The political mood of the Russian masses in the autumn of 1917 was characterized by their Bolshevization, rallying around the working class and its vanguard, the Leninist Party. These sentiments were most clearly expressed in the attitude of the masses towards the question of power, the fundamental question of the revolution, which determined its fate. "The question of power cannot be evaded or set aside," Lenin wrote, "for it is precisely the fundamental question that determines everything in the development of the revolution, in its foreign and domestic policy." 1 As the revolution progressed, broad strata of the working people were imbued with the understanding that without the overthrow of the power of the bourgeoisie and the landlords, without the transfer of the helm of State administration into the hands of the workers and peasants, not a single demand of the masses would be satisfied, and that this alone would be the way out of the impasse into which the policy of the Provisional Government On the eve of the Great October Socialist Revolution, the question of power in Russia escalated to the limit, accumulating all the vital aspirations and hopes of the masses, reflecting their main political moods.
The national detachments of the working people of Russia have also become convinced that none of their urgent demands will be met as long as State power is in the hands of the bourgeoisie and the landlords. The hated war continued, the solution of the agrarian question was postponed month after month, measures were not taken to combat hunger, which increasingly crushed the masses of the people, and many other issues of concern to the working people remained unresolved. The policy of national oppression continued, and the demands for self-determination and national freedom were invariably rejected by the bourgeois-landlord Government, which took the path of direct repression against the national liberation movement. The solution of national problems depended entirely on the solution of the all-Russian revolutionary question of power, but the question of the forms of national and state organization in certain regions of the country, the ways of cooperation of peoples, etc., had not yet become a priority. The main efforts of the working class and its party were directed primarily at mobilizing the masses to fight for the overthrow of the Provisional Government and the establishment of Soviet power throughout the country.
These efforts bore fruit: the Bolshevik influence among the working people of the national regions increased, and their support for the Bolshevik demands increased. Numerous documentary publications on the history of October, published in the center and in the field, contain a huge number of facts, documents and materials confirming the fact of the Revolution.
1 Lenin V. I. PSS. Vol. 34, p. 200.
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and which characterize the growth of Bolshevik sentiments among the broad masses of the working people of the national regions, and their desire to resolve the fundamental question of the revolution in favor of the working class and its party. 2 Referring readers to these materials, we will confine ourselves to some data only on two important points, which show quite clearly both the alignment of political forces in the country and the mood of the working people of the national regions, led by the working class, in relation to the question of power in the most critical days of the autumn of 1917.
The first indicator of this sentiment is data and materials on Constituent Assembly elections in the constituencies of national districts. Of course, in times of acute revolutionary crises, the results of voting are not the only or main indicator of the readiness of the masses for revolution. This readiness is primarily characterized by the revolutionary struggle of the masses, including armed ones. However, since the elections to the Constituent Assembly occupied a significant place in the political life of Russia in 1917, their results allow us to draw a number of important and fundamental conclusions and conclusions. The analysis of all issues related to the Constituent Assembly, in particular the attitude towards it in national districts, deserves a special study, especially since the available general works on the problem do not isolate national districts with their specifics .3 Leaving out all the twists and turns of the struggle related to the Constituent Assembly, we will briefly review the general election results for the electoral districts of the national districts and some data that allow us to judge the position of the working class and workers of these districts in the elections.
The question of a Constituent Assembly appeared in the programs of all Russian parties and was "subordinated to the question of the course and outcome of the class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat." 4 Based on this Leninist characteristic, we will turn to some materials reflecting the results of elections in national districts. The most complete picture of these results for the country as a whole is given in the table contained in the monograph by L. M. Spirin5 . It contains data on 78 electoral districts out of 81 determined by the All-Russian Commission for Elections to the Constituent Assembly. Although this table also suffers from some incompleteness (as other researchers have already noted 6), it gives a generally correct picture of the election results both for the country and for individual regions and national districts. Most of the digital indicators we use are derived from this table.
Of the districts included in the table, 31 are national districts. Unfortunately, the table does not contain data for 11 of them. O. N. Znamensky, not without reason claiming that elections were held in at least 10 of these districts, also does not provide data on their results. 7 It can be assumed, however, that the appearance of additional information on these districts is unlikely to make fundamental changes.
2 See the multi-volume edition of the Great October Socialist Revolution series (Dokl. and ml. m. 1957-1963), as well as documentary publications published in all the Union and many autonomous republics.
