Recent years in Cambodia have been marked by increasingly close interaction between the ruling Cambodian People's Party (CPP)and the leadership of the Buddhist Sangha. There is a clear desire of the authorities to use the Buddhist community to their advantage. The involvement of monasticism in official politics gives the country's leadership additional means of controlling the Sangha and opens up ample opportunities for manipulating the "resources of religious charisma", which in Cambodia are no less important than human or material ones. The scale and nature of the political activism of the sangha representatives is determined, on the one hand, by the degree of strength of the ruling regime, the interests of its various political forces, and, on the other, by the level of influence and authority of the Sangha itself.

Keywords: Cambodia, Buddhism, Sangha, monks, ruling elite, monetary patronage, People's Party of Cambodia.

An objective assessment of the current state of the Buddhist Sangha in Cambodia is possible only in the context of the history of recent decades. In the 1970s, the Sangha was virtually destroyed, and the religious infrastructure was severely damaged. During the civil war, as a result of the massive bombing of the territory of Cambodia by US aircraft, as well as as a result of the four-year rule of the Khmer Rouge, 25 thousand monks (more than 40%)¹ were killed, including 900 leaders of the sangha of the central and provincial level ² [Sou Ketya, 2005, p. 28]. 200 Buddhist hierarchs were killed by the Khmer Rouge. They were killed by the Khmer Rouge in the first two weeks after the seizure of power in April 1975. The Sangha itself was abolished as a "bearer of false religious views", and the monks were sent to "labor re-education".

During this period, half of the temples were completely destroyed, the rest, occupied as warehouses, prisons, barracks, were in an extremely neglected state. The monastery's archives and libraries were burned. 30 thousand religious books and 4 thousand Buddhist manuscripts disappeared without a trace from the funds of the Phnom Penh Buddhist Institute (Harris, 2007, p. 169). The religious education system was abolished.

After the formation of the People's Republic of Kampuchea (NRC) (1979 - 1989), the Buddhist Sangha was restored. However, the authorities tried to limit its status to the role of one of the public organizations that, within the existing authoritarian system, was supposed to work for the benefit of future "socialist ideals".

¹ By 1970, there were about 60,000 monks and 3,000 monasteries in the country.

² Currently, there is no consensus on the number of monks killed by the Khmer Rouge. These figures are official statistics of the Ministry of Cults and Religious Affairs.

The first signs of a revival of religious activity appeared in Cambodia in 1989 during the national reconciliation process. A landmark event was the public repentance of the then Prime Minister of Cambodia, ³-Hun Sen, who, during an official event in Kampot Province, knelt in front of a monk and asked for forgiveness for "the government's misguided policy regarding religion," implying the many restrictions that were imposed on believers and the Sangha in Cambodia. The 1980s [Vodano Sophan, 2005, p. 6]. This was followed by the proclamation of Buddhism as the state religion in 1990, the resumption of the annual Buddhist Congresses in 1992, and the formation of the Ministry of Cults and Religions in 1993.

After the restoration of the monarchy and the formation of a new state - the Kingdom of Cambodia in 1993, the triad "nation-throne-religion" was declared the main ideologeme of the national doctrine and enshrined in the constitution. The very fact of the restoration of the monarchy indirectly testified to the revival of Buddhism, since in the Khmer political tradition the monarchical principle is inseparable from the Buddhist worldview, an important component of which remains the concept of a "righteous king". Buddhism has always been the value foundation of the Khmer monarchy. It is no coincidence that the statement on the principles of the policy of the Royal Government of Cambodia, in particular, noted: "Khmer Buddhism serves to strengthen the foundations of royal power" [Statement..., 1993, p. 2].

The political stabilization and economic growth that began in the 1990s had a positive impact on the religious sphere, triggering a kind of Buddhist renaissance that has been going on for the past two decades. Moreover, it took place against the backdrop of a large - scale transformation of Cambodian society-its transition from a planned economy to a market economy and from an authoritarian regime to a more democratic political system. The changing milestones of political and economic development, the rapid opening up of the country to the outside world and Western culture, and the introduction of new forms of life have created a special need to turn to religion, which has traditionally helped the Khmer people maintain psychological stability and social harmony in an era of change, and to society as a whole - stability and national identity. From century to century, religious values in Cambodia have permeated all spheres of life - politics, ideology, economy and social structure. Accordingly, significant changes in the socio-political and economic context could not but affect the religious values themselves, the bearer of which in society is the Buddhist sangha.

