The difficulties of the transition to peaceful construction, the complex set of social and political contradictions that resulted from three years of civil war, the fatigue of the working masses, and the petty-bourgeois vacillation of the peasantry-all this was reflected in the course of the Soviet state's struggle against the Kronstadt rebels. According to V. I. Lenin, "the Kronstadt events were like a lightning bolt that illuminated reality more brightly than anything else." 1 That is why the study of this topic is extremely important, of fundamental importance.
"So no one doubted that the Soviet government would fall," began an editorial in the Socialist-Revolutionary newspaper Volya Rossii of March 9, 1921.2 The tone of this newspaper, whose editors had been crammed into strange corners in Prague for the second year, this time sounded in unison with the general (and quite a few )3 chorus of the emigrant press. Even the mutual quarrels and quarrels that seem to have obscured everything else in the world for retired politicians in exile were forgotten. Why did the Russian emigration on the banks of the Seine and Spree, the Vltava and Vistula Rivers, rejoice so much? After all, less than four months after November 15, 1920, when the last ship under the tricolor flag left Sevastopol Bay, taking away the remnants of the defeated Wrangel troops. Throughout the winter, the motley Russian emigration, torn by contradictions, shed tears about the "death of Russia" and its imminent demise. And suddenly... What happened? And what happened is this: on March 2, 1921, the garrison of the strongest naval fortress of Kronstadt and the crews of ships that were in the Kronstadt roadstead raised an anti-Soviet mutiny.
The area of Kotlin Island, where Kronstadt, the port, numerous forts and batteries are located, is very small - only a few square kilometers. It would seem that what danger can threaten from this piece of land giant Soviet Russia, where the new government is already firmly established? However, there was a real danger. Kronstadt was at that time a first-class naval fortress: 34 batteries covered the approaches to the island from all directions, most of the guns were large - caliber-twelve -, ten-and six-inch, and in addition, ten anti-aircraft batteries protected the fortress from air attack .4 On the eve of the mutiny (according to Pubalt's data for February 13, 1921), two of the four strongest ods were standing in the Kronstadt harbor-
1 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 43, p. 138.
2 "The Will of Russia", Prague, 9. III. 1921.
3 Emigrant newspapers at that time were, according to our calculations, 39-and this is only in Europe alone, not counting Asia and America. Calculated according to the bibliographic journal Russkaya Kniga (Berlin, 1921, NN 1-3, 6-9). These data are supplemented with publications that are not included in the specified reference book.
4 TSGAVMF, f. r. - 52, op. 1, d. 52, ll. 12-12 vol.
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notipnyh ships of the Baltic Fleet-battleships "Petropavlovsk" and "Sevastopol", slightly inferior to them in combat power battleship "Andrew the First-called", as well as minelayers "Lovat" and "Narova", two minesweepers and several small ships. The total number of naval, auxiliary and infantry units stationed in Kronstadt and the forts was (according to our calculations) 25,432 privates and 1,455 commanders .5 These were significant forces at that time. The fortress had sufficient food supplies and a large amount of ammunition. In addition, the situation in the country was alarming. By March 1921, large areas of the Ukraine, the Don, and partly even the central provinces were under the rule of Makhnovist gangs. Tambov had been under a virtual siege for months: detachments of the Socialist-Revolutionary Antonov ruled over the entire province. A kulak revolt was raging in the vast expanses of Western Siberia, and communication between the center and Siberia was temporarily interrupted. Only the largest centers of internal counterrevolution are mentioned here, but there were many smaller ones. This is why the Kronstadt mutiny was so dangerous for the young Soviet state: first, it was a gap on the border of the country, through which the international and Russian counter-revolution abroad could again pour, and, secondly, the rebels could consolidate the fragmented and divided anti-Soviet camp inside Russia.
The study of the causes of the Kronstadt mutiny began soon after the shots at Kotlin Island subsided. In 1921, a book by M. Raphael, a political worker sent to Petrograd during the uprising, was published in Ukraine. This is a general sketch (partly of a memoir nature)6 . The struggle against rebellious Kronstadt was carefully studied by military specialists who took a direct part in the events of 7 in the ranks of the Red Army . In the 1920s, a large number of memoirs of participants in the defeat of the Kronstadt mutiny also appeared .8 This memoir is very unequal in its content, but some memoirs contain important information about the actions of the Red Army and Navy, party and Soviet organizations in the days of the defeat of the rebels. From the general works at that time, an essay by A. Slepkov appeared, which, however, does not contain original information and in-depth analysis of events .9 At the very beginning of the 1930s, several informative articles by M. L. Lurie, a book by A. S. Pukhov, and a collection of documents and memoirs about the defeat of the Kronstadt mutiny (edited by A. S. Kornatovsky) were published, consisting mainly of materials from the Soviet press .10 The work of A. S. Pukhov is still the most detailed and so far the only monographic study on this topic. The author drew on a wide range of sources, analyzed in detail the causes of the rebellion and its anti-Soviet nature. The military aspect of the case, as well as events in the Baltic Fleet, are less clearly reflected in the work. Before the start of the Patriotic War-
5 Ibid., op. 2, d. 534, l. 79. The main forces of the fleet, including all submarines and destroyers, were in Petrograd.
6 M. Raphael. The Kronstadt mutiny. (From the diary of a political worker). Vseukr. govt. izdat. 1921.
7 "Red Army", 1922, N 10-11; V. Putna. Kronstadt, March 16-18, 1921 (Memoirs of a participant in the liquidation of the mutiny). 1918 - 1923. Collection of articles, Moscow, 1923; Reuter and Tsinit. Five years of the 11th Petrograd Rifle Division. Ptgr. 1923.
8 " The history of Soviet society in the memoirs of contemporaries. 1917 - 1957". Annotated index of Memoir literature, Moscow, 1958; "Journal Publications 1917-1957", Part II, issue 1, 2, Moscow, 1961, 1967.
9 A. Slepkov. The Kronstadt mutiny. (For the seventh anniversary). Moscow - L. 1928.
10 M. L. Lurie. The Kronstadt Mutiny in Soviet and White Literature. Krasnaya Letopis', 1931, No. 2; it is the same. Evaluation of the Kronstadt Mutiny in the works of V. I. Lenin. Ibid., 1931, No. 3; A. S. Pukhov. Kronshtadtsky mutiny, 1921, L. 1931; "Kronshtadtsky mutiny". Collection of articles, memoirs and documents, L. 1931.
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A popular essay by S. Zhakovshchikov also appeared on this topic 11 . In the post-war years and up to the present time, this topic has not become the subject of a generalizing study. Only a collective monograph on the history of the Leningrad Military District, an article by K. E. Voroshilov, and the work of the author of these lines have appeared .12
Thus, it should be recognized that the struggle against rebellious Kronstadt has not yet been studied with the involvement of the entire set of sources. Meanwhile, these events are among the most important and interesting in the complex chain of problems that faced Soviet Russia at the beginning of 1921. In this connection, it is useful to give a general outline of the defeat of the Kronstadt mutiny and to show the social and political roots of this phenomenon.
