In international relations on the eve of the First World War, the Moroccan question was one of the most significant nodes of contradictions. It gave rise to two acute crises, closely intertwining the competition of European powers, the anti-colonial struggle of the local population and the rivalry for power within the sultanate itself. But no matter how acute the contradictions on Moroccan soil reached, European states managed to find a compromise. In the end, the rivalry of the powers over Morocco did not lead to a major European war, although it significantly contributed to its approach.

Keywords: Franco-German rivalry, Algeciras Conference, S. Pichon, M. Rouvier, civil war, Bosnian crisis, M. Hafid, Casablanca incident, Baghdad railway, Franco-German agreement of 1909, antagonism of the Entente and the Triple Alliance, Moroccan question.

One of the most important stages in the development of the struggle of the powers for Morocco was the period 1907-1909. It contained the first attempt to find a compromise on Moroccan soil between France and Germany - rivals in the sultanate and members of antagonistic blocs; its failure; a sharp aggravation of Franco-German relations, which almost led to a new crisis, and a temporary settlement of differences, enshrined in a formal agreement. It ensured for some time the peaceful course of the Moroccan issue during the period under review, preventing its aggravation. The development of events was influenced by both external factors (the Bosnian crisis) and internal events in Morocco (the civil war).

The General Act of the Algeciras Conference of 1906 was the logical conclusion of the events of the First Moroccan Crisis. It established three principles of Morocco's continued existence: its sovereignty, territorial integrity and the principle of "open doors", which Germany particularly insisted on. At the same time, international guardianship over the sultanate was established, with the predominant role of France and Spain [Delonche, 1916, p.55-318].

It seemed that the Algeciras Act was a compromise: the French and Spanish had new prospects for further penetration into the sultanate; the Germans retained freedom of trade; and Morocco itself legally continued to exist as an independent state with its own government and a sultan directing foreign and domestic policy. However, in practice, the results of Algeciras were not so clear. As it was noted in the French newspaper "Figaro" of 09.04.1906: "The Conference is over, but the solution of the Moroccan question has only just begun" [cit. by: Sergeev, 2001, p. 54]. This was especially true for France and Germany: after the 1904 agreement, Great Britain no longer showed an active interest in the sultanate, and Spain played a secondary role in the fate of Morocco [Allendesalazar, 1990, p.3]. So the solution is Moroccan-

In fact, the solution of the French question was reduced to the problem of Franco-German relations in the sultanate.

As early as 1904, when concluding a "cordial agreement" with the British, the French counted on unhindered expansion in Morocco. French public opinion and political circles regarded Algeciras ' results as an undoubted success of their diplomacy. The most active colonialists, who expressed the interests of large French banking and commercial capital, expressed on the pages of publications under their control in favor of "shameless" penetration into the sultanate, its complete subordination and in fact its conquest, not forgetting to emphasize that the French intentions in Morocco are exclusively peaceful [Andrew, Kanya-Foster, 1971, p. 119; BCAF, Janvier 1908, p. 7-8; Hanotaux, 1912, p. 56]. However, the rapid growth of German interest in the fate of this Arab country, the imperious intervention of Kaiser Wilhelm in Moroccan affairs during the 1905 crisis, and the inflexible position taken by German diplomats in Algeciras, shattered the foundations on which Paris intended to build its activities in Morocco. Germany's growing colonial and world - wide claims have proved conclusively that it is an important figure without whose participation no international issue can be resolved.

The French Cabinet, since October 1906, headed by Jean-Claude Juncker. Clemenceau and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, S. Pichon, were faced with the choice of a strategy for penetrating the sultanate. It was becoming obvious that his continued submission would be possible only with German consent, probably obtained at the price of concessions. It was not by chance that a group led by former Finance Minister M. Rouvier emerged within the French government at this time, who defended the interests of circles associated with the Germans in the construction of the Baghdad Railway and believed that cooperation with Germany would help solve the Moroccan issue and would be favorable for France and the French market as a whole [Earle, 1924, p. 294].

Germany, which was outnumbered in Algeciras, was forced to admit failure in its attempts to thwart the French plans in Morocco. Although the transformation of the sultanate into a French protectorate did not take place in 1906, the Germans were forced to concede on crucial issues. This included the establishment of the State - owned Moroccan Bank, which was actually managed by the Bank of Paris; the French controlled customs, were responsible for drafting reforms designed to modernize the sultanate, but in fact-to make it even more dependent on Europeans. French officers were appointed as instructors of the Moroccan police, which allowed Paris to control the internal life of the sultanate. They, as they said in Paris, "rewarded" Morocco with statutes on the police, on forced alienation, on taxes [AVPRI, D. 1390, 1907, l. 36].

The diplomatic defeat of the Germans in 1906 led to an ambiguous mood in Germany. On the one hand, in the context of the deepening Anglo-German antagonism, and especially after the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian agreement in 1907.1, the idea of "encirclement by its enemies" became particularly popular in Germany, which was actively discussed in the nationalist press and fueled by various chauvinist and militaristic circles led by the Pan-German Union (Balobaev, 1965,p. ⁴). p. 4-5]. On the other hand, Berlin has revised its view of France. According to Reich Chancellor B. von Bulow, Berlin was finally convinced that France had not the slightest intention of attacking Germany in 1905 or putting up any obstacles to it in Europe [Bulow, 1935, p. 327]. There was a man standing behind her.