The revival of the Sangha was primarily reflected in its numerical growth and strengthening of the monastery economy. From 1989 to 2010, the number of monks in Cambodia increased 7-fold - from 8 to 57.3 thousand people, and the number of monasteries increased 1.5-fold - from 2.8 to 4.4 thousand [Hun Sen, 23.01.2011].

Significant changes have occurred in the age structure of the sangha. If in the 1960s it was dominated by representatives of the older generation, now experienced, elderly monks with considerable experience in the monastery, who are considered the mainstay of religious tradition and moral principles, make up only a small segment of the Sangha - about 1/5 of its members. The remaining 4/5 are young people under the age of 30, mostly from poor peasant families. The Buddhist community provides them with some guarantee of existence in purely material terms, as well as provides strong social security. It also has a sacred status

³ In 1989, the People's Republic of Kampuchea was renamed the State of Cambodia, which lasted until September 1993, when a new State, the Kingdom of Cambodia, was formed as a result of general elections.

morally compensates for economic "belittlement", contributing to social self-affirmation.

The rapid growth in the number of monasteries has revealed the problem of a shortage of trained monastic personnel, especially senior staff. As a result, many temples are headed by abbots who are poorly versed in Buddhist teachings, who are poorly acquainted with their duties and have little authority among the laity, and some monasteries are completely left without them. According to the Ministry of Cults and Religious Affairs," too many monasteries are being built in the country, and it is better that the money spent on this should be directed to other urgent needs of the Buddhist Sangha " (Ledgerwood, 2008, p. 159). These include, first of all, improving the quality of religious education and restoring the intellectual potential of monasticism.

With the revival of the Sangha, the religious factor began to play a significant role in the political life of Cambodia. The intention of the country's ruling circles to turn the Buddhist community into their mainstay is becoming increasingly clear. A deliberate demonstration of support for the Sangha and commitment to Buddhism is an essential element of the political image of the Cambodian People's Party. The country's political leader, Prime Minister Hun Sen, is increasingly using the patronage of the Sangha as a hidden mechanism for traditional legitimization of his power.

At first glance, in such a monarchical country as Cambodia, any claims to the role of patron of the Buddhist sangha look, at least, inappropriate, since the monarch is a priori such. However, the Hun Sen regime is trying (and quite successfully) to compete with the king in this field, using a variety of means-organizational and political, financial and economic, formal and protocol.

In order to reduce the king's influence⁴ Thammayutika. When she returned to Cambodia in 1991, a conflict situation arose in the Sangha. Thammayutika immediately tried to reclaim its former monasteries. The richest of them, according to the personal adviser to the head of Thammayutika, were concentrated in the capital: "When we returned, all of them were already occupied by Mahanikai monks. After becoming the patron of the Buddhist Sangha after his coronation, N. Sihanouk made a lot of efforts to return our monastery property, to protect the rights of the Nikaya, which is closely connected with his family"⁵. This was especially true of the capital's main monastery, Botumwuatday, which served as the residence of the head of Thammayutika since 1866. However, the dispute over the monastery was lost by Thammayutika, and the vast territory with all the temple buildings on it remained at the disposal of Mahanikai.

According to Thammayuthika's management, this decision was based solely on political motivations6. Indeed, the desire to prevent the revival of the authority of the royal Nikaya among believers was an integral part of the religious policy of Hun Sen and his entourage, who initially relied on the mass Mahanikaya sect in order to turn it into their strategic partner in the struggle for the electorate. Powerful state patronage (financial, political, informational) Mahanikai still allows it to maintain its position as the "exclusive guardian" of Buddhist values in Cambodia.

As a result, Botumwuatday became the seat of Non Nget, the second-highest-ranking hierarch of Mahanikai, and in fact a "platform" for NPC religious events. So,

⁴ Nikaya-a division of the sangha, often referred to by the word sect in Buddhist literature. Traditionally, the sangha in Cambodia was represented by two Nikayas - the mass Mahanikaya and the small, elite, serving the royal family Thammayutika. During the NRK period, Thammayutika was banned as "royalist, anti-people".

⁵ Interview taken by the author on November 20, 2010.

⁶ Ibid.

Speaking at the Non Nget anniversary event in May 2010, Hun Sen said: "The Botumwuatday Temple is the main place for all religious rituals, both for the leaders of the Cambodian People's Party and for my family members" [Hun Sen, 21.05.2010].