The Kronstadt revolt broke out in the midst of the economic and political difficulties that the young Soviet state was experiencing at that time. The victorious conclusion of the civil war and the beginning of peaceful socialist construction required the restructuring of all spheres of national economic life. In the conditions of the most severe devastation, this restructuring could not but be painful. V. I. Lenin warned about the upcoming difficulties as early as November 21, 1920, that is, immediately after the liquidation of the Wrangel front: "The transition here is extremely sharp and difficult, requiring different methods, different distribution and use of forces, different attention, psychology, etc." 13 It so happened that this transition, difficult in itself in any conditions, was aggravated in the winter of 1920/21 by the fuel and food crisis that broke out. On March 2 and 3, 1921, Pravda and Izvestia published the official statement of the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council "Fuel situation of the RSFSR". There were three areas that were most affected by the fuel crisis: Ukraine, Western Siberia, and finally Petrograd , where the situation deteriorated sharply in late 1920. In January 1921, 35% of the planned amount of coal was brought here, and in February-only 25% - the supply of local fuel (firewood). it was poorly organized. A special commission of the SRT noted in its resolution of February 24, 1921, that plans for delivering firewood to Petrograd were systematically not implemented .14 In addition, the winter turned out to be harsh and snowy. Wooden buildings and even houses were used for heating. This has taken on a large scale: by February, 175 buildings were broken and another 50 are scheduled for scrapping. The Petrograd Soviet was even forced to develop a special appeal to the citizens of the city against unauthorized demolition of houses for firewood 15 .
Transport difficulties, compounded by snow drifts, worsened the already difficult food situation in Petrograd. Sometimes block trains got stuck on the roads. So, on February 15, not a single train with food could be brought to the city. The city with a population of 700,000 was left without any food reserves. According to Petrocommune reports, on March 3, there were only one day's supply of bread according to the "half-size" norm, and on March 4-for four days "according to the reduced norm"16 . During the winter, the food supply increases-
11 P. Zhakovshchikov. The defeat of the Kronstadt counter-revolutionary mutiny in 1921 and 1941.
12 "Order of Lenin Leningrad Military District". Historical Essay, L. 1968; K. E. Voroshilov. From the history of the suppression of the Kronstadt rebellion. "Military-historical journal", 1961, N 3; S. N. Semanov. Lenin's Analysis of the internal policy of the Soviet State in connection with the Kronstadt Revolt. "V. I. Lenin in October and in the first years of Soviet Power", L. 1970.
13 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 42, p. 28.
14 LGAORSS, f. 1000, op. 5, d. 245, l. 2.
15 "Petrogradskaya pravda", 25. II. 1921; LGAORSS, f. 1000, op. 5, d. 244, l. 43.
16 "Petrogradskaya pravda", 16. II. 1921; LGAORSS, f. 6276, op. 6, d. 153, ll. 312, 315.
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vennye rations were reduced repeatedly. Since January 20, the norms were reduced for a period of ten days, but after it failed to return to the previous level. There were frequent delays in the distribution of bread to the population; on February 17, the Petrograd Soviet announced a reduction in grain standards for certain categories of citizens .17 Petrograd was provided with food only through a centralized state supply system, because under the prohibition of free trade, the delivery of grain by private individuals was limited, and barrier detachments were established on the roads to combat violators of the grain monopoly. The role of cooperation was insignificant.
The then leadership of Petrograd, headed by G. Zinoviev, was unable to cope with the impending catastrophe. Belatedly, a "five" group with extraordinary powers was created to provide the city with fuel. Information about the progress of trains with bread and fuel was published in newspapers as front-line reports. Fuel shortages threatened to paralyze the Petrograd industry. From January 19 to 22, the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet was forced to temporarily close a number of enterprises due to a lack of fuel, and on February 1, for the same reason, it was necessary to stop work indefinitely at 9 enterprises with a number of workers of almost 2 thousand people .18 On the evening of February 11, after a stormy meeting of the Petrograd Soviet, a dramatic decision was made: from February 1 to February 15, another 93 enterprises were closed .19 A characteristic detail: the end of the Council meeting was held in complete darkness - the power supply stopped... The closure of factories has gone from an economic problem to a social one. The working class was incredibly exhausted by the hardships and hardships of three years of civil war. A particularly hard fate befell the St. Petersburg proletarians, who went to the front in droves, twice repulsed the attack of the White Guards on the city, survived the famine of 1918, and worked hard for the defense.
A peculiar psychological factor also played a role. The White Guards and interventionists were defeated. The war is over. In the minds of the broad masses of the working people, the conviction prevailed that a sharp and noticeable improvement in life must now begin immediately, immediately. This expectation of drastic changes for the better on the very day after the end of hostilities was characteristic, in particular, for industrial workers who had borne all the hardships of the civil war on their shoulders. This accumulated fatigue of the working people, which V. I. Lenin repeatedly spoke about at that time, became a breeding ground for the growth of all kinds of petty-bourgeois sentiments. At the Tenth Party Congress, he noted that the mood of the petty-bourgeois anarchist element "affected the proletariat very widely." 20
During the years of the Civil War, the social composition of the Petrograd workers changed dramatically. Their number by the end of 1920 was only 87.9 thousand - almost five times less than in 191621 . A significant part of the industrial proletariat was dispersed due to frequent interruptions in the work of industry and the hardships of life in the city. In 1920, during a period of some economic recovery, a significant number of people were sent to factories and factories in the order of labor mobilization, as well as labor soldiers - former Red Army soldiers who were not demobilized, but were sent to enterprises. According to A. S. Pukhov (without reference to the source), in Petrograd at the beginning of 1921, 8-10 thousand labor soldiers and several thousand workers were employed.-
17 "Petrogradskaya pravda", 16 and 17. II. 1921.
18 "Petrogradskaya pravda", 21 and 26. I. 1921.
19 LGAORSS, f. 1000, op. 5, d. 1, l. 35.
20 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 43, p. 24.
21 "Essays on the history of the Leningrad Organization of the CPSU", Part II, L. 1968, p. 149.
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civilised 22 . Apparently, these data are exaggerated. According to the report of the Trade Union Council, at that time there were 3,203 labor Army men at Petrograd enterprises .23 This figure must be considered very significant, if we take into account the total number of industrial workers in the city. Almost 2,500 labor soldiers were employed at the largest metalworking plants (Baltiysky, Franco-Russky, B. Rosenkrantz, etc.). This part of the workers, who often lived in a barrack situation and were subject to paramilitary regulations, was in a particularly difficult situation. In the same summary of the Council of Trade Unions, almost every group of labor soldiers was reported: "There is an acute need for furniture and household equipment, clothing, shoes," etc.
The deterioration of the material condition of the workers, coupled with fatigue, served as the ground on which the petty-bourgeois vacillations of a section of the proletariat during the transition to peaceful construction became most pronounced. Under these circumstances, the remnants of the petty-bourgeois parties in Petrograd tried to intensify their activities. Menshevik proclamations appeared in the factories 24 . Anonymous leaflets of clearly counter-revolutionary content were also distributed, the paper and font of which clearly indicated their unconventional origin .25 The then leader of the Petrograd Mensheviks, Fr. Dan, who later found himself in exile, admitted that Menshevik leaflets were printed in Stockholm, from where they were sent to Russia .26 The Social Revolutionaries were also very active in Petrograd in February-March 1921. Finally, some right-wing groups did not remain indifferent. Reactionary elements took an active part in the street excesses that had already begun. Anti-Semitic demonstrations were noted 27 .