3 See: Rubinstein N. L. The Bolsheviks and the Constituent Assembly, Moscow, 1938; Gorodetsky E. N. The Birth of the Soviet State, Moscow, 1965, pp. 429-454; Spirin L. M. Classes and Parties in the Civil War in Russia, Moscow, 1968, pp. 58-64; Mints I. I. Istoriya Velikogo Oktyabrya. Vol. 3. Moscow, 1973, pp. 917-950; Znamenskiy O. N. Vserossiiskoe Sobratelnoe sobranie [All-Russian Constituent Assembly]. L. 1976; Skripilev E. A. All-Russian Constituent Assembly, Moscow, 1982; et al.
4 Lenin V. I. PSS. Vol. 34, p. 37.
5 Spiryan L. M. UK. soch., pp. 416-419.
6 See Znamenskiy O. N. UK. soch., p. 260.
7 See ibid. Such data are still available in the literature for some districts. So, it is known that in the Mogilev district 15% of voters voted for the Bolsheviks, and 81% for the Social Revolutionaries (Victory of the Soviet government in Belarus. Minsk. 1967, p. 427).
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changes in the overall election results; the number of votes received by compromisers and nationalists will probably increase slightly, since these districts were located in agrarian regions with small working-class contingents. It should also be noted that large national regions had several electoral districts (Ukraine - 8, Belarus - 3, etc.), and the presence of military electoral districts in these territories increased fragmentation, which also makes it difficult to characterize the election results.
Despite the above-mentioned and some other gaps in the final data of the Constituent Assembly elections and their shortcomings, the collective efforts of researchers allow us to draw a number of well-founded and principled conclusions based on these data and characterize the alignment of political forces and the mood of the masses on the eve of the October Revolution not only throughout the country, but also These conclusions correspond to the analysis of the election results made by Lenin based on the materials of N. V. Svyatitsky.
Elections to the Constituent Assembly were held mainly in November 1917, i.e. after the victory of the socialist revolution, and, it would seem, cannot reflect the alignment of political forces on the eve of October. But, as Lenin pointed out, first, they took place "according to the lists of parties that existed before the proletarian-peasant revolution, under the rule of the bourgeoisie"; secondly, "they took place at a time when the overwhelming majority of the people could not yet know the full scope and significance of the October, Soviet, Proletarian-Peasant Revolution" .8 . Therefore, Lenin stated, "The Constituent Assembly in its current composition was the result of the balance of forces that developed before the Great October Revolution." 9 These Leninist considerations provide a scientific justification for the legitimacy of using the election results to characterize certain features and peculiarities of the political mood of the masses on the eve of October. A brilliant example of such an analysis of the election results was given by Lenin in his work "Elections to the Constituent Assembly and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" .10
The main thesis in analyzing the results of the Constituent Assembly elections was formulated by Lenin: "The data on the Constituent Assembly elections, if one is able to use them and read them, show us again and again the basic truths of the Marxist doctrine of the class struggle." 11 Based on this statement, it can be stated that the results of elections in national districts give, in general, the same picture of the correlation of class and political forces as the results of elections on a national scale, so thoroughly scientifically analyzed by Lenin. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that the national districts were very different in terms of the level of socio-economic and cultural development, the size and cohesion of the working class, and a number of other conditions that influenced the alignment of political forces and the mood of the masses, which were reflected as a result of the Constituent Assembly elections.
The Bolsheviks were most successful in areas where the working class was more numerous and organized, and where Bolshevik organizations were stronger and more active. Thus, the highest percentage of votes cast for Bolshevik candidates was in the Livonia (71.9%), Minsk (63.2%), Vitebsk (51.2%) and Estland (40%) districts. These districts covered industrially developed and front-line territories with relatively large contingents of working class and revolutionary soldiers, with active Bolshevik forces.
8 Lenin V. I. PSS. Vol. 35, pp. 165, 163.
9 Ibid., p. 227.
10 Ibid., vol. 40, pp. 1-24.
11 Ibid., p. 19.
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organizations. The Bolsheviks received the smallest number of votes in such then relatively industrially backward, mostly agrarian districts as Transcaucasia (4.6%), Volyn (4.4%), Kiev (4%), Ufa (5%) and some others.
