turned into an armed support of the Bolshevik Party. Already at the end of September, Lenin, analyzing the growing and worsening of the national crisis in the country, noted :" We have seen a complete breakaway from the government of the Finnish troops and the Baltic Fleet." A few days later, he stated: "Finnish troops and navy against the government"51 . And it was true. On September 19, a joint meeting of the Central Baltic, representatives of 80 ship committees and the sailors ' faction of the Helsingfors Council openly declared that "it no longer executes the orders of the Provisional Government and does not recognize the authorities"52 . Over the next few days, this statement was supported by the Regional Committee of Finland, the Helsingfors Council, the military section of the Kronstadt Council, the joint meeting of committees of all parts of the Abo - Oland Position, the Revel Local Naval Committee, the meeting of fleet delegates and representatives of ship and company committees in Revel, the general meeting of ship commanders of the Moonsund Position, and many others .53 On September 26, the Kronstadt Soviet, in a resolution adopted by it, stressed that "the Kronstadt garrison and the workers resolutely refuse to support the government of betraying the revolution in any way whatsoever."54
The actions against the Provisional Government in the Baltic Fleet took on the character of concrete practical measures that removed the fleet from subordination to the government and the command assigned to it. The Regional Committee of Finland concentrated in its hands all power in relation to the Russian population and the troops stationed in Finland. On September 20, he decided to " establish the most vigilant control in all government institutions in Finland. Bring to the attention of all military organizations that none of the available-
48 P. E. Dybenko. From the bowels of the Tsarist Fleet to the Great October, Moscow, 1958, p. 122.
49 " Minutes and resolutions of the Central Committee of the Baltic Fleet. 1917-1918". Moscow-L. 1963, pp. 243-244.
50 V. I. Lenin. PSS, Vol. 34, p. 247.
51 Ibid., pp. 278, 340.
52 " Baltic Seamen...", p. 217.
53 S. S. Khesin. The October Revolution and the Navy, pp. 400-401.
54 " Baltic Seamen...", p. 226.
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The decision of the Provisional Government must not be carried out without the knowledge of the Regional Committee of Finland."55 Three days later, a joint meeting of the Helsingfors Council, the Regional Committee of Finland, the Central Baltic, the Regional Peasant Council, the Ship and Company Committees decided "to carry out orders issued only by the Regional Committee of Finland without question." 56 The Second Congress of representatives of the Baltic Fleet approved the new charter of the Central Baltic Fleet, which granted it the broadest rights. The 2nd paragraph of the charter read:: "All orders, resolutions and orders, with the exception of the purely operational and related technical part, concerning the fleet, are not valid without the approval of the Central Committee of the Baltic Fleet"57 . But the operational part was actually put under the control of the revolutionary-democratic organizations. Having decided to introduce the institute of commissars in the navy, the congress ordered each of them "to know all the orders given to the units of the fleet, and each order must be authorized by them." The Congress also declared that "the Central Committee [considers ]its only organization fulfilling the will of the entire Baltic Fleet." 58
Following the Central Board, following its instructions and example, local committees also established comprehensive control over the activities of the command on ships and in units. The general meeting of the military organization and the Russian section of the Revel Committee of the RSDLP (b) decided at the beginning of September to "establish control of the army and Navy committees over the activities of commanders"59 . "The ship's committees," Admiral M. K. Bahirev, head of the naval forces of the Gulf of Riga, informed the fleet commander, " wanted to interfere in everything, in a purely military part, and even demanded their presence during the analysis of operational telegrams." Commanders who tried to ignore the committees were suspended for "unwillingness to work with democratic organizations and their representatives." 60 In the fleet bases, the Soviets concentrated all actual power in their hands, creating special military-technical commissions and similar bodies that were in charge of military affairs. The representative of the Kronstadt Soviet at the Northern Regional Congress of Soviets, S. D. Kudinsky, said:: "No order in Kronstadt will be executed unless it receives the approval of the military - technical commission established by the Executive Committee of the Soviet." Similar commissions were set up in the Abo-Oland fortified position and in other areas where the fleet is based. 61
In the autumn of 1917, the Baltic Fleet was so out of control of the Provisional Government and its proteges that the fleet commander was forced to ask the Central Baltic and the Naval Congress whether his orders would be carried out. "We," Dybenko said at the Northern Regional Congress of Soviets, " have firmly declared to the commander that we will carry out orders only if control over operational actions is in our hands. And we have achieved this control. " 62 Simultaneously with the refusal to submit to the Provisional Government and its representatives in the Baltic Fleet, the Bolshevik demands for the transfer of all power to the Baltic Fleet are becoming more insistent.