The next important step in consolidating Mahanikai's privileged position was to reorganize the Sangha's management. Traditionally, both Nikayas were completely independent in organizational terms. In 2007, at the suggestion of Hun Sen, the post of the unified head of the Sangha was introduced. It was taken over by the former head of Mahanikai, Tep Wong, a loyal supporter of Hun Sen, who has worked closely with him since the 1980s. Currently, the three highest hierarchs in the sangha - Tep Wong himself, his deputy and at the same time the head of Mahanikai Non Nget, as well as the head of the metropolitan branch of the sangha Yik Nai - are clergymen who held senior positions during the NRK period and have long-standing friendly relations with Hun Sen.

The most effective means of establishing the Cambodian People's Party as a "Buddhist party" and the Prime Minister as a real patron of the Sangha are monetary offerings to the monastic community, which in terms of the amount, intensity of donations, and most importantly, the scale of advertising accompanying them, far exceed the religious charity of the king, the traditional patron of the Sangha.

In 2010 - 2011, at least 80 new monasteries were built annually in the country. Based on the average cost of building a monastery - about $ 155 thousand, the cost of religious construction annually reached $ 12.5 million. More than 90% of this amount was made up of donations from the country's political and business elite. If an ordinary Khmer in the province donates about $ 10 for the construction of a monastery, and in the capital - about $ 50, then representatives of the ruling elite give tens of thousands of dollars. The construction of the monastery occupies the top step in the hierarchy of "good religious deeds"among the Khmer people. "Religious merit" - bon-is a value criterion that still serves as an important means for the majority of the Cambodian population to identify themselves and others, determine their status in the social hierarchy, and structure social behavior in general. The greater a person's religious merit, the higher their place in the traditional hierarchy. That is why "earning merit" is always a public act, especially when it comes to political figures.

According to ordinary Cambodians, the ruling circles practically monopolized the variety of" religious merit " received from the construction of the monastery. Usually, the monetary offerings of Cambodians for the construction of the temple were small. They built the monastery "with the whole world": someone gave building materials (sand, wood, bricks), someone brought rice, which was used as a monetary equivalent to exchange for missing building materials, ⁷ someone worked on the construction site himself. It was this kind of joint action that gave rise to a sense of" peasant solidarity "and" national unity", and fostered a spirit of mutual assistance. The Khmer elite, adhering to this tradition, although they donated quite significant sums for the construction of temples, they also left a "niche" for ordinary Khmer people in earning merit through the construction of a monastery.

Currently, according to many ordinary Cambodians, the party and state bosses - neak thom-have forced out of their spiritual world the most important component-participation in the construction of the monastery [Kent, 2007, p.348-349]. The fact is that most monasteries are less and less in need of the modest contribution of ordinary Khmer people. Receiving large sums of money from the political elite, they prefer to buy the necessary building materials and hire them

⁷ In the 60s of the XX century, many Khmer monasteries created a so-called building fund, which the monks used to repair, reconstruct or expand the monastery. As a rule, farmers after harvesting made a contribution to this fund with rice.

professional workers. As a result, monks look for any means to get substantial money for the monastery, and the most reliable way is to invite a high-ranking official to a religious ceremony. One of the employees of the Ministry of Cults and Religious Affairs explains this as follows: "The Mevuat should definitely invite some of the influential members of the NPC to the ceremony in the monastery, since this is the largest party in the country and it has very extensive network structures on the ground. This does not mean that the monks are sympathetic to the NPC, but without its patronage, the pagoda will not be able to receive any significant help for its development. It should be remembered that in our country everything is under the control of the NPC, and therefore monks need to show flexibility" [Kent, 2007, p. 349]. Moreover, the clergy not only invites party bosses to preside over various religious ceremonies, but increasingly trusts them to lay the foundation stone of a new monastery, i.e., to actually determine its "sacred space".

The undisputed leader in sponsoring the construction of monasteries is Prime Minister Hun Sen and his family. So, in November 2010 Hun Sen and his wife Boon Rani donated $ 367,000. for the construction of a new temple in the province of Preah Viheah [Koh Santepheep, 15.11.2010]. Religious charity has become public in Cambodia. The names of donors are necessarily indicated on the massive stone fences of monasteries and, thus, are known to every passer-by. Prime Minister Hun Sen's personal monogram is displayed in all major monasteries in the capital.

A high level of religious offerings is typical for most members of the ruling elite. The most generous donors include, among others, Deputy Prime Minister and Head of his Office Sok Ahn, Deputy Prime Minister and Interior Minister So Kheng, Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Tea Ban, Phnom Penh Mayor Kep Chuk Tema, Justice Minister Ang Wong Wattana, Information Minister Khieu Kanyarit, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea. People's Party of Cambodia, President of the Senate Chea Sim and others. The Khmer Wat Construction Company, which monopolized contracts for the construction of large temples, is headed by Hun Sen's old friend Oknya ⁸ Mong Rythi.