But even in districts where the Bolsheviks did not achieve serious success, the majority of the working class voted for their candidates, as a rule. The most typical information in this regard is about the elections in Ukraine. According to the data of N. V. Svyatytsky, used by Lenin, in 8 Ukrainian provinces the Bolsheviks received only 10% of the votes, but in industrial centers and provincial cities, according to I. K. Rybalka's calculations, 26.8% of the votes were cast for their candidates. This percentage increases even more in large industrial areas and cities: in the Donetsk-Kryvyi Rih basin-32.3% of votes, in Luhansk-48%, in Yuzovka-47%, in Amur-Nizhnedniprovsk-36.6%, in Slavyanoserbsky uyezd-36% 12 . In Ekaterinoslav Province, about 330,000 workers took part in the elections , of which almost 200,000 (over 60%) voted for the Bolsheviks13, while a total of 213,163 voters in the province voted for them. In the Kharkiv district, the Bolsheviks received 10.5% of the vote, and in industrial Kharkiv-27.7% (27,336 out of 98,150 voters voted for them). 14 .
The situation was similar for a number of other districts of the national districts. In Reval, Estonia's largest industrial center, 22024 (47.6%) out of 46,173 people who participated in the election voted for the Bolshevik list15 . The first place was taken by the Bolsheviks in proletarian Baku, where 22.2 thousand voters voted for their candidates .16 In Belarus (including the Western Front), 30 Bolsheviks, 22 Social Revolutionaries and 4 other 17 were elected out of 56 deputies . Even more revealing are some figures for those districts where the Bolsheviks won only a few votes in the elections, but the working class consistently supported them. Thus, in the Ufa district, they received only 5% of the vote, but at the Ust-Katavsky plant, out of 5,062 people who participated in the elections, 4,222 voted for the Bolsheviks; at the Bogoyavlensky plant, they received 1,084 votes, and the Social Revolutionaries only 348 .18 The same thing happened in other national regions, where the working class followed the Bolshevik Party. For example, in the Tersk-Dagestan electoral district, the largest number of voters were from Vladikavkaz, Grozny, and some other industrial centers. Out of 18,610 voting participants, 8,218 people (44%), despite the terror and martial law imposed by ataman M. A. Karaulov, cast their votes for Bolshevik candidates .19 Workers, being the most politically conscious voters, also showed increased activity in the elections in national districts. Thus, 55% of the electorate participated in the elections in Baku, while 69% participated in Zavodskoy district and oil fields .20
12 Rybalka I. K. The working class of Ukraine in the elections to the All-Russian and All-Ukrainian Constituent Assemblies. - History of the USSR, 1965, N 1, p, 118-119.
13 Vargatyuk P. L., Kuras I. F., Soldatenko V. F. Lenin and the Bolshevik organizations of Ukraine in the October Revolution. Kiev, 1980, p. 313.
14 Kharkiv and Kharkiv Province in the Great October Socialist Revolution. Collected papers. and m-lov. Kharkiv, 1957, p. 290.
15 The Great October Socialist Revolution in Estonia. Sat. doc. and m-lov. Tallinn. 1958, p. 306.
16 Victory of the Soviet power in Transcaucasia. Tbilisi. 1971, p. 206.
17 Ignatenko I. M. The poorest peasantry-an ally of the proletariat in the struggle for victory of the October Revolution in Belarus. Minsk. 1962, p. 385.
18 Preparation and conduct of the Great October Socialist Revolution in Bashkiria. Sat. doc. i m-lov. Ufa, 1957, p. 244, 246.
19 Kuchiev V. D. October and the Soviets on the Terek. 1917 - 1918. Ordzhonikidze. 1979, p. 72.
20 Znamenskiy O. N. UK. soch., p. 297.
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Thus, the results of the Constituent Assembly elections in the national districts confirm Lenin's conclusion as applied to the whole country: the Bolsheviks "had behind them the vast majority of the proletariat, and in it the most class-conscious, energetic, and revolutionary section, the real vanguard of this advanced class." 21
The results of the elections in the national districts also confirmed the truth of Lenin's thesis that under capitalism and in the transition from capitalism to socialism, "the city inevitably leads the countryside" 22 and plays a leading role in solving the main political issues. It was manifested, in particular, in the fact that, as a rule, the Bolsheviks in the elections in the cities received more votes than in the villages and villages. Here are some data 23 . If in the Ekaterinoslav electoral district 17.9% of voters voted for the Bolsheviks, then in Ekaterinoslav itself-26.3%; in the Kazan district - 5.8%, in Kazan - 26%; in Kiev - 4%, in Kiev - 16.7%; in Orenburg - 23.6%, in Orenburg - 34%; in Stavropol - 5.4%, in Stavropol-47.6%; in Ufa-5%, in Ufa-19.2%; in Kherson-10.2%, in Kherson-18.3%; in Transcaucasia-4.6%, in Tiflis-18.6%, in Baku-20.1%.