55 TSGAVMF USSR, f. r. 2094, op. 1, d. 16, l. 84.
56 Ibid., ll. 76-76 vol.
57 "Protocols and resolutions of the Central Bank", p. 430.
58 " Baltic Seamen...", pp. 223, 229.
59 " The revolutionary movement in Russia on the eve of the October Armed Uprising (October 1-24, 1917)". Collection of documents and materials, Moscow, 1962, p. 47.
60 A.M. Blinov. Op. ed., pp. 311-312.
61 B. A. Breslav. Op. ed., p. 42; V. V. Petrash. Sailors of the Baltic Fleet in the struggle for the victory of October, p. 244.
62 B. A. Breslav. Op. ed., p. 36.
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power in the country to the Soviets and the immediate convocation of the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets. According to far from complete data, from the beginning of September to the second half of October alone, more than 70 resolutions with such demands were adopted at crowded rallies and meetings held in the navy and Navy democratic organizations, according to our calculations.
The situation in the navy, its actual withdrawal from subordination to the Provisional Government, and the fleet's resolute support for the Bolshevik slogan of transferring all power to the Soviets allowed Lenin to come to the conclusion at the end of September that " the only thing that we can fully have in our hands and that plays a serious military role is the Finnish troops and the Baltic Fleet." therefore, "all attention should be given to the military preparation of the Finnish troops and navy for the impending overthrow of Kerensky." 63 This Leninist directive was successfully implemented by the Bolsheviks of the fleet.
The preparation of the fleet for the uprising took place not in a calm atmosphere, but in conditions of overcoming the machinations of the enemies of the revolution, who were intensively preparing the "second Kornilovschina", an important part of which was the desire, if not to destroy the fleet, then at least to paralyze or weaken it as a military and revolutionary force. The failure of the Kornilov plot and the rapid growth of revolutionary sentiments discouraged the reactionary officers and caused confusion among them. I. I. Rengarten described the state of naval officers after the defeat of the Kornilov regime as follows: "A general nervous expectation, a lot of talk, gossip, fears, complete uncertainty - on what, on whom to rely" 64. Feeling that the leadership is slipping more and more out of their hands, the command circles of the fleet, with the active support of the Provisional Government, are making feverish efforts to maintain their badly shaken authority and restore the confidence of the sailors in the reactionary officers.
In the tenth of September, a group of staff officers of the Baltic Fleet, led by Fleet Commander A.V. Razvozov and Commissar of the Fleet, SR. F. M. Onipko, addressed the Maritime Minister D. N. Verderevsky with a "Note", the leitmotif of which was a demand to strengthen the authority and rights of officers. Verderevsky, although he "took the matter very carefully," nevertheless declared that the Provisional Government "could not help the Fleet in any way, but that help could be obtained from the Central Executive Committee, to which he would apply." 65 On September 10, the Socialist-Revolutionary-Menshevik Central Committee of Soviets heard Verderevsky's report on the situation of the fleet. "The only way to save the fleet from destruction," Verderevsky said, " is to make the sailors feel confident that the command staff can be trusted." He asked the Central Election Commission "to take measures against irresponsible agitation, devoid of any ideological content, aimed at deepening distrust of officers." The Central Executive Committee was very sympathetic to Verderevsky's complaints and requests and adopted a resolution recognizing the state of the fleet as "threatening the security of the country and the interests of the revolution", recommending that it promote "the restoration of the rights of the command staff", and explain to the sailors the danger "posed to the country and the revolution by the disintegration of the fleet"66 . However, this demarche of the compromising Central Executive Committee did not produce any results, as did the ministerial order of Verderevsky, which required "to inform the ship's committees that distrust and ill-will towards officers... it has no legal basis in the navy",
63 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 34, p. 265.