The fatigue of the Petrograd workers and the petty-bourgeois vacillation of a certain section of them found their culminating expression in the "bagpipes" that swept through some Petrograd enterprises in the last days of February 1921. On February 23, work at the Pipe Factory was stopped. In the same days, unknown "agitators" appeared at many other enterprises. Later, "bagpipes" spread to the Baltic, Obukhov and some other factories and factories. On February 24, a provocative demonstration took place on Vasilyevsky Island. Armed men attacked the guardhouse of the Petrograd naval base and released some of the arrested 28 . Given the subsequent events in Kronstadt, this fact deserves special attention. Then there were clashes between provocative elements and detachments of red cadets. On February 25 and 26, the "bagpipes" continued in some factories. At the same time, a delegation consisting of 12 Kronstadt sailors arrived in Petrograd: one of them made a brief speech in the Petrograd Soviet on February 26, which was very evasive and ambiguous .29
In the context of the economic crisis at the beginning of 1921, when the anarchist actions of the backward part of the working class were immediately picked up and fanned by unconscious "pipers" of all shades and fully conscious instigators, rapid and decisive measures were needed. The political situation required such actions that would ensure the preservation of the social gains of the revolution and the inviolability of the young Soviet state. And these measures would-
22 A. S. Pukhov. Op. ed., p. 23.
23 LGAORSS, f. 6276, op. 6, d. 175, ll. 163-181 (author's calculation).
24 Ibid., 82, rooms 38-40.
25 Ibid., f. 1000, op. 5, d. 220, ll. 99-101.
26 "Rudder", Berlin, 11. II. 1922.
27 LGAORSS, f. 1000, op. 5, d. 214, ll. 304, 305, 360.
28 TSGAVMF, f. r. - 34, op. 2, d. 537, l. 997.
29 LGAORSS, f. 1000, op. 1, d. 1, l. 54 vol.
page 27
whether accepted. Already on February 24, the Petrograd Provincial Committee of the RCP (b) decided to declare martial law in the city, form a Defense Committee, and create emergency troikas in all districts, enterprises, and institutions .30 The next day the Petrograd newspapers published an appeal from the Petrograd Soviet, the Soviet of Trade Unions, and the provincial party committee to all the workers of St. Petersburg to fight back against the provocateurs. Urgent measures were taken to improve the truly difficult situation of the St. Petersburg proletarians, but at the same time the Council of Trade Unions decided not to pay salaries to workers of those enterprises where the "bagpipes" will not stop from Monday, February 28, and also made an important decision on the demobilization of labor soldiers 31. On February 28, the SRT urgently decided to allocate 10 million rubles in gold "to improve the supply of food and basic necessities to workers in need " and to purchase goods abroad 32 . On March 1, this decree, signed by V. I. Lenin, was published in the newspapers. Finally, taking into account the particularly difficult situation in Petrograd, it was decided to remove the protective detachments 33 throughout the province, thereby allowing the supply of food to the city by private individuals. At the beginning of March, the "bagpipes" at Petrograd enterprises gradually ceased. And at that moment, a mutiny broke out in Kronstadt...
What is the reason why the Baltic seamen - in the recent past, the "beauty and pride of the revolution" - came out against the Soviet state? In addition to the general reasons (mass fatigue, difficult financial situation, etc.), two specific factors played a role here: the change in the social and psychological type of Baltic sailors, as well as the erroneous policy of the Baltic Fleet management.
During the revolution and the civil war, the Baltic sailors promoted many fighters loyal to the new government from their ranks. The scale of numerous mobilizations to the front lines has not yet been calculated, but it is indisputable that they were significant. The main thing, however, is not in the quantitative side of the matter, but in the qualitative one. By 1921, the predominant mass of the navy's personnel consisted mainly of regular sailors. The lists of commands of both mutinous battleships - Petropavlovsk and Sevastopol-have been preserved: the first of them has information about 1,242 sailors by February, and the second has information about 786 (we are talking only about ordinary personnel)34 . By service life, these 2,028 sailors were distributed as follows: up to and including 1913-20.2%; 1914-1916.- 59%; 1917 - 14%; 1918 - 1921 - 6,8%, moreover, only three people began their service in 1921. So, almost 4/5 of the teams of battleships, future skirmishers of the anti-Soviet mutiny, began serving in the navy before 1917. However, having retained the bulk of the old-timers, the naval crews lost the most seasoned, conscientious and dedicated sailors to the cause of the revolution. Memoirists are unanimous: mobilizations in the Baltic Fleet usually affected only communists. And new recruits were accepted into the party in the fleet without proper selection. For example, during the party week in the autumn of 1919, the number of some cells increased immediately by 7-9 times, as a result, by the beginning of the rebellion, from 80 to 90% of the members of the RCP in Kronstadt were from among those who joined the party during the party week 35 . On the battleship Petropavlovsk on the eve of the mutiny, 1,300 personnel (together with their commanders) accounted for
30 LPA, f. 16, op. 1, d. 50, l. 103.
31 LGAORSS, f. 1000, op. 6, d. 65, ll. 39 vol., 40 (delegates of the Petrograd Soviet pointed out at the meeting on February 26 that it was the Labor Army men who were often the main object of anti-Soviet agitation. See LGAORSS, f. 1000, op. 5, d. 1, l. 55 vol.).
32 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 42, p. 352.
33 "Petrogradskaya pravda", 1. III. 1921.
34 Here and further calculated according to the lists of personnel of the brigade of battleships (TSGAVMF, f. 304, op. 1, dd. 41, 43).
35 LPA, f. 15, op. 1, d. 22, l. 1.
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203 communists 36, that is, every sixth member of the ship's crew was in the party! And it was this ship that became the center of the mutiny... At the same time, during 1920, about 200 of the best political workers were transferred from the Navy to the army and civilian institutions .37
And now, three years after the victory of October, a dangerous discrepancy between the usual ideas and reality arose on some ships and in parts of the Baltic Fleet: there were qualitative changes in personnel, discipline fell, dependent moods appeared, ships that had been moored for a long time turned into floating barracks, political work was poorly conducted, and at the same time at the same time, the sailors were better supplied. It is not surprising that those who sought a more or less peaceful refuge in the heated class struggle, and who simply waited to see where the course of events would lead, sought to stay on the inactive fleet. So, already by 1920, the image of the notorious "kleshnik", "Ivan Mora"-a screamer, demagogue, loafer, who had only one resemblance to the Baltic sailor, the hero of October, was formed-a vest and a capless cap.