These data show that in the national regions, as in the whole country, there were "numerous unconsciously proletarian, semi-proletarian, semi-petty-bourgeois strata of the working masses", which the working class still had to firmly win over to its side, and that "these strata of the working and exploited give the vanguard of the proletariat allies with whom it has a firm connection." the majority of the population", but "the proletariat can win these allies only with the help of such an instrument as state power, that is, only after the overthrow of the bourgeoisie and the destruction of its state apparatus" 24 .
In the national districts, another feature was clearly observed, which Lenin noted on the basis of an analysis of the results of the Constituent Assembly elections: as in the whole country, " the unity and unity of the party of the proletariat existed here, despite the enormous fragmentation of the parties of the petty bourgeoisie and the parties of the bourgeoisie. "25 This" huge fragmentation " in the national districts was compounded by the abundance of nationalist parties, organizations, groups, and associations that participated in the elections with separate lists. According to O. N. Znamensky's calculations, there were at least 150 candidates in the country as a whole, and according to incomplete data, there were 68,26 candidate lists of nationalists of various shades . For example, in Homel there were 11 lists, of which 6 were put up by various nationalist organizations .27 In the Podolsk district, only Jewish nationalists submitted 6 lists 28. 7 lists (4 of them nationalist) were proposed to the voters of Revel 29 . There were 18 lists running in the Bessarabian district, 30 in Volyn, 15 in Ekaterinoslav, 22 in Kiev, 22 in Kharkiv ,and 18 in Ufa.
Nationalist parties and organizations were very active not only in the national regions, but also throughout the entire territory.-
21 Lenin V. I. PSS. Vol. 40, p. 5.
22 Ibid.
23 Spirin L. M. UK. soch., pp. 416-422.
24 Lenin V. I. PSS. Vol. 40, p. 23.
25 Ibid., p. 7.
26 Znamenskiy O. N. UK. soch., pp. 275-276, 224.
27 The Great October Socialist Revolution in Belarus. Collected papers. m-lov. T. 2. Minsk. 1957, p. 197.
28 Znamenskiy O. N. UK. soch., p. 275.
29 The Great October Socialist Revolution in Estonia, p. 306.
30 Gorodetsky E. N. UK. soch., p. 434.
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It is not without reason that they rely on the multiethnic composition of the Russian population. Such activity can be confirmed by data on the Constituent Assembly elections in some electoral districts of the interior of the country. Thus, in the Petrograd district, 14,907 (3.2%) votes were received by the Finnish Socialists and 15,693 (3.4%) - by the Estonian list; in the Samara district, national petty-bourgeois parties collected 5,1212 (4.3%), and bourgeois parties - 192,861 (15.9%) votes; in the Novgorod district, national petty-bourgeois parties-1,935 (3.4%), bourgeois - 400 (0.1%) votes, etc. In total, nationalist petty - bourgeois parties received 6018371 (13.5%) votes in the Constituent Assembly elections, while bourgeois nationalist parties received 3230747 (7.3%) votes .31 Naturally, in the national regions, nationalist parties had much greater influence than in the Great Russian territories. These parties and organizations tried to maximize their representation in the Constituent Assembly. For example, one of the nationalist leaders, S. Maksudov, speaking at the Second All-Russian Muslim Congress in Kazan at the end of July 1917, said: "The desire to send as many Muslim representatives as possible to the Constituent Assembly should prevail over all other aspirations." 32
Let's note some features of voting for nationalists. Almost universally, nationalist petty-bourgeois parties received far more votes than nationalist bourgeois parties. This indicates that, first of all, the main contingent of voters who gave their votes to the nationalists were petty-bourgeois, mainly peasant strata of the population of the national regions. Secondly, these strata, while still under the influence of nationalist demagoguery, generally preferred the less reactionary trends in the nationalist camp. Third, in areas with a multi-ethnic composition of the population, there was a corresponding diversity in the votes received by nationalists. For example, in Homel, where the population was multiethnic, Jewish nationalists received a total of 25.2% of the vote, Polish - 5.6%, and Belarusian - 1.2%. 29.6% of the electorate voted for the Bolsheviks there .33
In industrial centers, nationalist parties and organizations received significantly fewer votes than in agricultural areas and rural areas in general. Thus, while in the Kiev electoral district petty-bourgeois nationalists received (mainly at the expense of the rural population) almost 80% of the vote, in the Donetsk-Kryvyi Rih basin - only 23% 34 . The same picture is found when comparing the election results for entire districts. So, if in the Transcaucasian district nationalists of various stripes unconditionally dominated, then in Estonia, where the influence of the working class and its party was stronger, they received only 27.9% of the vote. In the most industrially developed national regions (the Baltic States, the Donbass, etc.), the influence of nationalist parties and organizations was always small, and by the fall of 1917, the number of people living in the Soviet Union was very low. it's even lower. In these regions, the working class and its party, having led the broad masses of working people, became the main representatives of national interests.