¹ The terms of this agreement were intended to smooth out the Anglo-Russian contradictions in the Middle East. Its signing completed the creation of the Entente (see Ostaltsva, 1977; Romanova, 2008, pp. 80-86).

A stronger rival is Britain, which not only kept Paris ' foreign policy under review, but was also able to come to an agreement with Russia, a country that Berlin had high hopes for rapprochement with.² At that time, the idea was born in German political circles to use any opportunity to break up the Anglo-Russian link of the Entente [Bulov, 1935, p. 339]. France could be the card that Berlin could use to shuffle the established European order, so by 1907 Berlin decided to adopt a "peace-loving" position.

However, the considerations of "high politics" and the realities of Moroccan reality turned out to be far from each other. The Algeciras results gave the French carte blanche to act in Morocco, which they immediately took advantage of. Naturally, the activity shown by them brought a serious discord in the relations of the parties "on the ground". The contradictions became deeper, the struggle became more acute, and eventually Franco-German rivalry began to dominate the economic, political and social life of the sultanate.

One of the most striking indicators of the lack of mutual understanding between the powers was the clear division of Europeans living in Morocco into two camps: the" French bloc", which included representatives of England, Spain, Portugal and the United States in addition to the French, and supporters of Germany, including those from Italy, the Netherlands, Austria-Hungary and Belgium [AVPRI, d. 2771, 1908, l. 18]. G. Stahl, a Russian citizen who was staying in Morocco at that time, wrote: "The German and French colonies live in poorly concealed hostility, and intrigues have built a strong nest for themselves" [AVPRI, d. 2752, 1907, l. 20]. Echoing him, the German representative Fr. Rosen argued that "the French envoy Regnault is conducting a systematic 'conspiracy policy' against Germany here; having secured the support of the 'bloc', the German side can only submit to the decision of the majority" [AVPRI, d.2752, 1907, l. 23]. As a rule, in their reports from Morocco, European representatives agreed that relations between the two sides were strained.

An example of the struggle of the powers for a dominant position in the sultanate is the little-known episode with the election of an engineer who was supposed to lead the implementation of public works in the country. Following the terms of the Algeciras Act, in February 1907, the Moroccan government (mahzen) announced the election of a neutral Belgian figure to this position, which was approved by the Belgian Government, Germany, Italy and Austria - Hungary. However, France strongly opposed it, saying that due to the prevailing Franco-Spanish interests in Morocco, a Frenchman or Spaniard should be appointed to this post. Surprisingly, this, in fact, secondary incident rather sharply strained relations between the French and Germans, and the latter were legally right. Then the French representatives accused the members of the German diplomatic mission of organizing a conspiracy with Machsen, calling their actions unacceptable, and offered to resolve this issue by voting. For three months, the parties lived in a state of "cold war", wove intrigues, resorted to threats. E. V. Sablin, the Russian Charge d'affaires in Tangier, in a secret telegram to the Russian Foreign Minister A. P. Izvolsky, noted:: "It is extremely difficult to reconcile the three affected egos: Moroccan, Belgian and French, to which German will be added if the Belgian's candidacy is rejected" [AVPRI, d. 1390, 1907, p. 34].

As a result, thanks to a clever diplomatic game and the persistence of the French envoy in Tangier, Regnault won the protege of Paris. According to E. V. Sablin, the actual voting did not take place, as the German and Belgian representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation did not participate in the voting.

² We are talking about the Bssrk Agreement of 1905, which did not enter into force.

³ According to E. V. Sablin, " France's self-esteem was more affected by Machsen's initiative, which was undoubtedly caused by German influence."

The representatives refrained from expressing their opinion, and there were no objections from other European diplomats [AVPRI, d.1391, 1907, p. 45]. So the French were able to beat their rivals, successfully proving their pre-eminent position in the country. The Germans, on the other hand, behaved inconsistently during the "engineering incident", which predetermined their defeat in this case. Initially, the French engineer was unacceptable to them, which prompted them to do everything possible to prevent the Franco-Spanish combination. However, by the time the issue was resolved, they had dramatically changed their minds, and at the May 1907 election of the candidate, they did not even mention their Belgian protege. When reporting to St. Petersburg, E. V. Sablin pointed out the frequent departures of the German envoy, F. V. Sablin. Rosen went to Berlin, where he apparently received instructions not to aggravate relations with the French on such an insignificant issue [AVPRI, d. 1391, 1907, p. 34]. This fact proves once again that Berlin was looking for a peaceful solution to the Moroccan misunderstandings.

In practice, the Algeciras results only served to deepen Franco-German contradictions in Morocco. In this situation, Russia was one of the few powers that saw that it was a compromise between the two rival states that would be the best option for resolving their "deaf dispute on Magrebin soil." It is worth noting that Russia did not take part in the division of Morocco, and the Russian diplomatic mission was rather an observation mission4. As one of the members of the Russian diplomatic mission in Morocco, P. S. Botkin, noted: "We have no interests; we have excellent relations with both conflicting blocs. ... Almost all local representatives are inclined to see us as the only power capable of playing an impartial role between Germany and France in their misunderstandings in Morocco" [AVPRI, d.1392, 1907, l. 18]. However, Russian representatives in the Sultanate in their reports to St. Petersburg repeatedly noted that the French who lived in Morocco value Russia's assistance and hope for its voice in resolving the" sensitive " Moroccan issue.