The political Administration of the Baltic Fleet (Pubalt) did not perform its functions well, broke away from the masses and became mired in a bureaucratic routine. This was stated on February 8 in a special PUR circular: "In parts of the fleet, political and cultural work is poorly conducted ..." 38 . Indeed, studying Pubalt's documents for the troubled winter of 1921, one cannot help but be struck by the fact that instead of vigorous political work in the Navy, sluggish cultural activity prevailed. The newspaper "Red Baltic Fleet", the organ of Pubalt, devoted most of its space in January and February to reprinting Trotsky's speeches and reports on the activities of the Proletkult and its "studios" in the Navy, and did not publish any political materials on topical topics at all. It is not surprising that in February, at the Baltic Fleet sailors ' party conference, Pubalt was criticized. The resolution stated: "Pubalt has broken away not only from the masses, but also from active party workers, and has become a bureaucratic body that does not enjoy any authority."39
The situation created in Kronstadt was aggravated by the fact that the commander of the Baltic Fleet, F. F. Raskolnikov, during the discussion about trade unions imposed on the party by the Trotskyists in the winter of 1920/21, advocated a Trotskyist platform. The overwhelming mass of Communist sailors then condemned Trotsky's anti-Leninist views. On January 10, 1921, the Kronstadt party activists approved Lenin's theses on trade unions40 by 108 votes to 30 . The Trotskyists suffered an even more crushing defeat at the general meeting of Communist sailors in Petrograd on January 19: the sailors overwhelmingly rejected the Trotskyist resolution and condemned Raskolnikov's factional actions .41 All this could not but undermine the authority of the fleet leadership and negatively affect the general mood of the sailors. Such was the political situation in the fleet on the eve of the mutiny.
The beginning of the anti-Soviet revolt in Kronstadt should be considered March 1, 1921. The day before, a meeting was held on the Petropavlovsk, officially called the meeting of the battleship brigade teams, but it was practically a gathering of all the rebellious elements from various parts of the fortress. The meeting was led by S. Petrichenko, the future "leader" of the rebels 42 . A "resolution" was adopted with the following proposals:-
36 TSGAVMF, f. r. - 34, op. 2, d. 441, l. 136.
37 A. S. Pukhov. Op. ed., p. 45.
38 TSGAVMF, f. r. - 34, op. 2, d. 536, l. 3.
39 Ibid., d. 450, l. 603.
40 LPA, f. 15, op. 1, d. 16, l. 3.
41 Ibid., f. 16, op. 1, d. 65, l. 103.
42 Petrichenko S. M.-senior clerk of the battleship Petropavlovsk, year of conscription 1914, originally from the Poltava region. During the party week of 1919, he joined the RCP, but during the time of the Revolution, he did not return to the Soviet Union.
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These demands include the re-election of Soviets by secret ballot, freedom of speech for "anarchists and left-wing socialist parties", the liquidation of political departments, the removal of detachments, the equalization of rations "for all working people with the exception of hot shops", the release of "political prisoners of socialist parties", and so on .43 This "resolution" played the role of a policy document throughout the rebellion.
On March 1, at two o'clock in the afternoon, a general meeting of sailors and the garrison of the fortress was held on Yakornaya Square. On the eve of the rally, the organizers sent out telephone messages to various units and ships of the Petrograd Naval base, inviting them to send their delegates to the upcoming meeting .44 It is known that some delegates from the Petrograd sailors were at this meeting. P. Vasiliev, the head of the Kronstadt Soviet, presided - a young man, politically inexperienced, who could not master the mood of the huge mass of excited people. The mutinous speakers managed to attract the attention of the crowd, and a "resolution" was read out, which P. Vasiliev and N. Kuzmin, the Baltic Fleet Commissar, courageously voted against. The meeting was attended by the chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee M. I. Kalinin, who specially arrived in Kronstadt in the morning in order to calm the excited sailors and soldiers. However, rebel activists disrupted his speech. There were even attempts to detain the chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee as a hostage, but the rebel leaders ultimately did not dare to take this step, and "deputations" of rebels were sent to military units, ships and factories in Petrograd with the text of the "resolution"45 .
From that moment on, the activities of the legitimate Soviet authorities were paralyzed, and the leadership in the fortress passed to the rebels. On March 2, about 300 delegates (two each from ships, units, institutions, etc.) gathered in the House of Enlightenment 46 . S. Petrichenko was already the chairman. At the meeting, N. Kuzmin delivered a courageous speech against anti-Soviet instigators. However, the composition of delegates was already appropriately selected. Power "officially" passed to the self-appointed "Provisional Revolutionary Committee" ("VRK") headed by Petrichenko, who became its chairman. Kuzmin and Vasiliev were arrested and taken into custody at Petropavlovsk. Arrests of party activists began. The head of the Pubalt, Batis, the co-organizer of the Kronstadt Komsomol members, Ye. Gerasimov, and several dozen other communists were detained. All of them were later imprisoned. Part of the Communists (from the Cheka, Revtribunal, party school and other organizations) went to Oranienbaum on the night of March 3 with weapons in their hands. Thus the power in Kronstadt fell into the hands of the counter-revolution. The next day, March 3, 1921, the first issue of Izvestia of the Provisional Revolutionary Committee, the official organ of the rebels, was published. At the same time, the first two orders were issued: on the universal execution of all orders of the "VRK" and on the prohibition of leaving Kronstadt without the permission of the "VRK"47 .
after re-registering, I exited it. In the summer of 1920, he returned to his homeland, expressed anarcho-syndicalist views, and sympathized with Makhno's "movement". There is no reliable information about his membership in the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. After the defeat of the rebellion, he emigrated, published an anti-Soviet pamphlet, then repented and returned to the USSR in the mid-20s.
43 "News of the Provisional Revolutionary Committee of Sailors, Red Army Men and Workers of Kronstadt", 3. III. 1921.
44 TSGAVMF, f. 304, op. 1, d. 46, l. 38 ob.
45 During February 28 - March 2, Kronstadt agitators appeared on ships, in parts of the fleet and at some enterprises in Petrograd, but most of them were detained.
46 " Izvestiya vremennogo revolyutsionnogo komiteta...", 4. III. 1921.
47 Ibid.
page 30
The political essence of the Kronstadt revolt was clearly expressed by V. I. Lenin in his speech at the Tenth Party Congress: "Here the element of petty-bourgeois, anarchist, with slogans of free trade and always directed against the dictatorship of the proletariat was revealed." He strongly emphasized the threat to the very existence of the Soviet state from such a rebellious element: "This petty-bourgeois counter-revolution is undoubtedly more dangerous than Denikin, Yudenich, and Kolchak put together, because we are dealing with a country where the proletariat is a minority, we are dealing with a country where the ruin is revealed on the peasant property ..." 48
On March 4, the composition of the "VRK" was supplemented, a total of 15 people were listed in it, mainly sailors from both battleships, as well as dockworkers and employees. It is not possible to establish the party affiliation of each of them, only about a member of the" Revkom " V. Valka there is information that he was a Menshevik. The main "ideologue" of the rebels, S. T. Putilin (he was not a member of the "VRK"), was a very active figure - a former priest who resigned his ordination after the revolution, then labored in journalism and became editor of the Kronstadt Izvestia .49 The ideology of the rebellion fully fit into the notorious slogan "soviets without communists". The main propositions of the Kronstadt leaders were as follows:" Power to the Soviets, not to the parties"," The third revolution of the working people"," Down with the counter-revolution from the right and from the left", and so on.The latter slogan is particularly characteristic of the ideology of the leaders of the rebellion: they verbally repudiated not only the White Guards, but also the" constituent " slogans.