One of the main Buddhist holidays in Cambodia, Bon Kathen, when the Sangha make the largest monetary offerings, has been elevated to the state level. Traditionally, every year one of the country's temples is chosen for the official Kathena ceremony. For strategic reasons, in 2010 this temple became Preah Viheah, which Thailand claims to own. The main Kathen was held on November 12, 2010, under the chairmanship of Hun Sen and his wife Boon Rani, who donated $ 367,000 to the Sangha. At the same time, they distributed $ 2.5 and a sarong each as gifts to two thousand local residents who participated in the ceremony [Koh Santephiep, 15.11.2010]. On the same day, Deputy Prime Minister Sok Ahn and the Prime Minister's wife Boon Rani held another Kathen at the Svai Tyum Temple in Preah Viheah province, giving him $ 200,000. [Rasmei Kampuchea, 13.11.2010]. All ministries and provincial governors were ordered to participate in the festival. The Khmer press was full of reports about their offerings to the Sangha. So, the Ministry of Defense gave monks 50 thousand dollars, the Ministry of Agriculture-44 thousand, the Ministry of Social Problems and Veterans ' Affairs-31 thousand, the Ministry of Information-17 thousand, the governor of Banteay province Myen Tey-25 thousand, the governor of Battambang-19 thousand, the deputies of the National Assembly from Kampot province-22 thousand dollars. Khmer newspapers published a detailed account of the participation of high-ranking political figures in Kathen, as well as members of the Prime Minister's family. So, according to press reports, Hun Sen's father-Hun Neang participated in the PR-

⁸ For the meaning of the term, see below.

organizations of the holiday in three metropolitan monasteries, giving each 30 thousand dollars. [Koh Santepheep, 16.11.2010].

However, the generous charity of the ruling elite towards the Sangha is not limited to the period of religious holidays. For example, in January 2011. Hun Sen and his wife donated $ 318,000 to the Popae Pile Temple. for the construction of a Buddhist University on its territory, in March - 152 thousand dollars. for the construction of a monastery in Battambang province [Hun Sen, 23.01.2011].

Large monetary donations have allowed the NPC to establish an extensive client network among abbots of monasteries both in the capital and in the provinces. Often, the construction of temple complexes begins with the cell of the abbot of the monastery. Some of them are not inferior in size and financial costs to the monastery itself. Thus, 150 thousand dollars were collected for the construction of the cell of the head of the capital's Lanka monastery in 2010. Hun Sen and his father gave 20 thousand dollars each. Information Minister Khieu Kanyarit, Phnom Penh Mayor Kep Chuk Tema, and Deputy Communications Minister Sarak Khan also provided significant sums. The abode of the abbot of the main Botumvuatday monastery in the capital was built entirely at the expense of Hun Sen and his wife.

Powerful financial injections into the Buddhist Sangha have led to an increased role for the acharyas⁹ who have traditionally been the link between the monastery and the laity. They were responsible for the mission of raising money for the monastery's needs. Their" monastic background", their local roots, their thorough knowledge of village problems, and their worldly experience give acaryas a high level of authority, usually exceeding the influence of local authorities. Their status as" informal " leaders is never questioned by the villagers, as it is based on a strong foundation of traditional values and beliefs.

Currently, acaryas, controlling the money received as gifts for the monastery from politicians of various levels, actually act as intermediaries between them and the villagers and thereby become increasingly involved in vertical connections. They often initiate the collection of donations themselves, addressing a specific high-ranking person on behalf of the rural community, explaining that "the arrival of, for example, an influential member of the NPC guarantees them not only a large sum of money, but also patronage of the monastery by local authorities" (Kent, 2007, p.348).

Given the strong authority of the Acharyas as "informal" leaders, the ruling elites tend to use them as" agents of their influence " on the ground, giving them an important place in their network structure. This allows the acharyas to attract more money to the village, and the party bosses to influence the mood of the peasants, in whose minds the attitude of support for political figures who provide financial assistance to their monastery is fixed.

Given Cambodia's market-oriented reforms, accompanied by land redistribution, and various economic projects that are sometimes unsafe for the environment, it is particularly important for the authorities to provide support to local informal leaders. The ruling party is not averse to including such leaders with a traditional form of legitimacy in the local political process, sometimes relying on them to a greater extent than on formally elected authorities, especially since in many districts it is the pagoda that becomes the arena of electoral activities. The acharya of one of the capital's monasteries admits:: "I know what my patron needs-votes, and I can't resist his pressure." He is echoed by the acharya of Siem Reap Monastery: "Our patron is me cha-

^{The acharya} is a very secular person, supervises religious ceremonies in which believers take part, and provides communication between the monastery and the village.