These hopes were not unfounded. Russia had helped France in Algeciras, and now that the competition with the Germans was becoming more acute, the French began to appreciate its friendly position on the Moroccan issue even more. In the face of Russia, they saw an additional voice that gave them an advantage in the event of further aggravation of the fight against the Germans. At the same time, it is worth considering that Russia, being an ally of France, was not bound to it by any agreements on Moroccan affairs, which in principle untied its hands in relations with the Germans, since they concerned Morocco.

However, Russian diplomats living in the Sultanate repeatedly stated in their reports that Russia was more desirable to play a mediating role in the context of the struggle between the two groups. Thus, E. V. Sablin wrote: "Whether Morocco will eventually belong to Germany or France is equally unprofitable for us. In the first case, Germany will undoubtedly penetrate into the Mediterranean, and in the second, when she is convinced that Morocco is inseparable from France, she will naturally seek other compensations, and perhaps not indifferent to us. Would it not be more advantageous for us to assume the position of mediator in the Moroccan question, with the aim of reconciling the claims of these Powers and bringing them to an agreement by mutual concessions?" On the report of Sablin, the inscription was made in the hand of Nicholas II: "Very efficient. Tsarskoe Selo. 20.02.1907 " [AVPRI, d. 1390, 1907, p. 43].

Thus, the initial calculations of the French for unambiguous support from St. Petersburg were only partially justified. In a secret instruction sent by the Foreign Ministry to P. S. Botkin, it was stated that it would be advisable for Russia not to interfere

⁴ Another Power with little interest was the United States.

However, in the event of an escalation of the issue, it should not openly support its ally France, but rather contribute to the resolution of the issue by a majority vote. At the same time, it was clarified that "we should not at all compromise the benefits that the opportunity to control one's voice in a dispute between powers rather independently creates for Russia, which is not bound by special agreements and its own real interests" [AVPRI, d.1390, 1907, l. 50]. At the heart of Russia's Moroccan policy during this period was not just the support of the French side, but mainly the prevention of German penetration into the Mediterranean Sea.

The reaction of the Russian representatives in Morocco to the instructions received from St. Petersburg was laconic:" We will try to reconcile France and Germany on Moroccan soil " [AVPRI, d.1391, 1907, p. 65]. However, the Moroccan reality interfered with the plans of Russian diplomats, and the rivalry between the powers turned out to be stronger than attempts to find a compromise. In the sultanate itself, far away from big politics and diplomatic games, Franco-German cooperation was accompanied by fierce competition, which resulted in local discontent with increased European penetration. The anti-colonial movement became a new factor that interfered in Franco-German relations.

The internal political situation in Morocco after 1906 was extremely difficult. The impotence of the local government to stop the absorption of the country by Europeans, internal strife brought the Sherif monarchy to a final decline; lack of money weakened the power of the ruling Sultan Moulay Abdelaziz, making him even more dependent on European loans. These factors created fertile ground for intensifying the struggle of the interested powers, which had all the necessary tools for this: the French - the preferential position created by Algeciras, and the presence of a fairly large number of troops on the territory of neighboring Algeria, and the Germans "had an apple of discord behind them - the sultan himself and Makhzen" [AVPRI, d. 1391, 1907, l. 65].

It is worth noting that the influence of the Germans on the Sultan's government and M. Abdelaziz himself was quite strong. The balance of power established at the Court had its roots in the early 1900s, in the origins of the Moroccan question. Thanks to the skilful policy of the German representatives, there was a strong conviction among the Sultan's subjects that the only Power from which Morocco could receive real help and which could be counted on as a friend was Germany. And the rest are "either indifferent or hostile" [AVPRI, d. 2758, 1908-1909, l. 78]. Machsen's initiative on any issues was, in fact, an initiative of Germany, which hit the political positions of their French rivals.

In this connection, a logical question arises: is it possible to say with confidence that the French really won the victory in Algeciras? In my opinion, the French "triumph" was deliberately inflated by representatives of those circles for whom the Empire of the Sheriffs became not only a vital goal, but also a question of the status and prestige of their Moroccan policy. Naturally, the established international character of guardianship over the sultanate did not meet the aspirations of the French government, and the incessant rivalry with other powers greatly complicated the task of further subordination of the country. Instead of becoming a full-fledged "master" of Morocco, the French got the role of a kind of"European gendarme". Constant incidents within the Sultanate only served to complicate the situation in Paris and further confuse the Moroccan question. The exultation that prevailed in the Caie d'Orsay and the Moroccan reality were far from each other: against the background of the gradual and peaceful German tactics, the French seemed to the local population to be aggressors intent on invading their country.