In words... But there were still things to do. And these actions immediately led the rebels to an armed action against the Soviet government. At the beginning of the insurrectionary movement in Kronstadt, the counter-revolutionary officers kept aloof from events. But after the victory of the rebels, the pressure of this group increased significantly. Already on March 3, Revkom held a meeting with military specialists at Petropavlovsk . The former headquarters of the fortress continued its activities under the new "government". Soon, the actual leadership of the military side of the mutiny (and this was the main task in its short history) passed to former officers. The title of "Chief of Defense of Kronstadt" was given to former Captain E. N. Solovyanov (recently chief of staff of the fortress), the most active figures of the mutiny were former Lieutenant Colonel B. A. Arkannikov (head of the operational department) and former General A. R. Kozlovsky (chief of Artillery)50 . The rebel officers ' minority suggested that they should immediately move towards Oranienbaum and Petrograd, but the Revkom did not dare to do so. There was, however, an attempt by a rebel detachment to approach Oranienbaum at night, but it ended in no avail .51 The "Revkom" was inclined to the idea of defense and waited for events. V. I. Lenin described this circumstance as the fear of"the wavering Menshevik-Socialist-Revolutionary-non-Party masses" 52 before decisive action.
At the first news of the outbreak of the insurrection, the Soviet Government took the most decisive measures to suppress it. By resolution
48 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 43, p. 24.
49 Many of Izvestia's articles clearly bear the stamp of bad church rhetoric. Here is a typical example of this style: "Peter is already renouncing, Judas will soon be hanged," and so on.
50 A. R. Kozlovsky in 1917, with the rank of colonel, took part in the investigation commission of the Provisional Government on the case of General L. G. Kornilov, was promoted to Major General, then served for some time in Petrograd. After the suppression of the Kronstadt rebellion, he emigrated and did not show any political activity.
51 "The Will of Russia", Prague, 19. IV. 1921.
52 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 43, p. 238.
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STO from March 2, the Petrograd province was declared under a state of siege, all full power was transferred to the Petrograd Defense Committee, and rebellious leaders were outlawed .53 At the same time, the SRT clarified that the Defense Committee, "in all measures and actions related to the liquidation of the Socialist-Revolutionary and White Guard armed rebellion, is entirely subordinate to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic."54 Later, the 7th Army was restored, and M. N. Tukhachevsky, who arrived in Petrograd on the afternoon of March 5, was appointed its commander. All military units in the district were transferred to its subordination, and the 27th Omsk Rifle Division was transferred from the Gomel region to Petrograd. All the Petrograd Communists were declared mobilized, armed themselves, and went over to the barracks. The Gubkom decided not to send a Petrograd delegation to the Tenth Party Congress opening in Moscow .55 Together with ordinary Communists, the delegates took part in the fight against the rebels. Meetings and rallies were held at enterprises and in military units of the city and province, where the anti-Soviet nature of the rebellion was exposed.
Vigorous measures were taken in Oranienbaum, a district located in the immediate vicinity of Kronstadt. Already on March 1, all units here were put on alert, the Communists were armed and a round-the-clock duty was established, a cavalry squadron was transferred from Novy Peterhof. Attempts to agitate in favor of the rebels in parts of the Oranienbaum fortified area were resolutely stopped, and several instigators who spoke out in the naval air division were arrested. On March 2, two revolutionary committees were created in Oranienbaum, which received full power. 56 F. F. Raskolnikov was removed from office. On March 2, the Baltic Fleet command was headed by a revolutionary guard led by I. K. Kozhanov. The Revtroika order of March 3 prohibited "all gatherings on ships, units, and establishments of the Baltic Fleet", and suggested that "all those found agitating against the Soviet government"should be immediately arrested .57
So in the shortest possible time, an iron ring was created around Kronstadt. The instigators of the anti-Soviet action were isolated. On March 4, the Petrograd Defense Committee addressed the "deceived Kronshtadts": "Disarm and arrest the criminal leaders, especially the tsarist generals. Whoever surrenders immediately will have his guilt forgiven. " 58 There was no response to the request... Now it was up to the rifles and cannons to decide the outcome of the mutiny. And soon they were talking.
At the time of the mutiny, only three divisions were stationed in Petrograd, which also had to guard the troubled border with Finland. In the first days of March, only the 11th Rifle Division and consolidated detachments were sent against the rebels. On March 5, by order of the Revolutionary Military Council, Commander-7 M. N. Tukhachevsky was subordinated to all the troops of the Petrograd District, as well as the Baltic Fleet .59 The available forces of the Soviet troops were deployed by March 7 as follows. The Northern combat group (chief E. S. Kazansky), concentrated in the Sestroretsk area, numbered only 3,763 people (of which the most combat-ready unit was the Petrograd cadet detachment - 1,195 fighters).60 . The southern group (head A. I. Sedyakin) consisted of
53 Petrogradskaya Pravda, 3. III. 1921.
54 TsGAOR USSR, f. 130, op. 5, d. 379, l. 27.
55 LPA, f. 16, op. 1, d. 51, l. 8
56 TSGAVMF, f. r. - 34, op. 2, d. 542, l. 89; d. 543, l. 194.
57 Ibid., f. 304, op. 1, d. 46, ll. 46-47.
58 Petrogradskaya Pravda, 4. III. 1921.
59 TSGASA, f. 25888, op 6, d. 863, l. 1.
60 "The Order of Lenin Leningrad Military District", p. 87; TSGASA, f. 25888, op. 6, d. 66, l. 2.
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9853 people. Here the best unit was the combined division under the command of P. E. Dybenko, which included several Communist detachments. As you can see, the forces at the disposal of the Soviet command were small and numerically inferior to the rebels. In addition, the personnel of the 561st Infantry Regiment (it was part of the 187th Brigade) consisted mainly of former soldiers of the White Armies and Makhnovists .61 Naturally, his morale was low. Some other units also turned out to be poorly trained and armed. However, Trotsky, who had arrived in Petrograd for a short time, hastened the offensive. He confidently declared that Kronstadt would "throw out the white flag" after the first shots were fired .62
On March 5, the "Last warning to the garrison and population of Kronstadt and the rebel forts" was prepared, in which the participants of the uprising were invited to lay down their weapons. There was no response, although the Kronstadt Izvestia newspaper reprinted this appeal in the March 7 issue. Then the order was given to attack the rebel fortress in the early morning of March 8.
On the eve of the offensive, artillery training began. The Kronstadt batteries responded, causing several houses to be destroyed in Sestroretsk and Oranienbaum. However, the shooting did not bring significant results. On the afternoon of March 8, Red Army air reconnaissance reported that the shells had fallen very short at Kronstadt, and "no damage was found in the city itself or on the two battleships standing in the harbor." 63
The attack on the fortress began in the dark. Among the attackers there was a "fear of ice", there were rumors that the ice of the Gulf of Finland could not withstand the weight of the advancing columns. The actions of some units were uncertain and not decisive enough. Under these conditions, true heroism was shown by the army and communists mobilized in Petrograd, who, by their personal example, led the soldiers to attack. A small detachment of cadets from the northern group reached Kronstadt unnoticed, suddenly attacked the rebels and broke into the city. However, the cadets ' forces were small, they did not receive the support of the southern group, and there were no reserves. The rebels counterattacked the cadets with outnumbered detachments, and they were forced to retreat, suffering 64 casualties . Even less successful was the attack of the southern group. Before the offensive, part of the Red Army soldiers of the 561st regiment did not want to obey the order, only the Communists managed to lead the column to attack. After encountering heavy rebel fire, units of the vanguard 187th brigade and cadets lay down, and then retreated back, and part of the 561st regiment surrendered. The units of the 32nd brigade in the second echelon came under fire and also retreated .65
So, the first attack of the fortress was unsuccessful. The reasons for this lie primarily in poor, hasty preparation and lack of strength. However, this defeat also played a positive role. First, it turned out that the rebels do not run away from the sound of a shot and will fight hard, therefore, you need to prepare for a second attack thoroughly and with large forces. Secondly, it turned out that the ice cover of the Gulf of Finland is strong enough to withstand the attackers. Finally, another unexpected and very important circumstance was revealed: in Kronstadt, which was prepared for defense from the sea, there were not enough battleships on board.