The SRT says that I should urge the villagers to support the ruling party, especially in the elections, if we want to continue receiving support for the temple. " ¹⁰

Giving to the Sangha brings much more merit than any secular charity. In this regard, some acharyas, understanding the importance of developing economic infrastructure to improve the lives of villagers, urge patrons from the center to send offerings not only to the temple, but also to infrastructure facilities, assuring them that this also leads to the accumulation of "religious merit". Thus, one of the acharyas explains :" Now the wealthy people are fixated only on the construction of pagodas and religious offerings, completely losing sight of the importance of the social sphere. However, the development of public infrastructure, i.e. the construction of roads and bridges, also brings merit to the donor. I'm trying to get this across to the high patrons. " ¹¹

The growing authority of the acharyas leads to the fact that the peasant population listens to their advice much more attentively than to the appeals of the local administration. Representatives of local authorities do not hide: "It is sometimes difficult for us to explain a particular conflict situation to the peasants from a legal point of view. Best of all, if the acharya does this, based on the principles of Buddhism and the law of karma" [Thon Vimealea, 2009, p. 52]. Relying on traditional leaders-acharyas and abbots of monasteries - has become an essential element of the NPR's strategy to attract potential voters.

The regime is also strengthened by the recently increased religious activity of an influential stratum of businessmen who managed to get the title of village chief. In colonial Cambodia, this title was given to high-ranking officials for long and impeccable service. Now the title of oknya is granted by the king on the recommendation of the Cabinet of Ministers mainly to entrepreneurs who have spent more than 100 thousand dollars. for charity, including religious ones [Thon Vimealea, 2009, p. 34]. In fact, in exchange for a charitable contribution of 100 thousand dollars. oknya acquires values of a different kind - connections, influence, and power. Regular monetary donations to monasteries, as the most important component of the philanthropic activities of the monastery, are not so much evidence of the high religiosity of businessmen, but rather a kind of way to launder and legitimize new fortunes that are not always obtained in a righteous way.

According to the villagers, local villages not only give money for religious activities themselves, but also mobilize their clientele, as well as attract funds from high-ranking patrons from the center. It is precisely because of his title, rather than his financial position, that Oknya gains a high social status in the eyes of local residents, which helps him actively lobby for the interests of the ruling party [Thon Vimealea, 2009, p. 46].

Generous monetary patronage from the ruling circles objectively leads to political bias of the leadership of the Buddhist Sangha, which actually does not observe the principle of non-interference in politics, openly giving preference to the NPC. This is especially true for the head of the sangha Tep Wong, who in one of his interviews with The Phnom Penh Post frankly stated: "... there is a master party in the country that rules. Other parties are guests. Only the host party revives and protects Buddhism. Guest parties are destroying the Khmer national identity " [The Phnom Penh Post, 15-28.12.2006].

In all their public speeches, the hierarchs of the Sangha emphasize "the wise leadership of Prime Minister Hun Sen, thanks to which the country is experiencing an unprecedented flourishing of Buddhism" [Kampuchea Thmei, 14.11.2010]. They refer to Hun Sen as a "model Buddhist" and Monuh myeon bon as a man with a great deal of experience.-

¹⁰ From an interview taken by the author on November 19, 2010.

¹¹ Ibid.

a mom of religious merit, which cements his reputation as a leader with extraordinary vitality. On the pages of the most authoritative religious publication, Kamput Soreya, it was stated: "Hun Sen leads the country strictly adhering to the dharma and relying on the moral and ethical norms of Buddhism. The great success achieved by Cambodia in the last decade was made possible largely due to the Prime Minister's deep commitment to Buddhism "[Kamput Soreya, 2006, p. 96].

All of Hun Sen's own public appearances are colored with Buddhist rhetoric. He calls for expanding religious charity and strengthening the position of the Buddhist Sangha in society, for close cooperation "between the Buddhist and secular world." Hun Sen speaks of the urgent need to introduce such Buddhist principles as tolerance, peacefulness, and nonviolence into everyday life. "As long as we follow the norms of Buddhism, we will be guaranteed political stability - a necessary condition for successful economic development" [Hun Sen, 21.01.2003]. The Prime Minister positions himself as a "righteous Buddhist", as a statesman who cares about the moral character of his subordinates. So, he calls on officials to "refrain from unrighteous deeds", which is the key to their good karma. The Prime Minister directly links the decline in violence in society to the growing influence of Buddhism, which "reaches everyone's heart." Hun Sen explains the increased efficiency of the government's work by the fact that high-ranking officials have become more careful to follow the principles of Buddhism, which teaches people to "do only good deeds" [Hun Sen, 07.04.2006].