Events were not long in coming. In March 1907, a wave of murders of Europeans living there swept through Morocco. A special protest in Paris was caused by the massacre of the French doctor Moshan committed by a fanatical crowd. At that time, there were rumors in Marrakech that the mastermind of the murder was a certain Holtzmann, a German by birth, who assured the Arabs that the doctor was an unofficial guide of the French policy [AVPRI, d. 2758, 1908-1909, l. 64]. France's response to this episode was the occupation by its troops of the territories bordering Algeria, centered in the city of Oujda5.

In the summer of the same year, another riot broke out in Casablanca. In August 1907, one of the French construction companies started construction of the port and railway. During the work that was carried out near the Muslim cemetery, a fight broke out, nine people were killed, three of whom were French, and two were Spaniards. The murder was suspected by Moroccans, who actually wanted to stop the work, and the accusation brought against them by the French turned out to be false. Soon the fight turned into a clash between Europeans and Moroccans, which lasted several days. Almost immediately, the inhabitants of Casablanca were joined by neighboring tribes, and the Casablanca brawl quickly turned into an anti-European rebellion. In response, the French, acting in concert with the Spanish, bombed the city. At the same time, declaring "respect for the sovereignty of the Sultan in accordance with the Algeciras Act" and under the pretext of "restoring the former peace and order in Morocco", the French troops led by General d'amada actually went to the open capture of the North Atlantic region of Shawiya [BD, 1928, vol. VII, No. 78].

Formally, the actions of the French went beyond the Algeciras Act, which did not provide for the use of military force to restore order in the sultanate. In one of the meetings with von Bulow, the French ambassador in Berlin, J. Cambon, assured him that the French were not carrying out conquests of the country, but, guided by peaceful intentions, were protecting the safety of Europeans living there. At the same time, on behalf of the French government, he expressed the hope that the Casablanca events would not destroy the friendly relations that were gradually building up between the two powers [DDF, 1946, vol. XI, № 131, 145].

Whether the assurances made by the French side were sufficient for Berlin or whether it was undesirable for it to upset relations with Paris is a moot point. Nevertheless, the Wilhelmstrasse considered the actions of the French quite natural. In confirmation of their peace-loving course, the Germans declared that they did not intend to cause any difficulties for the French in Morocco or incite the Sherif government against them, as the German representative in Tangier was informed. Rosen was given the most complete instructions [BD, 1928, vol. VII, No. 73, 78, 79]. The position taken by the Berlin cabinet made a favorable impression on the French government, as it could provide significant assistance in further moving Franco-German relations towards warming, softening or even completely eliminating Germany's unfriendly attitude towards the actions of the French on the Moroccan coast.

In fact, the occupation of the Moroccan provinces was a way of showing the Germans that the French would respond to intrigues or any other attempts to circumvent themselves in Morocco not only with diplomatic measures, but also with military expansion. That France was not so much concerned with revenge for the murder of Moshan as with the intention of using this event both as a pretext for intervention, since it did not abandon its goal of achieving the final submission of the sultanate to its power, and as a way to make changes in the situation of the Sultanate.

⁵ According to E. V. Sablin, the NSMCC diplomatic mission in Morocco considered the French move to open hostilities to be a direct confirmation that Dr. Moshan had died as an unofficial informant in Paris. And the local press called the CDF "the first victim of Franco-German rivalry" [AVPRI, d. 2758, 1908-1909, l. 68].

discord in the "German-Moroccan friendship", according to Russian diplomatic reports. Thus, the ambassador in Paris, A. I. Nelidov, conveyed to him the French confession that "the French government decided to act in Morocco without any prior appeal to Makhzen" [AVPRI, d.1390, 1907, l. 78].

As a result of the French actions, the German positions were significantly damaged, and soon the local population finally lost faith in them as saviors from the French. As one of Abdelaziz's closest associates, an English agent at the Sultan's court, Caid Maclean, noted: "The French waited 2.5 years to repay the Moroccans for their Germanophilism" [AWPRI, d. 2758, 1908-1909, l. 317]. For Europe, French aggression meant that Paris would make every effort to expand and consolidate its dominance in the Sheriffs ' Empire. And the Germans, according to the figurative remark of E. V. Sablin, "had only to hurry, otherwise the French would regain their lost position without asking or giving them anything" [AVPRI, d. 2758, 1908-1909, l. 320].

It was becoming obvious that Germany would not remain indifferent to the strengthening of the French military presence in the Sheriffs ' Empire and would try to protect its "rights". In many respects, the desire to continue pursuing an active policy towards Morocco was due to pressure from representatives of large banking capital and heavy industry: the Krupp, Kirdorf, Thyssen, and Mannesmann concerns, which had a strong influence on Berlin's foreign policy [Heydorn, 1964, p.56]. They were in favor of continuing expansion in order to be able to enjoy the riches of Moroccan land. In search of sources of raw materials and markets for the products of German industry, which was experiencing a period of rapid growth, they were ready to persuade the German government to abandon political claims in the sultanate and, upon receiving appropriate concessions, grant the French the right to be "first violin in the Moroccan orchestra of powers" (Dugdale, 1929, p. 78).

It is worth noting that in the period 1906-1909, the Germans achieved great commercial success in Morocco, creating serious competition with other European powers. Thus, the German-Moroccan turnover reached 11 million marks and accounted for 14% of the total external turnover of this country; the Germans occupied the third place in exports, and by 1909 for the first time came out on top, in imports-on the second, ahead of the French; more than 200 German trading houses had their representative offices in various Moroccan cities; the Germans they actively participated in providing various loans to the Sultan's government; finally, it was the German Bank that the Sultan entrusted with minting coins [Rudakov, 2006, pp. 82-83].