61 A. S. Pukhov. Op. ed., p. 140.
62 LGAORSS, f. 1000, op. 5, d. 34, l. 6.
63 TSGASA, f. 25888, op. 6, d. 74, l. 1 ob.
64 Subsequently, M. N. Tukhachevsky highly appreciated the actions of cadets and their fighting spirit (see Military Knowledge, 1921, No. 8).
65 TSGAVMF, f. r. - 52, op. 1, d. 88, l. 38.
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shrapnel and shrapnel, which could cause massive damage to infantry on the smooth surface of the frozen bay. On the contrary, heavy shells of fortress and ship artillery, breaking through the ice, exploded in the water, forming relatively small ice holes, giving a small number of fragments and a weak shock wave .66
The unsuccessful Soviet attack on March 8 somewhat encouraged the rebel garrison. Expressing this mood, the Kronstadt Izvestia wrote in its usual ornate style: "Our cry has been heard. The revolutionary sailors, Red Army soldiers, and workers of Petrograd are already marching to our aid ... " 67 At the same time, in Kronstadt itself, the Revkom began to strengthen its repressive measures against Communists still at large. Taking into account the illegal propaganda work carried out by party members in the rebel fortress, the Revkom decided that "decisive measures will be taken against them, dictated by the circumstances of wartime" 68 . These measures were reflected in the fact that many Communists filled up the cells of the Kronstadt prison, where their comrades were already being held.
The arrests of Communists were perhaps the only" offensive " action of the rebel leadership. Until their fall, they made no attempt to go beyond the ring that surrounded them by the 7th Army. Even the reconnaissance was not very active (which is why, by the way, the decisive attack on the night of March 17 took the rebels by surprise). The leaders of the rebellion pinned all their hopes on the "third revolution". This almost mystical expectation was a characteristic feature of their short reign.
There was, however, one more prospect of extending the Kronstadt "bagpipes" - in case of assistance from the Russian back-channel and international counter-revolution. This was not mentioned aloud at the meetings of the mutinous "soviet"; the Kronstadt Izvestia considered it their duty to disown the "counter-revolution on the right". Moreover, the printed organ of the Revkom even considered it necessary once to dissociate itself from the slogan of the Constituent Assembly .69 But it was a direct deception. Later, once in Finland, the leaders of the mutiny openly declared that "their mood had changed" in favor of the Constituent Assembly. 70 This question, as the captured rebels later showed, was repeatedly discussed at the meetings of the "revolutionary committee" 71 . Only the rapid fall of Kronstadt prevented these constituent sentiments from manifesting themselves openly.
Events imperiously drew the rebels to the right, to the camp of the White Guards. V. I. Lenin, in an interview with a correspondent of The New York Herald, showed a clear social alternative to the current events in the midst of the Kronstadt rebellion: "Believe me, there are only two possible governments in Russia: tsarist or Soviet. In Kronstadt, some madmen and traitors were talking about the Constituent Assembly. But how can a man of sound mind even entertain the idea of a Constituent Assembly in the abnormal state in which Russia finds itself? A constituent assembly at the present time would be a gathering of bears led by tsarist generals by rings stuck through their noses. " 72
News of the Kronstadt mutiny appeared in the foreign press relatively late, on March 5-6. The first days of the main source
66 LGAORSS, f. 1000, op. 5, d. 34, l. 4.
67 " Izvestiya vremennogo revolyutsionnogo komiteta...", 11. III. 1921.
68 Ibid., 9. III. 1921.
69 Ibid., 12. III. 1921.
70 "The Will of Russia", Prague, 19. IV. 1921.
71 LGAORSS, f. 6276, op. 6, d. 82, l. 42.
72 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 43, p. 129.
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The Kronstadt radio station reported on the actions and intentions of the rebels. This station was low-powered and even in the Baltic states was difficult to catch. The news of the mutiny was greeted with jubilation by reactionary circles. The right-wing newspaper "Rudder" wrote in an upbeat tone in those days about the enthusiasm of emigration: "There is a great revival in all local Russian organizations. Meetings are underway. Negotiations are underway to merge the company's activities."73 Indeed, almost all anti-Soviet organizations have united in their efforts to fan the embers of the Kronstadt rebellion into a new bonfire of civil war. Menshevik politicians and retired Socialist-Revolutionary conspirators, liberal cadets and cadet-like liberals, stockbrokers and yesterday's White Guards hurried to join the" friends "of the" Ivan Moram "and" kleshniki". All of them now warmly applauded the rebellious "revkom", although just the day before the very word was pronounced by them with gnashing of teeth. The" Council of Ambassadors "in Paris, made up of former Tsarist diplomats, sent a telegram to Washington to BA Bakhmetyev, urging him to launch a campaign for "American sympathy" for the Kronstadt rebels .74 On the other hand, these respectable gentlemen were joined by the "batko" Makhno, who sent a telegram to the rebels saying: "The hour of uniting the free Cossacks with the heroes of Kronstadt is approaching."75 As can be seen, the Makhnovist chieftains also dreamed of "unity."..
Even the impoverished Russian bourgeoisie became generous in favor of the Kronstadt rebels. According to emigrant newspapers, 100,000 francs were allocated on behalf of the Union of Commerce and Industry for the benefit of the rebellious Revkom, 5,000 pounds were allocated on behalf of the Russian International Bank, 200,000 francs were allocated on behalf of the Russian - Asian Bank, 15,000 francs were allocated on behalf of the Salamandra Insurance Company, and the Zemstvo-City Council committee fee - 100 thousand francs 76 . And this is not counting numerous other smaller amounts received from various institutions and individuals. This money was considerable on the scale of that time. And yet, only a few days had passed since the beginning of the mutiny. Apparently, the Kronstadt "freedom fighters" could count on something more. A little later, when hopes for the notorious "third revolution" that supposedly began in Kronstadt burst like a soap bubble, Smenovekhovsky publicist A.V. Bobrishchev-Pushkin quipped:"With a blush of shame, we have to remember how those who were cursed with horror yesterday were greeted in Paris." 77 It is curious that only the extreme monarchists remained absolutely indifferent to the" successes " of the Kronstadt rebels in the eyes of the emigrant "public". This is evidenced by the pages of the Berlin weekly "Double-headed Eagle" (it called itself "the organ of monarchical thought"). At the same time, a meeting of Russian monarchists in Yugoslavia arrogantly declared that "with such an uprising, we are not on our way." 78
The embraces that emigrant leaders of various shades opened for the members of the "revkom" were a profound political lesson during the civil war. V. I. Lenin gave an exhaustive analysis of this lesson. Behind the emphatic "non-partisanship" of the leaders of the mutiny, he saw the familiar slogans of the compromisers. "The spring fluctuations of 1921," he wrote, " showed once again the role of the Social Revolutionaries and Menshevis-
73 "Rudder", 10. III. 1921.