The nationalists retained their positions in areas where the forces of the working class were weaker, where petty-bourgeois sentiments prevailed. These areas included the agricultural provinces of the UK-
31 Spirin L. M. UK. soch., pp. 416-419.
32 TsGAOR USSR, f. 1791, op. 6, 21, l. 80.
33 The Great October Socialist Revolution in Belarus, vol. 2, p. 197.
34 Rybalka I. K. UK. soch., pp. 118-119.
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rainy mountains, vast territories of Central Asia, and some others. However, even where the nationalists retained their influence, distrust of the Provisional Government and its great-power national policy grew. In the autumn of 1917, Lenin wrote: "The annexationist, grossly violent policy of Bonapartist Kerensky and Co. towards the inferior nations of Russia has borne fruit. The broad mass of the population of the oppressed nations, i.e., the mass of the petty bourgeoisie among them, trusts the proletariat of Russia more than the bourgeoisie, for here history has placed on the agenda the struggle of the oppressed nations against the oppressors for emancipation. " 35
The development of the revolution in a historically short period of time has convinced the broad masses of the national regions that the bourgeois-landlord government is incapable not only of fairly resolving acute and vital issues, but also of giving genuine national freedom. Describing the process of Bolshevization of the working people of the national districts, the Twelfth Congress of the RCP (b) noted: "If the Russification policy of tsarism has created a gulf between Tsarism and the nationalities of old Russia, and the semi-imperialist policy of the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries has led to the departure of the best elements of these nationalities from Kerenskyism, then the liberation policy of our party has won the sympathy and support of the broad masses of these nationalities in their struggle against Tsarism and the imperialist Russian bourgeoisie. There can hardly be any doubt that this sympathy and support served as one of the decisive moments that determined the victory of our party in the October days. " 36
All this shows that national problems played a major role in the mood of the population of national regions, and the working class still had a large and multifaceted work to do to overcome the misconceptions and misconceptions in this area, which were subject to quite a large number of working people in national regions. Analyzing the results of the elections to the Constituent Assembly on an all-Russian scale in relation to the national question, Lenin noted that "the hesitation of the non-proletarian working masses on such a question is quite natural, even inevitable, but not at all terrible for the proletariat. A representative of the proletariat who really knows how to be an internationalist must treat such fluctuations with the greatest caution and tolerance, and must leave it to the non-proletarian working masses themselves to overcome these fluctuations by their own experience." 37
The results of the elections in national districts showed that the broad masses in them, as in the whole country, have not yet acquired " such a high level of consciousness, firmness of character, insight and broad political outlook that they will be able to decide by one vote, or in any way decide in advance, without long experience of the struggle, that they are going for such and such a class or for such and such a party. " 38 In addition, it must be borne in mind that in the autumn of 1917, when the alignment of class forces in Russia was changing rapidly, the elections could not, of course, fully reflect it correctly.
Considering the results of the Constituent Assembly elections from the point of view of the attitude of voters to the question of power, one should count among the supporters of the Bolshevik way of solving it not only those who voted for the candidates of the Leninist Party, but also some of those who voted for representatives of other parties. The main Bolshevik demand-
35 Lenin V. I. PSS. Vol. 34, p. 299.
36 CPSU in resolutions and decisions of congresses, conferences and plenums of the Central Committee. Ed. 8-E. T. 2, pp. 435-436.