By the beginning of 1907, in Paris and Berlin, almost simultaneously, they were talking about the possibility of overcoming mutual differences on Moroccan soil. It is also important that these ideas appeared not in diplomatic departments and ministerial offices,but in the environment of French and German commercial, industrial and banking capital. In March 1907, E. V. Sablin reported to St. Petersburg that representatives of various large German banks living in Morocco assured him of their readiness to work in the sultanate together with the French [AVPRI, d.1391, 1907, l. 69]. In Berlin itself, Emperor Wilhelm stated that the possibility of Franco-German cooperation depends on the wishes and needs of entrepreneurs who had their economic interests in Morocco, which could lead the two powers to conclude an agreement of a more general plan [DDF, 1946, vol. XI, № 175].

It is also worth noting that in view of the financial crisis that broke out in 1907 and as French and German appetites grew, representatives of the largest concerns, banks and trading houses were ready to move closer to their rivals in order to extract maximum profit from these connections. But this is precisely the mutual desire of the powers, as one of the active supporters of the Franco-German alliance said.

such rapprochement, Cambon, could have led to even greater complications of the Moroccan question than in 1905 [DDF, 1946, vol. XI, № 41].

For the first time, the possibility of real Franco-German cooperation was discussed in January 1907, when the German side proposed to J. Cambon to achieve economic and financial cooperation in Morocco [DDF, 1946, vol. XI, № 81]. At the same time, the leader of the French colonialists and a close friend of Rouvier-E. Etienne went on a private visit to Berlin, where he met with the Kaiser and Count von Bulow. During these meetings, the politicians touched upon the issue of Franco-German cooperation and possible rapprochement between the two powers in Morocco. As noted by Zh. Cambon, in his report to the French Foreign Minister, S. Pichon, describing one of these meetings, the emperor approved of the French side's willingness to cooperate, noting at the same time rather ironically that the French are trying to conclude an entente with the whole world. The Kaiser also recalled that the Germans repeatedly made attempts to improve relations with France, but that " instead of a friendly hand, it turned its back on them." Parrying the emperor, Etienne offered to negotiate on colonial issues and resolve the issue of borders in Africa. "This is already yesterday, today we need an alliance, "Wilhelm replied" [DDF, 1946, vol. XI, № 79].

Soon, the negotiations initiated by the German side moved from Europe to Morocco. In the summer of 1907, the German representative in Tangier, G. Langwerth, received instructions from his Government to start an informal dialogue with French intermediaries "on the ground" [DDF, 1946, vol. XI, № 89, 140]. As early as August 1907, Langvert, together with his French counterpart Saint-Auller, were ready to provide both governments with a preliminary draft of the future agreement on Franco-German cooperation in Morocco. In particular, it was assumed that the French and Germans would be able to agree on cooperation in the trade sphere while maintaining the principle of "open doors", which met German interests. But at the same time, the Germans would abandon their political claims in Morocco, which the French side especially insisted on [DDF, 1946, vol. XI, № 135, 140, 148]. In practice, it was supposed to create joint "international" enterprises based on Franco-German capital, but the participation of other interested powers was also welcome [AVPRI, d.2758, 1908-1909, l. 18].

However, in 1907, these negotiations did not bring positive results: this was largely due to the unwillingness of the French and German governments to take an important step. In Paris, S. Pichon did not recognize the exchange of letters between representatives of the two states in Tangier as legitimate [DDF, 1946, vol. XI, № 175]. The influence of his closest political entourage also affected, warning that the French public, with its idea of regaining national prestige lost after the war of 1870-1871, would react negatively to the news of its government's attempts to negotiate with the Germans. As one of the French representatives of the Committee on African Affairs stated, "for her (Germany - K. D.) Morocco serves as a bait, with which she wants us to seize the bait that would lead us to the course of the German Empire "[Malcolin, 1931, p. 216]. It is no coincidence that the negotiations were held in an atmosphere of the strictest secrecy.

Moreover, there were also concerns about the possible reaction of the allies-the Spanish in Morocco and the British in Europe - to the news of French attempts to negotiate behind their backs. If the French were bound to the former by joint guardianship of the sultanate, then their relations with the British went far beyond the borders of Morocco, since they were bound by obligations within the framework of the Entente. Once rivals, they became allies not only in the Sheriffs ' Empire, but also in Europe. In this way, London was able to maintain a favorable balance on the continent, and in return, it provided considerable assistance to the French in all their Moroccan affairs [Romanova, 2008, p.116]. Therefore, even the very fact of Franco-German negotiations would be negatively perceived-

It was accepted by the British, and the reaction to them could create unnecessary difficulties for the French. "In principle, we are not opposed to possible Franco-German economic cooperation in Morocco," Pichon wrote, " but here this cooperation can be possible within the framework of agreements reached with Spain and England. In this case, we can find possible cooperation with the Germans only in the sphere in which the Spanish and British would refuse to take part... " [DDF, 1946, vol. XI, № 85]. Despite the search for mutual understanding with the Germans, Paris tended to follow the traditional foreign policy line and maintained allied relations with Britain and Russia, which generally helped to preserve the already established balance of power in Europe and did not violate the existing system. Finally, in the midst of the negotiations, unrest broke out in Casablanca.