74 "Voice of Russia", Berlin, 11. III. 1921.
75 This telegram was distributed with reference to Bucharest, where it was received from the Makhnovist field radio station (Posledniye Izvestiya, Revel, 14. III. 1921; Segodnya, Riga, 17. III. 1921).
76 "Rudder", 10. 12. III. 1921; "Voice of Russia", 11. III. 1921.
77 "Changing milestones". Collection of articles. Tver. 1922, p. 82.
78 Ibid., p. 83.
page 35
kov: they help the wavering petty-bourgeois element to recoil from the Bolsheviks, to make a "shift of power" in favor of the capitalists and landlords." In this connection, he emphasized a new phenomenon of principle, which was particularly pronounced in Kronstadt: "The Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries have now learned to repaint themselves as 'non-party'. This is fully proved."79 Lenin always emphasized the narrow-mindedness, half-heartedness and vacillation of the petty bourgeoisie, its parties and leaders. In connection with the Kronstadt revolt, he recalled the fate of the Samara Komuch, which ultimately served only as a stepping stone for the establishment of the Kolchak dictatorship .80
The" movement to the right " of the anti-Soviet uprising on Kotlin Island was obvious. The Kronstadt leaders during the mutiny categorically denied any connection with foreign or emigrant organizations, this was repeatedly repeated in Izvestia of the Revkom and in its statements on the radio. This was, however, a deliberate attempt to mislead the broad masses of sailors and soldiers, who in the overwhelming majority were indeed extremely wary of White Guards of all shades. After the first news of the mutiny, a lot of various correspondents, dubious representatives of charitable organizations, and suspicious "public figures"immediately rushed to Revel and Helsingfors81 . It is safe to say that among this motley crowd there were quite a few agents of various secret services. Some of these messengers of the "free press" still managed to visit Kronstadt. Emigrant newspapers reprinted interviews from the rebel fortress of a Finnish journalist 82, a correspondent of the Chicago Tribune 83 and some others.
Red Army air reconnaissance regularly patrolled over Kotlin Island. In the early days of the mutiny, the snow-covered ice surface of the bay remained lifeless. But at 18 hours on March 11, the pilot succinctly reported:: "From the north-western tip of Kotlin Island to Finland road". On the second day, two roads were already discovered, and five uavs were moving along one of them . In the future, communications with the Finnish coast were carried out regularly until the fall of the rebel fortress. Subsequently, members of the" revkom " testified that at least 400 pounds of food and cigarettes were received from Finland. 85 "Assistance" to the rebels with food was provided from Finland by Russian (zakordonny)figures The Red Cross, whose representative Zeitler was in Vyborg. Even before the fall of the rebel fortress, two members of the Revolutionary Committee, I. Oreshin and N. Arkhipov, moved to Terioki to communicate allegedly with the International Red Cross .86 These planned "connections" were not cut off by the will of the Kronstadt leaders. Finally, in Riga, a representative of the American Red Cross, Colonel Ryan, who was associated, in his own words, with Zeitler, launched a rapid activity to help the rebels .87 The fact that this colonel's activities were interrupted very soon is again not his fault.
Of all the emigrant leaders, the special interest in kroon-
79 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 43, p. 241.
80 Ibid., p. 24.
81 According to the Helsingfors newspaper Put (17. III. 1921), by the end of the mutiny, a large number of correspondents had gathered in Terioki, intending to move to Kronstadt.
82 "Latest news", 14. III. 1921.
83 "Latest news", Paris, 20. III. 1921.
84 TSGASA, f. 25888, op. 6, d. 74, l. 159, 161.
85 LGAORSS, f. 1000, op. 5, d. 1, l. 82.
86 "The Will of Russia", 3. IV. 1921.
87 "Today", 22. III. 1921.
page 36
V. M. Chernov has shown interest in the Stadt affairs. The hapless chairman of the one-day Constituent Assembly was eager for revenge on the political stage. He arrived at Reval immediately after receiving the first news of the mutiny (apparently on March 8 or 9)88 . He sent a messenger to Kronstadt, who arrived there, as V. Valk later testified, on March 13, 89 . A secret meeting of the "revkom" was held. Another member, a sailor from the Sevastopol and the main "agitprop" of the rebels, P. Perepelkin, covered this event in this way: "Chernov's proposal was that, as chairman of the Constituent Assembly, he should be allowed to come to Kronstadt; but as a condition of his coming, he stipulated that the struggle should go on under the flag of the Constituent Assembly and that all leadership in the struggle against Soviet power should be left to the Constituent Assembly. Chernov proposed an armed force. In the Revkom, Valk was in favor of Chernov's proposal. Petrichenko and Kielgast wanted to give an indefinite answer, or rather, to agree in principle, but for the time being to answer vaguely. I myself was opposed to Chernov's proposal, and the proposal was rejected by a huge majority. " 90 Now it does not matter much whether the "vast majority" of the "revkom" was really against Chernov's founding ideas, what was the role of Perepelkin himself in this case (giving evidence to the Cheka, he had reason to characterize his position and the position of the "Revkom", of which he was a member). What is important is that even the first probe of Chernov met with some sympathy among some of the Kronstadt leaders. It is not difficult to imagine the further development of events, if the mutiny lasted a little longer.
So, in the middle of March, various messengers and correspondents and small carts with sacks of flour were already moving across the ice of the Gulf of Finland to Kronstadt. But that was just the beginning. The spring sun was rapidly gaining strength. Another week or two, and then... Then, in the clear waters of the bay, military squadrons under false flags would not be slow to appear at the forts of Kronstadt. No wonder the rebel leaders turned their eyes to the sun in a truly pagan plea. The well-known anarchist E. Yarchuk expressed these spring hopes in the following emotional lines: "It was a bright sunny day. The entire snow cover of the bay burned with its rays and seemed to remind Kronstadt: if it had held out for a short time, when the bay, breaking its ice, would carry them away into an unknown distance, then the independence of the mighty revolutionary hearth would have been saved. " 91 But the hopes of the motley patrons of the Revkom faded much earlier than the ice of the Gulf of Finland. A crushing blow was already being prepared for the rebel fortress.
On March 10, V. I. Lenin asked the Central Committee and the SRT to send delegates to the Tenth Party Congress to put down the insurrection. Already on March 12, trains with delegates left for Petrograd. According to incomplete data, they numbered 279 people (out of 1,135 delegates to the congress). Among them were K. E. Voroshilov (he became a commissar under A. I. Sedyakin), J. F. Fabricius (he took over the 501st Regiment), A. S. Bubnov, I. F. Fedko, P. I. Baranov and many others. The arrival of prominent party and military figures, who joined the ranks of the Soviet troops aimed at Kronstadt, raised the morale of the Red Army. At the same time, the "bagpipes" in Petrograd stopped. At the meeting of the provincial committee on March 11, it was noted that only three enterprises have not yet fully restored their work .92 Attempts on the part of individuals to carry out "Kronstadt" agitation, which
88 "Voice of Russia", 10. III. 1921.