Among the most controversial political issues among monks is their participation in elections, which is permitted by the 1993 Constitution but discouraged by Buddhist injunctions that require clergy to stay out of politics. In the run-up to the 1998 and 2003 elections, the Sangha leadership issued a circular that "strongly recommended that monks refrain from participating in the elections." However, in 2006, the head of the sangha, Tep Wong, lifted the ban on participation in elections. As a result, according to the Ministry of Religious Affairs, a third of the members of the Sangha participated in the 2008 elections and voted for the ruling party [The Phnom Penh Post, 19.12.2008].

Khmer monk Hok Savann, Ph. D. in Buddhism, points out the dangers of such a policy: "The authorities, by attracting clergy to participate in elections, pursue their own short-term political goals - to get more votes from the electorate. They are unaware of the damage they are doing to the purity of the Buddhist religion itself. The Buddhist path is the middle way of non-alignment with the parties. This is non-or non-partisanship" [Hock Savann, 2008, p. 22].

However, in general, the majority of Buddhist youth positively assesses the fact of possible participation in the elections, arguing that "monks, as citizens of the country who are primarily concerned about the welfare of their compatriots, can participate in the election of worthy leaders of the country"¹². Despite the trend of increasing politicization of monasticism, few ordinary metropolitan monks participated in the 2008 elections, citing the lack of real freedom of political choice.

Many metropolitan monks do not hide the fact that the abbots of their monasteries are actively campaigning to vote for the ruling party during the elections. The monks of Onnaloom Monastery explain this as follows: "Abbots always try to support the strongest party that can guarantee the temple both substantial financial support and other forms of patronage. There is only one party in Cambodia that has the same capabilities - the People's Party of Cambodia. All monuh thom¹³ -

¹² From an interview with the author on November 13, 2010.

¹³ This is what Cambodia calls the politically powerful and economically wealthy.

these are members of the NPC. The financial base of opposition parties is limited. Therefore, the more powerful the financial injections into the Sangha from the NPC, the more active the support of the party by Buddhist hierarchs at different levels."¹⁴. This opinion is shared by the monks of the Proyurovong monastery: "The political sympathies of the abbots are explained by purely pragmatic considerations - caring for the monastery, ensuring its prosperity. However, we must not forget that the money of the party bosses ties the hands of the Sangha leadership, deprives it of its voice. Generous gifts to monasticism are politically beneficial to the government, which is gradually turning the sangha into a tool for solving its own secular problems. " ¹⁵

The monks of Botumvuatday Monastery explain: "Most abbots support the ruling regime, as they receive substantial financial assistance from it. On the eve of the elections, the abbot always talks to us, insistently urging us to support the NPC. It is difficult to disobey the advice of a senior mentor, so it is better not to vote at all." Their opinion is shared by the monks of the Koch Monastery: "During the election period, ballot boxes are installed in the monastery. Senior monks observe the voting process. We have no freedom of choice, no opportunity to vote for the opposition, so it is better to refrain from participating in the elections. " ¹⁶

Monks of the Svay Donkum monastery pay attention to the outright cynicism of those in power. "Representatives of the political elite do nothing selflessly. They won't give a dollar to a starving poor man. They do not spare money for charity, only when in return they receive an honorary title or "religious services". The ruling circles give large sums of money to the leaders of the sangha to help strengthen their authority"¹⁷. The monks note with concern that "during the reign of N. Sihanouk, the highest hierarchs were not afraid to criticize the authorities, but now the leadership of the sangha is firmly connected with the ruling elite, supporting it in everything" ¹⁸. In general, the youth of the monastery takes a rather categorical position, stating: "The authorities give our pagoda money and in return demand to support it her. They just buy us. We may not vote, but we can't help but think about what is happening in the country. Therefore, many young monks do not have peace and tranquility in their hearts. " ¹⁹

According to Hock Savannah, further involvement of the clergy in official politics, in particular through the electoral process, is fraught with a split in the Sangha [Hock Savannah, 2008, p.23]. The author's field research conducted in November 2010 in the capital's monasteries in Cambodia showed that a hidden schism already exists. While representatives of the official Buddhist establishment are closely allied with the ruling party, ordinary monks, at least in the capital, do not share the political sympathies of their leadership.