In turn, the German government was not prepared to give up Morocco so easily. In its official reply to Paris, taking into account the emerging rapprochement between the two powers, it considered it pointless to continue the dialogue, since diplomatic negotiations should have been preceded by discussions in economic circles that had their own interests in Morocco [DDF, 1946, vol. XI, № 174]. Perhaps a more powerful argument for ending the negotiations was that the Germans did not receive serious compensation in return for the establishment of French power over Morocco. At the same time, the issue of obtaining concessions related to other territories or the construction of the Baghdad Railway was not raised by the German side [DDF, 1946, vol. XI, № 130, 146].

Meanwhile, the situation in 1907 favored this: by playing on the sentiments of its competitors, reinforced by the success in Algeciras, using its influence at the Sultan's court, Germany could achieve much more significant concessions than it received two years later. As E. V. Sablin noted: "If they (the Germans - K. D.) had acted more shrewdly and, while stroking the Moroccan mouse, stroked the French cat at the same time, things would have been different" [AVPRI, d.2758, 1908-1909, p. 34].

The Franco-German negotiations of 1907 showed that both States were open to dialogue and equally interested in establishing mutual cooperation in Morocco. In addition, the shakiness of the French position in the sultanate was demonstrated, and the growth of German influence could turn into serious difficulties for them. It was becoming increasingly clear that if Paris did not intend to abandon its aspirations in Morocco (which in principle was no longer possible), it would inevitably have to come to an agreement with Germany.

It is worth noting that the negotiations still had practical results. In November 1907, the first joint venture "Union of Moroccan Mines" was established, with recent rivals - the French Schneider-Creusot concern and the German Krupp concern-becoming participants. According to the German State Secretary W. von Schoen, they became "supporters of the rapprochement of the two powers", which once again confirmed that the idea of cooperation between the powers was based more on the needs of financial groups, and not on the initiative of political elites [DDF, 1946, vol. XI, № 317]. The capital was distributed as follows: most of it belonged to the French, represented by Campany Marocain, the Schneider-Creusot group, and the bankers Autrien and Gontier, followed by the German companies Deutsch Kaiser and Helsnekichner. The British were represented by Keane and Williams, and the Italians and Spaniards by individual interested industrialists. The ratio of power shares in the new company was as follows: 45% - France, 20% - Germany, 11% - England, 10% - Spain, 14% - Italy, Belgium and Portugal [Allendesalazar, 1990, p. 219].

As early as April 1908, Berlin and Paris continued to talk about the need to conclude an entente [DDF, 1946, vol. XI, № 317]. However, soon there was a new aggravation of Franco-German contradictions. In the Casablanca events of 1907

and the subsequent occupation of a number of provinces, the Moroccans blamed the ruling Sultan M. Abdelaziz. A wave of discontent swept across the country: In the streets, mosques, and shopping centers, it was said that the Sultan had sold out his country to "infidels", "got involved with the enemies of God and religion and became dependent on them" (Hajoui, 1937, p.82-83). The pro-European policy of the Sultan and the intervention of the powers in the internal life of the Sherif Empire undermined its economic and political stability, which as a result led to the outbreak of civil war in the spring of 1908. At the head of the "holy war" against the "infidels" was the younger brother of M. Abdelaziz and the governor of the South, Moulay Hafid.

In the ensuing feud, as if following the old tradition of rivalry, the French and Germans supported the opposing sides. So, to continue the struggle for his throne, Abdelaziz received material assistance from the French, who showed all the duplicity of their Moroccan policy: "they gave help with one hand, and with the other they seized the Moroccan land inch by inch" [AWPRI, d.2758, 1908-1909, l. 52]. In turn, Hafid, whom the French called "a religious fanatic suffering from megalomania," was supported by the Germans. In addition, they were the only Europeans who accepted the Moroccan mission that arrived in Berlin at the governmental level [DDF, 1946, vol. XI, № 319]. In return, Hafid promised to grant the Germans mining concessions in southern Morocco [Voronov, 2004, p. 123].

Thus, in the struggle of the brothers for the Moroccan throne, the parties did not act as impartial observers, but decided to use it to their advantage. In one of his reports, P. S. Botkin emphasized that Moroccan affairs would be better if " both rivals were left to themselves and Messrs. Regnault and Rosen would cease to be the first "Azizist" and the second - "hafidist" "[AVPRI, d. 1393, 1908, l. 78]. By supporting Hafid, the Germans have shown that they are still able to exert a strong influence on the internal political situation in Morocco and that without their consent, French plans in the sultanate may not be realized. In fact, the civil war was a catalyst for the further deepening of Franco-German rivalry on Moroccan soil and testified to a change of mood in relations between the two powers.