64 "Red Archive", 1929, vol. 4 (35), p. 28.
65 Ibid., pp. 24-26.
66 TsGAOR USSR, f. 6978, op. 1, d. 125, ll. 1-1ob.
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and "the deepening of distrust of officers, making the final collapse of the navy and army, is a criminal work in relation to the republic" 67.
Despite the failure of such attempts to strengthen the authority of officers in the navy, government and command circles continued to search feverishly for ways to keep the fleet in their hands. The most reactionary and short-sighted part of them called for the complete elimination of democratic organizations "infected with Bolshevism"in the navy. The more cautious part of the officers suggested a slightly different way of "improving the fleet". In early October, the Pre-Parliament discussed Verderevsky's report on the situation in the navy. The minister described it as extremely difficult, said that discipline in the navy was " completely destroyed." He saw a way out of this situation in the formation of" a unified and strong power in the center and in the localities", but not by transferring it to the Soviets, which, in his opinion, would lead to"a dispersion of power" 68 .
In parallel with the development of such plans, bourgeois circles and the press intensively spread rumors about the alleged complete disintegration of the fleet, the loss of its combat capability. Thus, speaking at a meeting of the Council of public figures in Moscow, M. V. Rodzianko said that the fleet "will not fight; there are ships that are completely depraved and do not represent a fighting force."69
All these slanderous attacks had nothing to do with reality. Both the central and local revolutionary-democratic organizations of the navy, overcoming the sabotage and treachery of reactionary officers, worked hard to improve the combat capability of ships and units, strengthen revolutionary discipline and order, and transform the fleet into a well-organized fighting force designed to serve the revolution. They discussed almost daily the state of naval combat readiness, military discipline and revolutionary order, and took measures to improve them .70 Antonov-Ovseenko reasonably wrote: "Centrobalt worked feverishly to strengthen the approaches to the Gulf of Finland and bring the fleet to combat readiness" and "achieved exceptional discipline on ships" 71 . All the active activity of the revolutionary forces of the fleet in this direction was subordinated to the tasks of protecting the revolution from attempts by Russian and international imperialism, and preparing the fleet for military insurrection. This was openly stated by Dybenko. Speaking on October 13 in the soldiers 'section of the Petrograd Soviet, he spoke on behalf of the navy:" The sailors will die, but they will not tarnish themselves by betraying the revolution.. we defend the revolution and the triumph of its ultimate goals with all our might."72
In view of the futility of attempts to strengthen their leadership in the navy, reactionary circles, while preparing for the "second Kornilovschina", took a number of measures to weaken the combat power of the most revolutionary forces of the fleet. In the autumn of 1917, the naval staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief suggested that the government abolish the fortress of Kronstadt, "since it has now lost its strategic importance"73 . In mid-September, the command tried to remove a number of artillery batteries from Kronstadt and nearby forts. But this idea was thwarted by the Kronstadt Soviet, supported by the Second Congress of the Baltic Fleet-
67 TSGAVMF USSR, f. r-342, op. 1, d. 3, l. 231.
68 "Izvestiya CEC", 11 and 17. X. 1917; K. Ryabinsky. The Revolution of 1917 (Chronicle of events). T. V. M. 1926, pp. 58-59.
69 " Baltic seamen...", pp. 240-241.
70 See "Minutes and Resolutions of the Central Bank of Russia", pp. 175-252.
71 V. A. Antonov-Ovseenko. Op. ed., p. 114.
72 "Rabochy put", 17. X. 1917.
73 "Petrograd Bolsheviks in the October Revolution", p. 332.