The vast majority of ordinary monks are young people between the ages of 18 and 30, coming from the provinces from poor peasant families, for whom joining the Sangha is the only opportunity to get an education. However, according to them, "government corruption and an all-encompassing system of patronage relations" leave them with little chance to realize themselves in the future.

Many of them are quite critical of the ruling party, sympathizing with the opposition, primarily the Sam Rainsy Party. Thus, the monks of Onnaloom Monastery are recognized as: "We do not support the political party that the majority of the population votes for." ²⁰ According to the monks of the monastery of Mohamontray,

¹⁴ From an interview conducted by the author on November 17, 2010.

¹⁵ From an interview conducted by the author on November 12, 2010.

¹⁶ From an interview conducted by the author on November 14, 2010.

¹⁷ From an interview conducted by the author on November 19, 2010.

¹⁸ From an interview with the author on November 18, 2010.

¹⁹ From an interview conducted by the author on November 19, 2010.

²⁰ From an interview conducted by the author on November 16, 2010.

"The Sam Rainsy party is popular in the capital not only among young people, but also among older citizens. However, since there are no real political freedoms in the country, citizens are afraid to express their political sympathies openly"²¹. The monks of the Proyurowong Monastery are more radical: "The NPC has monopolized everything in the country. It is intolerant of any competition. Those citizens - representatives of the intelligentsia and youth who sympathize with the opposition forces, do not dare to support them openly, because they are afraid of reprisals from the authorities, including physical violence. Among those who are critical of the ruling party and share the position of Rainsy Himself, there are also financially wealthy people -quite large businessmen. However, they prefer to hide their political sympathies, because they are afraid that, otherwise, the authorities will simply take away their business " ²².

Young clergy closely follow the activities of opposition parties, read their newspapers, and are familiar with their websites. Many of them express their disagreement with the policy of the ruling circles towards the opposition. The youth of Saravonteda Monastery explains their position as follows: "Different political opinions should be expressed in society. In our country, even if the opposition tries to offer something useful and useful for society, the ruling party will still convince citizens that all the opposition's proposals are harmful and incorrect."²³. The monks of Svai Donkum Monastery agree with this point of view: "To agree or disagree with the position of the Rensi Himself, he must first be given the opportunity to express it. His party is the only one that is not afraid to criticize the policy of the authorities. We respect Sam Rainsy for his courage. " ²⁴ Developing the topic of freedom of speech, one of the monks says: "Our political leaders talk a lot about the need for democratic freedoms, the rule of law, and multiparty relations. However, their actions do not correspond to their correct speech at all. Government officials do not tolerate criticism. Even if I, as a monk who is supposed to take care of the state of mind of the laity, express concern about the growing social inequality, I hear a contemptuous response: "So you must be a poor man from the provinces "" ²⁵.

One of the monks of the Proyurowong monastery described the relationship between government and the sangha as follows:"In the 1950s and 1970s, under Norodom Sihanouk, monks were the elite of society; now they are an instrument of power."²⁶. This rather categorical statement can only be partially accepted, since the sangha has always been an instrument of secular power. Buddhist hierarchs have traditionally served as the mainstay of all political regimes in Cambodia, and the young monastics have always been subject to various kinds of critical attitudes towards the authorities. However, it is necessary to recognize that quite typical for the Buddhist Sangha phenomena are now being implemented in a changed social context. First, the sangha has never received such an impressive amount of money before, since the country's ruling elites simply did not have such financial opportunities as they do today. Secondly, never before has the Khmer Sangha felt so acutely the absence of generally recognized spiritual authorities in its ranks who can resist the pressure of the authorities.

All this has led to the deliberately frank, devoid of traditional delicacy, nature of the activities of Buddhist hierarchs in support of state power. The previous historical experience of Cambodia clearly showed that the undisguised political commitment of the leadership of the sangha to power, as a rule,

²¹ From an interview conducted by the author on November 9, 2010.

²² From an interview with the author on November 18, 2010.

²³ From an interview conducted by the author on November 10, 2010.

²⁴ From an interview conducted by the author on November 19, 2010.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ From an interview with the author on November 12, 2010.

it leads to a "waste" of the sangha's religious charisma and a decrease in its prestige and authority in society.