89 LGAORSS, f. 6276, op. 6, d. 82, l. 42.
90 Ibid., l. 42 vol. Kilgast - navigator of a long voyage, was the secretary of the "Revolutionary Committee".
91 E. Yarchuk. Kronstadt in the Russian Revolution. New York, 1923, p. 62.
92 LPA, f. 16, d. 51, l. 25.
page 37
This took place in some units stationed on the southern shore of the Gulf of Finland (marine air division, work-convoy detachment), 93 were decisively stopped . At the beginning of the second decade of March, the famous 27th Omsk Division began to arrive near Oranienbaum. Anti-Soviet agitators tried to influence the Red Army soldiers of the newly arrived units, who had not yet understood the situation. On March 13, the 236th regiment even began to ferment among part of the 94 soldiers . However, this incident did not have serious consequences, and in the future the regiment performed well during the storming of the fortress.
By March 16, the superior forces of the Red Army were concentrated against the rebels. Active reconnaissance, including aerial reconnaissance, was conducted. It was established that the ice around Kronstadt was not blown up (as some feared). In addition, it turned out that the rebels were negligently conducting combat security: the scouts of the 32nd brigade regularly approached the very walls of the forts and even the Kronstadt harbor, and often the fortress was not even alerted .95 Soviet planes often bombed it, but did not achieve success, since the bombs were low-power and were dropped inaccurately. However, the constant air raids had a depressing effect on the rebellious garrison. The coastal batteries of the northern and southern sections were constantly firing on Kronstadt. In general, this shooting caused little damage to military facilities, but the constant roar of guns over the Gulf of Finland all the time reminded the rebels of the imminent retribution.
The command of the 7th Army, led by M. N. Tukhachevsky, calmly and at the same time confidently prepared for a decisive assault. Command and control of the troops was conducted at a high level, iron discipline reigned in the units, all measures were taken to ensure surprise attacks and camouflage. For the delivery of ammunition, machine guns and other things on the ice, special sleds were used, in addition, to overcome cracks and sagebrush, the troops were equipped with light folding bridges made of planks. By the beginning of the assault, the engineering units had produced 915 such sleds and 1,500 catwalks .96 The troops received white camouflage coats. The overall strategic plan of the offensive called for a quick and decisive attack on the fortress from the north and south, with the northern group simultaneously cutting off the rebels ' escape routes to Finland. For a direct attack, five brigades of the Red Army, various cadet and consolidated detachments were concentrated. However, the assault on the smooth ice of a strong fortress with concrete forts and powerful weapons nevertheless presented an incredible difficulty. It was expected (and this was confirmed later) that the rebels would resist stubbornly. On the other hand, it was impossible to expect to starve the fortress out, as spring was approaching and the ice might soon open up. The assault was scheduled for the night of March 17. All day on March 16, Soviet batteries conducted an intense bombardment of Kronstadt. At night, there was silence in the northern combat area, and artillery in the southern one until 4 o'clock. The army continued to fire on the forts of Fortress 97 . The advanced units of the attacking infantry descended on the ice after 2 o'clock. nights. Orders provided for movement in marching columns while maintaining complete silence and order, and it was possible to break up into a chain (even under fire) only as a last resort. It was specifically stipulated that "no conversations should be held with the rebels in the city, that they should be arrested and sent to the rear." 98
The night of March 17 was dark and moonless. Parts as shown below,
93 TSGAVMF, f. r. - 34, op. 2, d. 542, l. 115.
94 V. Putna. Op. ed., p. 202.
95 TSGAVMF, f. r. -52, op. 1, d. 88, l. 98-a.
96 TSGASA, f. 25888, op. 6, d. 884, l. 196.
97 Ibid., op. 3, d. 132, l. 83.
98 Ibid., d. 144, l. 26.
page 38
so, in the southern section, in perfect order and secretly went to the nearest approaches to the fortress, turned around in a chain and began to overcome the wire barriers. The enemy opened fire with guns and machine guns. The 537th Regiment under the command of I. V. Tyulenev was the first to strike at 4: 30 a.m.: An hour later, the 32nd brigade soldiers broke into the city from the southern side and began a street battle, in which the brigade commander M. A. Reuter was soon seriously wounded. Almost at the same time, the attacking units of E. S. Kazansky's group entered Kronstadt from the north.
Victory seemed close at hand, but the rebels launched several fierce, if poorly organized, counterattacks. At the same time, the heavy artillery of the fortress opened fire on the Soviet units of the second echelon, which were forced to move already in bright sunlight. But many shells did not explode or, falling at a sharp angle, ricocheted without breaking through the ice. However, the attackers suffered significant losses. In these difficult conditions, communists and political workers, including delegates to the congress, played a major role, marching in chains and dragging the fighters forward. Units unfurled battle banners, the Red Army soldiers marched at full height, overcoming sagebrush and cracks. Fierce mutual counterattacks continued in the city for a long time. Around noon, Soviet units were forced to retreat from the city center to the pier. At this moment, one of the most spectacular episodes of the Kronstadt epic took place. The Soviet command sent one of its last reserves, the cavalry regiment of the 27th Division, into battle. This was the only case in military history: cavalry attacked a sea fortress on ice! This daring attack brought success: the cavalrymen broke into the city through the Petrogradskaya pier and pushed the rebels back.
By evening, the battle had turned sharply. The rebels could not stand the strain of the battle and began to retreat. Together with them, most of the members of the "revolutionary committee" headed by Petrichenko and the officers who led the mutiny were among the first to leave the city. The crews of both battleships threw out white flags. However, fighting with separate groups of rebels continued all night and subsided only in the morning of the next day, March 18 at 12 o'clock. 10 min. the last order was finally given: "1. The Kronstadt Fortress is cleared of rebels. 2. The military commandant of Kronstadt was appointed com. Dybenko"99 .
The fierce battle that lasted in the city did not allow parts of the northern group to cut off the rebels ' escape routes. All night long crowds of them, throwing down their weapons, ran to the Finnish coast. They were interned in Finland. In total, according to the emigrant press, they numbered about 8 thousand people. The same figure was called by Soviet sources 100 .
The liquidation of the Kronstadt mutiny in March 1921 marked a significant milestone in the transition period from war to peace, when the foundations of the new economic policy of the Soviet state were laid. A month after the insurrection was liquidated, Lenin formulated the most important political conclusion: "The mass of workers and peasants needs an immediate improvement in their situation. The food tax and a number of related measures will help you do this. We will cut off the economic root of the inevitable fluctuations of the small producer... And we will fight mercilessly against political fluctuations that are useful only to Milyukov... The oscillators are disconnected. We are united... The waverers don't know what they want... And we know what we want. And so we will win. " 101
99 "The Order of Lenin Leningrad Military District", p. 94.
100 TSGAVMF, f. r. - 52, op. 1, d. 91, l. 17.
101 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 43, p. 243.
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