37 Lenin V. I. PSS. Vol. 40, p. 20.
38 Ibid., p. 15.
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Message - " All power to the Soviets!" - it was widely popular among the masses, and at that time it was also supported by some left-wing groups in the ranks of non-Proletarian parties, especially the Social Revolutionaries. Therefore, many voters, while voting for the candidates of these parties, also voted for the solution of the fundamental question of the revolution in the way indicated by the Bolsheviks. For example ,in the Kazan district, the right SRS received only 1.2% of the vote, while the left, which then supported the Bolsheviks on the issue of power, received 30.3% .39 Therefore, some of the deputies of the Constituent Assembly elected in the national districts, formally representing the petty-bourgeois and even some bourgeois parties, essentially supported the Bolshevik position on the fundamental question of the revolution. Lenin's conclusion that "because of this, even formal, correspondence between the will of the electors in their mass and the composition of those elected to the Constituent Assembly does not and cannot exist" 40 fully applies to the results of elections based on the party affiliation of those elected in national districts.
The natural fluctuations of the petty-bourgeois strata of the working people of the national regions, which were clearly manifested in the results of the Constituent Assembly elections, fully confirmed the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the class struggle, the position of the leading role of the working class and its allies in the revolutionary battles, and the decisive importance of the fundamental question of the revolution. Based on an analysis of the results of the Constituent Assembly elections, Lenin showed that in order "to win the majority of the population to its side, the proletariat must first overthrow the bourgeoisie and seize state power into its own hands," 41 in other words, first of all resolve the fundamental question of the revolution in favor of the working class and its allies. At the same time, the results of the Constituent Assembly elections in the national districts show that the working class faced an even greater and more difficult struggle to win over the broad masses of working people and overcome the influence of nationalists of various stripes. This struggle developed with particular force after the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the country.
The question of power in Russia in the autumn of 1917 could not be decided by a vote: this required other, revolutionary forms and methods of expressing the will of the broad working masses (including armed struggle), which led not to the establishment of a bourgeois-democratic parliamentary republic, but to the transformation of Russia into a Republic of Soviets - a much higher form democracy. Returning to the analysis of the results of the Constituent Assembly elections, Lenin wrote in 1922, referring to the most active strata of the working people, that "in fact, not in voting, but in the struggle for the Bolsheviks, at the end of October and in November 1917, there was a majority of the proletariat and class-conscious peasantry, represented by the majority of the delegates of the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets" and the majority of the multi-million-strong army 42 . In this respect, the results of the Constituent Assembly elections, both for the country as a whole and for the national regions, did not reflect the process of revolutionizing the broad masses of the working people, noticeably lagging behind it. The development of the revolution has clearly shown that the working people of the country are "extremely prepared to accept the Soviet system" 43. and this readiness of theirs was reflected in the position adopted by the delegates to the Second Congress of Soviets on the fundamental question of the revolution, a position that expressed the mood of the broad masses of working people.-
39 Gorodetsky E. N. UK. soch., p. 441. " Lenin V. I. PSS. Vol. 35, p. 163.
41 Ibid.;. Vol. 40, p. 14.
42 Ibid., vol. 45, p. 175.
43 Ibid., vol. 41, p. 43.
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the shield. Lenin noted: "The Soviets, the organ of the struggle of the oppressed masses, naturally reflected and expressed the moods and changing views of these masses immeasurably faster, more fully, and more accurately than any other institutions." 44
Let us now turn to some points that characterize the will of the working people of the national regions, and above all of the working class, on the fundamental question of the revolution, as clearly and clearly expressed by them in connection with the convocation and work of the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets, which finally decided the question of power in the country.
As the revolutionary mood of the masses grew stronger, demands were made for the immediate convocation of the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets. As early as August 30, the Baku Soviet demanded that the All-Russian Central Executive Committee convene a congress of Soviets "to make a final decision on the creation of an authoritative government." 45 On September 24, the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party decided to "conduct a broad campaign everywhere and pass resolutions in various Soviets demanding the immediate convocation of a congress." 46 In response to this decision, the flow of demands for an early convocation of the Congress of Soviets sharply increased. As a rule, they were combined with demands for the transfer of all power in the country to the Soviets. Such demands also came from the national districts, most of all from those where there were significant contingents of the working class and strong Bolshevik organizations. In September and October, these demands were loudly voiced at workers 'meetings and meetings, and in decisions of various workers' organizations in Latvia, Estonia, Ukraine ,Bashkiria, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Bessarabia, Central Asia, and other national regions. 47 The mass character of these demands testifies to the desire of the workers of the national districts, and above all of the working class, to overthrow the Provisional Government, and to their readiness to support the Soviets ' assumption of State power.