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ta 74 . At the same time, the command tried to remove the most revolutionary military units from the fleet's base areas. These intentions posed a serious threat to the preparations for the uprising. Lenin therefore emphatically demanded:"We can never allow the withdrawal of troops from Finland, that is clear." 75 Lenin's instructions were successfully executed.
In September 20, the command's order to withdraw an infantry division from Finland was "declared unenforceable by the Regional Committee." 76 A few days later, the Regional Committee of Finland, having considered the withdrawal of the 2nd Infantry Reserve Regiment, suggested that "the regiment should remain in its place" 77 . The Committee issued a proclamation strongly protesting the attempted withdrawal of troops. "No strategic considerations," the appeal said, " can justify this step... All references to "strategy" and "defense" are hypocrisy that disguises a direct fight against political opponents... A new Kornilovschina is coming at us in a more democratic guise and therefore immeasurably more dangerous. At this point, the revolution cannot allow its forces to be dispersed." The Committee stated that, "considering it its duty to protect the rear of the capital of the revolution from possible Novokornilov attacks, it is vigilantly monitoring the regrouping of troops near Petrograd." 78
Naturally, such activities of the committee aroused the anger of the Provisional Government. On October 4, Kerensky ordered the commander of the Northern Front, General V. A. Cheremisov, "in view of the current political and military situation, which requires the adoption of energetic measures against the corrupting principles of Bolshevism, to take the most decisive measures to eliminate the criminal activities of the Finnish Regional Committee and to completely restore order among the troops stationed on Finnish territory." 79 But all these formidable orders were already impracticable, because, as Lenin stated, "the entire Baltic Fleet and all the Russian troops in Finland are on the side of the Bolsheviks." 80
After the failure to withdraw the revolutionary units, the reactionary command attempted to introduce "reliable" troops intended to suppress revolutionary actions into the fleet's home areas. On September 20, Cheremisov informed the commander of the Baltic Fleet that "due to the need to have fully equipped, trained and fully combat-ready troops in Finland, especially in such an important point as Helsingfors and the Sveaborg Fortress, the 4th Don Cossack division and gradually the entire 44th cavalry division will be sent there in the near future." Soon Cheremisov ordered "two regiments of the 3rd Cavalry Corps to be urgently sent to Revel at the commandant's disposal for the decisive establishment of order there." 81 But all these intentions were immediately known to the revolutionary organizations, which took measures to thwart them.
A major role in this was played by the establishment of firm control over the actions of the command, the appointment of commissars to headquarters and communications facilities. Reactionary circles tried in every possible way to get rid of such control. On September 29, Cheremisov ordered the fleet commander
74 TSGAVMF USSR, f. r-29, op. 1, d. 161, ll. 3, 5, 6; " Baltic sailors...", pp. 227, 354.
75 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 34, p. 265.
76 " Baltic Seamen...", p. 219.
77 TsGAOR USSR, f. 9678, op. 1, d. 506, ll. 42-42ob.
78 TSGAVMF USSR, f. r-2094, op. 1, d. 16, ll. 81-82.
79 "The October Armed Uprising in Petrograd", p. 256.
80 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 34, p. 386.
81 TSGAVMF USSR, f. r. 29, op. 1, d. 161, ll. 8-9; d. 162, l. 5.
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82 On October 4, Verderevsky telegraphed the Commander of the Fleet and the Second Baltic Fleet Congress that the government would not allow "the congress to interfere in an area that is in no way under its jurisdiction"and demanded that the Congress "take measures that are absolutely unacceptable in the theater of war and are currently taking place in Finland."stop harmful anti-government policies " 83 . All these orders and appeals did not produce any tangible results, and the power of the government and the command in the fleet became more and more ephemeral.