As a result of short-lived military operations from March to July 1908, Hafid defeated his brother and in August in Fez, and then in other cities, was proclaimed the legitimate ruler of the country. The defeat of Abdelaziz was extremely negatively perceived in Paris and was regarded as a blow to the entire French policy in Morocco [AVPRI, d. 2771, 1908, l. 67]. It is noteworthy that on the day of the proclamation of M. Hafid as Sultan, a large crowd gathered in front of the building where the German mission was located, which supported Germany and shouted the slogan "Down with France!" [AWPRI, d.2771, 1908, p. 69].

Immediately after his accession to the throne, the new sultan engaged in leading the country out of a protracted political and economic crisis, and also continued to fight internal opposition. Understanding the gravity of the problems and the precariousness of their position, the new authorities in Fez were well aware that with limited resources, they would face huge costs. The Sultan needed financial support, which he could get in the form of a loan from the European powers. Thus, he actually repeated the fate of his predecessor: becoming financially dependent on the Europeans, Hafid turned into a pawn in their hands. As the Russian Charge d'affaires E. V. Sablin noted: "The Algeciras Act guarantees the sovereignty of the sultanate, but does not name the sultan. The best sultan for Morocco will be the one who will be the best for Europe "[AVPRI, d. 1392, 1907, p. 55].

Based on these considerations, M. Hafid began to establish relations with the European powers. It is not by chance, in our opinion, that the Germans were the first to whom he applied for official recognition. And the fact that already at the beginning of September 1908.

Kaiser Wilhelm sent a note to the European capitals declaring his intention to recognize Hafid as a legitimate ruler, calling on all others to follow his example, which was further evidence that during the civil strife, Hafid's sympathies were on the side of the Germans, and he acted in the interests of Berlin [BD, 1928, vol. VII, No. 105]. In September 1908, a German mission was sent to the court of the new Sultan, headed by Consul W. Nürdorf, who took the initiative on behalf of his Government to establish diplomatic relations [Hajoui, 1937, p.85].

France, supported by Spain and Britain, declared that the Germans had violated the agreements reached at the Algeciras Conference: if one of the powers, without the consent of the others, recognizes someone as the legitimate sultan, any other can put forward its own candidate in response [BD, 1928, vol. VII, No. 94]. So Hafid, unwittingly, found himself "between two fires", and his figure became the subject of bargaining between the powers. As a result of a long diplomatic correspondence and exchange of notes, the parties were able to reach a compromise: the French agreed to the victory of M. Hafid, the sultan friendly to Germany, in exchange for his recognition of all the points of the General Act of the Algeciras Conference and other obligations given by his predecessor.

It seemed that the rivals in Morocco-the French and Germans-were able to find common ground and resolve the differences that arose. However, the new incident unexpectedly strained relations between the two powers to the limit, becoming one of the last serious tests of their interaction in Morocco.

On September 25, 1908, the German Consul sheltered six deserters from the French Foreign Legion, three of whom were Germans. When the fugitives landed on a German ship in the roadstead, they were arrested by French officers, who threatened the secretary of the consulate who accompanied the deserters, beat and tied up the consulate security officer who was with him. German diplomats, outraged by the violation of consular immunity, demanded an apology for the violence committed against the consulate staff. The French government, considering the accusations unfounded, strongly rejected the statements made by the Germans, accusing them of harboring deserters.

For the French, the desertion episode became a matter of national prestige, which is why they absolutely did not intend to give in to the Germans [BCAF, October 1908, p.271]. The situation was fueled by the outbreak of a newspaper skirmish, which was used by colonial circles and the chauvinist press to incite nationalist feelings among the public. At the same time, in September 1908, the congress of the Pan-German Union was held in Berlin, where hopes were expressed for strengthening the combat readiness of the fleet and recognizing the need to increase the military power of Germany [Balobaev, 1965, p. 9].

Events were developing so rapidly, and the situation reached such an acute stage, that the British Foreign Office started talking about a possible European conflict. In the event of a Franco-German clash, England was ready to take the side of France [BD, 1928, vol. VII, No. 135].

The situation continued to escalate. In October 1908, the French Embassy in St. Petersburg informed the Russian Foreign Ministry about a possible German attack on France [Bestuzhev, 1962, p. 67]. At the same time, the French President of the Council of Ministers, J. Clemenceau said he would go to war with Germany over Morocco. Following this, Paris informed Russia about the possibility of such a war [Voronov, 2004, p. 129]. Russia, in turn, confirmed its loyalty to France "under all circumstances" [DDF, 1946, vol. XI, № 554].

Thus, the Moroccan question ceased to be a matter solely of two powers and with the participation of third parties (England and Russia, and after them Spain) it could escalate into a major international clash. In Germany itself, in November 1908, preparations were made for mobilization. As the Russian military attache in Berlin wrote 2 Vostok, No. 4

A. A. Mikhelson, "the idea of the possibility of war on such an empty pretext as the Casablanca incident means a high degree of international tension" (quoted in [Vinogradov, 1964, p. 53]).

The events that took place in the autumn of 1908 marked the peak in the development of relations between the two Powers during the period under review. The tension may well have triggered another international crisis on Moroccan soil. It became clear that the Franco-German rivalry "on the ground" could not be covered up by the speeches made in European capitals about the friendly intentions of states towards each other. But at that point, France and Germany compromised and a few months later notified Europe of the signing of a joint agreement.