However, in some national regions, mostly industrially backward, where the influence of bourgeois nationalists was strong, individual mass organizations still retained confidence in the Provisional Government and opposed the Bolshevik program for solving the fundamental question of the revolution. Such sentiments were most common in some parts of Central Asia. Thus, on September 12, the Tashkent Regional and Syrdarya Regional Councils called for the participation in the Government of "representatives of all those organized strata of the bourgeoisie - without any exceptions - who agree to work with democracy." 48 The same position was adopted by the Kokand Council on 17 October. 49 On 24 October, the Zaisan Council in Turkestan expressed confidence in the Interim Government. 50 But such facts were relatively few in the national regions, and they were drowned in mass demands for the convocation of a congress of Soviets and the transfer of all power in the country to them.
The will of the working people of all the peoples of Russia, their desire to resolve the fundamental question of the revolution in favor of establishing the power of Soviets in the country, was expressed at the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets.-
44 Ibid., vol. 37, p. 281.
45 The revolutionary movement in Russia in August 1917 Defeat of the Kornilov revolt. Sat. doc. Moscow, 1959, p. 167.
46 Minutes of the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b). August 1917-February 1915, Moscow, 1958, p. 69.
47 Cm. The Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets. and m-lov. M. 1957, p. 88, 89, 90, 98, 99, 103, 106, 108, 128, 132, 134, 135, 137, 138, 140, 146, 150, 151, 153, 157, 165, 172, 173 175, 180, 188, 190, 192, 193, 194, 198, 202, 211, 212, as well as numerous other documentary publications.
48 TsGAOR USSR, f. 6978, op. 1, d. 447, ll. 26, 28-30.
49 Ibid., f. 1235, op. 80, d. 50, l. 3.
50 Ibid., f. 6978, op. 1, d. 447, l. 9.
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mu, according to Lenin's Plan 51, was given the power that had been taken from the Provisional Government by the insurgent workers and the Petrograd garrison. The work of the congress, its decisions and their world-historical significance are covered in detail in many works and are reflected in a number of documentary publications .52 We will confine ourselves to a brief description of the positions of the delegates who came to the Congress from the national districts and expressed the demands of their working class and all working people.
The following national regions of Russia were represented at the II All-Russian Congress of Soviets: Ukraine, Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkestan, Bessarabia, Karelia, Tataria, Bashkiria, Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Udmurtia, Mordovia 53 .. According to the calculations of Academician I. I. Mints, the national districts were represented at the congress by 228 delegates: 122 from Ukraine (69 Soviets), 51 from Belarus, 26 from the Baltic States, 12 from Transcaucasia, 9 from the North Caucasus, 5 from Central Asia, and 3 from Bessarabia . These data do not contain information about delegates from Karelia, Tatarstan, Bashkiria, Udmurtia, and Mordovia. In addition, according to recent estimates, the number of delegates from some districts was somewhat higher (for example, Ukraine was represented by 143 delegates from 78 Soviets) .55 But regardless of these and other details, it is an indisputable fact that the national districts of the country are very widely represented at the congress. The Ekaterinoslav newspaper Zvezda rightly pointed out that the II All-Russian Congress of Soviets was attended by " representatives of almost all nationalities: Ukrainians, Poles, Lithuanians, Latvians, Jews, Belarusians, Georgians" and therefore the congress expressed the will of all the peoples of the country .56
It should also be emphasized that the largest number of delegates from national districts represented industrial centers and regions. So, if from Central Asia there were only 5 delegates, and from Bessarabia - 3, then from Donbass-27, from the Baltic States - 26; Kiev - 7, Odessa - 8, Ekaterinoslav - 7, Kharkiv - 6, Revel - 7, Baku - 4 delegates 57 . This shows the leading role of the working class at the Congress. The same is confirmed by the data on the party composition of delegates who arrived at the congress from national districts. Among the delegates from Ukraine , there were 65 (45.4%) Bolsheviks , 58 from Belarus - 24,59, 4 (out of 5) 60 from Central Asia ,6 61 from Transcaucasia, and so on. More than half of the delegates from national regions were Bolsheviks. 62 It is characteristic that industrial centers, as a rule, were sent to the congress of the Bolsheviks. Thus, three Bolsheviks and one left SR were elected delegates from the Baku Soviet, and three Bolsheviks and two srs were elected delegates from the Revel Soviet .63 The Bolsheviks prevailed among the delegates of the Donbass, Latvia and other industrially developed regions.