One of the features of the "second Kornilovshchina" was the more active participation of international imperialism in it and the decisive steps taken by the Kornilovites to surrender Petrograd to the Germans in order to strangle the revolution in this way. One of the major steps in this direction was the Battle of Moonsund, which has been repeatedly described in our literature .84 The battle was the result of a conspiracy between Russian and foreign imperialists to surrender revolutionary Petrograd to the Germans. 85 This was clearly shown by Lenin, who wrote in those days: "Does not the complete inaction of the British fleet in general, as well as of the British submarines, at the time of the capture of Ezel by the Germans, in connection with the government's plan to move from St. Petersburg to Moscow, prove that a conspiracy has been formed between the Russian and British imperialists, between Kerensky and the Anglo-French capitalists to the Germans and to stifle the Russian revolution in this way? I think that proves it. " 86 Lenin's conclusion is confirmed by numerous facts of treacherous behavior of the command both on the eve of the Battle of Moonsund and during it, which were revealed at the same time by the revolutionary-democratic organizations of the fleet .87 With good reason, Lenin wrote in those days: "The facts prove that the admiralsthey can betray as well as Kornilov. " 88
Despite the bravery and heroism of the Baltic sailors, despite the losses suffered by the German navy, it managed to achieve its military goal - to capture the islands of the Moonsund archipelago, drive the Baltic Fleet out of the Gulf of Riga, force the ground forces to withdraw to the east and thereby significantly change the situation on the approaches to Petrograd in its favor. 89
As a result of the Battle of Moonsund, contrary to the claims of some authors, 90 the threat to revolutionary Petrograd increased even more, and there was a real danger of strangling the revolution with the help of German bayonets .91 Lenin persistently drew attention to this danger, revealing the ways in which Petrograd might be surrendered to the Germans, and warning that "we have no right to wait until the bourgeoisie stifles the revolution."92 These same circumstances were one of the most important reasons for this.
82 Ibid., d. 161, l. 11.
83 " Baltic sailors...", p. 230; TSGAVMF USSR, f. 418, op. 1, d. 544, l. 39.
84 A.M. Kosinsky. The Moonsund operation of the Baltic Fleet in 1917. L. 1928; A. I. Matveev. In the battles for Moonsund, Moscow, 1957; A. S. Pukhov. The Battle of Moonsund, L. 1957; V. V. Petrash. Sailors of the Baltic Fleet in the struggle for the victory of October, etc.
85 For more information, see: A.V. Ignatiev. Russo-English relations on the eve of the October Revolution, Moscow, 1966, pp. 316, 338; I. I. Mints. Istoriya Velikogo Oktyabrya [History of the Great October], Vol. 2, Moscow, 1968, pp. 805-816.
86 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 34, p. 347.
87 See "Minutes and Resolutions of the Central Bank of Russia", pp. 205-240.
88 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 34, p. 404.
89 This was acknowledged in their speeches by the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief N. N. Dukhonin in the Pre-Parliament and Verderevsky at the CEC meeting (TSGAVMF of the USSR, f. 24, op. 1, d. 153, l. 2).
90 See N. F. Izmailov, A. S. Pukhov. Op. ed., p. 122; A. S. Pukhov. Op. ed., pp. 92-93; A.V. Bogdanov. Op. ed., p. 184; M. H. Kiuru. Op. ed., p. 153, etc.
91 For more information, see: S. S. Hesin. The October Revolution and the Navy, pp. 411-417.
92 V. I. Lenin, PSS. Vol. 34, p. 404.
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There are significant reasons why, as early as October 8, 1917 - the day after the end of the Moonsund battles - Lenin particularly emphasized the need for an early armed uprising to overthrow the Kerensky government.