The situation is compounded by the apparent decline in the overall level of discipline in the Sangha. The issue of monastic discipline was central to the agenda of the All-Cambodia Buddhist Congress in 2009 and 2010. Thus, in his speech at the congress in 2009, Senate President Chea Sim stated that there is growing distrust of the sangha in society, since monks do not observe the moral and ethical precepts of Buddhism and have ceased to be "models of Buddhist morality" in the eyes of the population."[The Phnom Penh Post, 30.12.2009]. Monk Hock Savann sees a strong link between the politicization of the Sangha and the decline in discipline in its ranks. He explains this connection as follows: "The key to the unity, prosperity and high authority of the Sangha is the strict observance of the rules of Vinaya by all its members. By participating in elections, which the monks are being pushed to do by politicians, they are violating the Vinaya. And if a monk has violated one provision of the disciplinary charter, it means that he is internally ready to violate other provisions as well. This is what we are seeing now in the Khmer Sangha" [Hock Savann, 2008, p. 22].

The Cambodian People's Party's desire to keep the Buddhist Sangha under control is explained by both objective and subjective factors. First of all, the tendency of the prevailing part of the political elite to absolutize the traditional components of Buddhist political culture, such as natronage-client relations, the paternalistic nature of the supreme power, adherence to the concept of karma and their preservation as the basis of relations between the authorities and citizens. The NPC is driven by the desire to retain the support of a fairly significant part of the rural electorate that has a strong commitment to religious values.

The increased religious activity of the NPC also indicates a pronounced desire of its leadership for additional legitimation of its power through the norms and concepts of Buddhism, since it is the traditional sources of legitimation that make power truly authoritative and fill it with the symbolic meaning of the national value system.

By appealing to religion in the context of a new socio-economic and political reality, the authorities expect to mitigate to some extent the consequences of the rapid Westernization (even if rather superficial) that the country has undergone in recent years, and thereby link new socio-economic realities and a new lifestyle with the usual semantic, including religious ones. in this context, as well as to resist the impact of globalization processes that erode national identity. However, it should not be forgotten that excessive involvement of the Sangha in official politics, as a rule, is fraught with negative consequences: the growth of contradictions within the monastic community, the decline in discipline in its ranks and the decline in the authority of the clergy among the population.

list of literature

Vodano Sophan. History of Khmer Buddhism. Phnom Penh. 2005 (in Khmer, Russian).

Statement of Policy Principles of the Royal Government of Cambodia. Phnom Penh, 1993 (in Khmer).

Soreya Campus. Phnom Penh. 2006. N 1. (in Khmer).

Kampuchea Thmei (in Khmer).

Koh Santephiep (in Khmer).

Rasmei Kampuchea (in Khmer).

Hawk Savannah. The role of monks in Khmer society. Phnom Penh, 2008 (in Khmer).

Harris 1. Buddhism under Pol Pot. Phnom Penh: Documentation Center of Cambodia, 2007.

Hun Sen. Remarks as Chairman of Supreme Council for State Reform. 21.01.2003 // www.cnv.org.kh

Hun Sen. Selected Comments at the Birthday Anniversary Celebration for Samdech Preah Ahhiserei Sokumthea Buo Kri, Maha Sangha Raja of Dhammayutlika Nikaya. 23.01.2011 // www.cnv.org.kh

Hun Sen. Selected Comments at the Inauguration of the Buddhist Hall in Pagoda of Sovanmuni of Phnom Penh. 07.04.2006 // www.cnv.org.kh

Hun Sen. Selected Comments at the Birthday Anniversary of Samdech Moha Sume Thea Thibdei Non Hget at the Buddhist Pagoda of Botum Vadei. 21.05.2010 // www.cnv.org.kh

Kent A. Purchasing Power and Pagodas: The Sima Monastic Boundary and Consumer Politics in Cambodia // Journal of Southeast Asian Studies. 2007. June. Vol. 38(2).

Ledgerwood J. Buddhist Practice in Rural Kandal Province, 1960 and 2003 // People of Virtue: Reconfiguring Religion, Power and Morality in Cambodia Today I Ed. A. Kent & D. Chandlc. NIAS studies in Asian topics. N 43. Copenhagen, 2008.

Sou Ketya, Hean Sokhom, Hun Thirith. The Ordination Ceremony of Buddhist Monks in Cambodia: Past and Present. Phnom Penh: Center for Advanced Study, 2005.

The Phnom Penh Post.

Thon Vimcalea, Ou Sivhuoch, Eng Netra, and Ly Tem. Leadership in Local Politics of Cambodia: A Study of Leaders in Three Communes of Three Provinces. CDRI Working Paper Scries. N 42. Phnom Penh, 2009.

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