51 See Lenin V. I. PSS. Vol. 34, pp. 266-267.
52 Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets of R. and S. D. Collection of doc. 1928; The Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets; History of the CPSU. Vol. 3, book 1. Moscow, 1967; Mints I. I. UK. soch. Vol. 2. Moscow, 1968; et al.
53 Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets of R. and S. D., pp. 112-143.
54 Mints I. I. UK. soch. T. 2, p. 1100.
55 Vargatyuk P. L. et al. UK. soch., p. 227.
56 Cit. by: Soldatenko V. F. Tribune of Proletarian Internationalism. Kyiv. 1977, p. 136
57 Mints I. I. UK. soch. T. 2, p. 1100.
58 Vargatyuk P. L. et al. UK. soch., p. 227.
59 The Victory of Soviet Power in Belarus, vol. 2, p. 253.
60 The victory of Soviet power in Central Asia and Kazakhstan. Tashkent, 1967, p. 353.
61 The victory of Soviet power in Transcaucasia, pp. 185-186.
62 Chugaev D. A. The Communist Party-organizer of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Moscow, 1972, p. 98.
63 The Victory of Soviet power in Transcaucasia, p. 185; History of the Estonian SSR, vol. III. Tallinn. 1974, p. 78.
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In conclusion, we will focus on the position of the congress delegates and the National District Councils represented by them on the issue of power, the main point of the instructions and resolutions handed over locally to the congress delegates. According to the questionnaires of the Bolshevik faction of the Congress, 105 Soviets of national districts expressed an official attitude to the question of power. Of these, based on the received instructions, in the column "All power to the Soviets" - 74, "All power to democracy" - 14, "Coalition power" - 6; 11 filled out 2-3 columns 64. In favor of establishing the power of the Soviets were: from Ukraine-56.7% of Councils and 57.8% of delegates; from Belarus-13 city councils out of 17 represented at the congress; from Central Asia-all delegates; from Bessarabia-all 65 delegates . These data show that even in the national regions, the working people, and above all the working class, "turned away from the petty-bourgeois leadership, from the illusions of an agreement with the bourgeoisie, and went over to the side of the proletarian revolutionary struggle for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie." 66
Expressing the will of the vast majority of the working people of all the peoples of the country, the Congress (with 2 votes against and 12 abstentions) adopted an appeal written by Lenin "To the workers, soldiers and peasants!" It said: "Relying on the will of the vast majority of the workers, soldiers and peasants, relying on the victorious insurrection of the workers and the garrison that has taken place in Petrograd, the Congress takes power into its own hands." The appeal went on to say: "The Congress decides that all local power is transferred to the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers 'and Peasants' Deputies." 67 The fundamental question of the revolution was finally and irrevocably resolved in favor of the working people of Russia; the revolution won, which "must ultimately lead to the victory of socialism." 68
The overthrow of the Provisional Government, the decisions of the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets on the universal transfer of power to the Soviets, on peace, on land, on the self-determination of peoples, and the formation of the Soviet Government were in the vital interests of all the peoples of the country, and were of a truly internationalist nature. The news of the October events in Petrograd, spreading to all corners of multinational Russia, helped to rally all the detachments of the Russian working class into a single political army of the socialist revolution. This is one of the most striking signs of its international character and its liberating significance for all the peoples of the country.
64 Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets of R. and S. D., pp. 144-152.
65 In the struggle for Soviet power in the Ukraine. Kyiv. 1977, p. 157; Victory of Soviet Power in Belarus, Vol. 2, p. 255; Victory of Soviet Power in Central Asia and Kazakhstan, p. 353; Esaulenko A. S. The Socialist Revolution in Moldova and the political collapse of bourgeois nationalism. Chisinau. 1977, p. 81.
66 Lenin V. I. PSS. Vol. 37, p. 281.
67 Ibid., vol. 35, p. 11.
68 Ibid., p. 2.
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