An integral part of the Novokornilov plans during the Battle of Moonsund, along with the creation of a springboard for the capture of Petrograd by the Germans, was the desire, if not to destroy, then significantly weaken the revolutionary Baltic Fleet. Such intentions were directly stated by Rodzianko. While advocating the surrender of Petrograd, he spoke with the hope that "with the capture of Petrograd, the fleet will still perish; perhaps it will even raise the white flag and will not fight." 93
These plans were exposed by the Bolshevik Party. On October 7, the Moscow Bolshevik newspaper Sotsial-Demokrat wrote: "Let's ask ourselves: what is the Baltic Fleet, Kronstadt, St. Petersburg, Finnish troops? This is the mainstay of the revolution. Wilhelm threw two-thirds of his ships against it, putting aside any fears of a counterattack from the North Sea." A few days later, one of the leaders of the Central Council of the Petrograd Factory Committees, N. I. Derbyshev, declared: "The bourgeoisie may be waiting with secret joy for the death of the revolutionary fleet, since the Baltic Fleet is a real thorn in its side. But this is not the view of the revolutionary proletariat, which regards sailors as its own flesh and blood. " 94 The revolutionary sailors thwarted the Kornilovites ' intentions. In the Battle of Moonsund, the fleet, although it suffered considerable losses, retained and even increased its combat capability, and its revolutionary potential increased even more, as the treacherous behavior of the Kornilov command was exposed and the Bolshevik Party became the undivided owner of the fleet. In the days of the Moonsund battles, Baltic sailors loudly declared: "We are not going into battle in the name of fulfilling the treaties of our rulers with the allies, which bind the hands of Russian freedom in chains. We are fulfilling the supreme command of our revolutionary consciousness. " 95
After the Battle of Moonsund, the reaction did not abandon its intention to destroy the Baltic Fleet. On October 18, the Council of Flagships of the Baltic Fleet drew up a" memorandum " on the results of the Battle of Moonsund, sent to the Provisional Government. This document tendentiously assessed the combat capability of the fleet, stated that "the overwhelming superiority of the German Fleet forces precludes the possibility of a successful fight against it, "and the task of the fleet"can only be to inflict the greatest damage to the enemy at the cost of at least its own death." At the same time, the memorandum accused the sailors of "not being aware that a single uplift of spirit and readiness for self-sacrifice is not enough, and that, if not combined with the recognition of the need for the strictest and most systematic military organization, this uplift can be broken by the enemy in the shortest possible time." 96 As I. I. Rengarten writes in his diary, the reactionary flagships, while proposing such a "decisive" use of the fleet, believed that although it "would hardly actually take place, it is nevertheless possible to hope that to a certain extent such a task will be completed, after which our fleet will cease to exist"97 .
Given such intentions of the Kornilovites, Lenin warned about the possibility of their surrender of Petrograd. One way of doing this, he saw, was that " they can 'conspire' about the freedom of action of just one person."-
93 " Baltic seamen...", p. 241.
94 " The October Revolution and factory committees. Materials on the history of Factory Committees", Part II, Moscow, 1927, pp. 115-116.
95 " Baltic Seamen...", p. 239.
96 Ibid., pp. 247-248.
97 "Red Archive", 1927, N 6 (25), p. 38.
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the Metz Fleet, which is stronger than we are, will come to terms with both the German and British imperialists."98 All this was evidence of the need for an early overthrow of the Provisional Government, for an immediate uprising, in which the Baltic Fleet could and should play a decisive role. In those days Lenin said: "Only an immediate movement of the Baltic Fleet, Finnish troops, Revel and Kronstadt against the Kornilov troops near St. Petersburg can save the Russian and world revolution." 99
Lenin's excellent knowledge of the real situation and the situation in the navy, and his sober assessment of the forces and capabilities of the navy, enabled him to include the navy, along with the workers ' and revolutionary military units, in the main forces of the insurrection, and to place the sailors among the most determined elements capable of displaying skill and triple courage .100 The Fleet fulfilled its tasks with honor and fulfilled the hopes placed on it by the Bolshevik Party, becoming one of the shock forces of the October armed Uprising. The navy could have played such a role as a result of the Bolshevik Party's intense and active work among the sailors and their involvement in the political army of the socialist revolution. V. I. Lenin's close attention to the fleet on the eve of October, and his analysis of the conditions, opportunities, and situation prevailing in the Baltic Fleet at that time, are one of the clearest evidences of Lenin's deep consideration of the alignment of class forces, the real situation, and his ability to draw principled political and practical conclusions from the sum of facts and data, and to determine the correct revolutionary strategy and tactics.
98 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 34, p. 404.
99 Ibid., p. 390.
100 See ibid., pp. 333-384.
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