The reason for such a sharp change of mood in Franco-German relations should be sought in the Balkans, where at the same time the events related to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary, ⁶ which was opposed by Russia, Turkey and Serbia, became explosive. Planning the annexation of these provinces, Vienna was counting on support from Germany and the interference of France and England, I would leave Russia without the help of its allies in the bloc. Of course, Russia would not dare to defend its claims alone, and even more so to escalate the situation to an armed conflict with the combined forces of the Triple Alliance. In this sense, the Casablanca incident, which seriously quarreled Paris and Berlin, made its own adjustments to the plans of the Austrian Foreign Ministry. Therefore, Austria-Hungary asked Germany to settle the Moroccan disputes as soon as possible, so that in case of a conflict with Russia in the Balkans, it would not annoy its ally [DDF, 1946, vol. XI, № 172, 188].

Germany's position on the Bosnian issue was decisive: without taking a direct part in the Balkan events themselves, it supported its ally and resolutely sided with Austria-Hungary. It is no coincidence that it was at this time that Berlin recalled the recent attempts to find mutual understanding with the French in Morocco. The calculation of German political circles was simple: to use the "weak point" of the French, which was the question of Morocco, to promise them preferential rights and thus, overcoming mutual differences, solve problems of a larger nature. By" buying " the neutrality of Paris in this way, Germany would simultaneously solve several problems: first, the settlement of the Moroccan question, secondly, the deterioration of relations within the Entente by aggravating Franco-Russian-British ties, and finally, the preservation of the former order in the Balkans.

Paris also considered the Bosnian crisis a convenient opportunity for an amicable resolution of the Moroccan question: the Germans were preoccupied with the Balkan events, which distracted them from the problems of the sultanate. So why not recall past conversations about possible cooperation in this part of the African continent and get full freedom of action from Germany? Such ideas were defended by a group formed at that time in the Chamber of Deputies, which included members of the colonial party led by Ye. Etienne, members of the Committee on Moroccan Affairs, political editor of the newspaper " Tan " Tardieu, Minister of Finance J. Caillot, defending the interests of those industrial circles that were aimed at cooperation between French and German capital in the Sultanate [Edwards, 1963, p. 500]. German Charge d'affaires von Lanken wrote that with the beginning of the Bosnian crisis, the mood in Paris shifted towards rapprochement with Germany, even despite the Casablanca incident [DDF, 1946, vol. XI, № 443].

The calculation of the Germans was correct: Britain and France, under various pretexts, evaded taking concrete measures against Austria-Hungary, without showing any signs of aggression.

⁶ Formally, they were part of the Ottoman Empire, but by the decision of the Berlin Congress of 1878, they were occupied by Austria-Hungary. The latter has long considered these strategically important provinces as a springboard for strengthening its influence in the Balkans.

no involvement in Russia's interests. And Germany, through a skillful diplomatic game, was able to "take revenge" on St. Petersburg for its rapprochement with England [Romanova, 2008, p. 162].

The Bosnian crisis, which revealed the existence of certain contradictions between European states and revealed the problem of relations within the allied blocs, ultimately had a decisive impact on the Franco-German rapprochement in Morocco. Under these circumstances, neither side sought to create a new hotbed of international tension. Therefore, the aggravation of the Moroccan problem in 1908 did not acquire the character of an international crisis, but was localized within the framework of Franco-German relations. In this regard, the events of the autumn of 1908 in Morocco can be described as a failed crisis: the Balkan scale ultimately turned out to be more significant for Germany, and in France it was considered inappropriate to aggravate relations with Austria-Hungary because of secondary issues, from the point of view of Clemenceau and Pichon [DDF, 1946, vol. XI, № 487, 503, 548]. Common sense and the prevailing mood in the capitals showed that reaching a compromise between the two powers was the most expedient way for the parties to get out of the conflict situation. Already from the end of November 1908, tensions between France and Germany on Moroccan soil began to gradually subside. At the same time, the two Powers agreed to submit the settlement of the Casablanca incident to arbitration. ⁷

The result of these changes was the beginning of the second phase of the Franco-German negotiations, which lasted from October 1908 to February 1909. Negotiations were conducted in an atmosphere of the strictest secrecy in Berlin and Paris.

It is noteworthy that already in October 1908, during one of the meetings with State Secretary von Schoen, Zh. Cambon made an attempt to link the Bosnian crisis and the Casablanca incident in order to create a favorable ground for Franco-German rapprochement [DDF, 1946, vol. XI, № 491]. A month later, in November 1908, at the opening of the new session of the Imperial Reichstag, Kaiser Wilhelm emphasized in his welcoming speech the friendly attitude towards France and expressed Berlin's desire to meet "the efforts of the current French Cabinet aimed at improving mutual relations" [AVPRI, d.2758, 1908-1909, l. 81].

On December 13, 1908, during a meeting of the French Minister of Finance, Jean-Claude Juncker. The former openly suggested that the Moroccan problem should be excluded from the list of controversial issues. The two sides officially assured each other that the sultanate was "vital for France because of its close proximity to Algeria," and important for Germany "solely because of commercial interests." The question of compensation, which Berlin would like to receive in return, von Lanken suggested that Paris should decide. At the end of the meeting, both diplomats expressed hope for reaching an early understanding in the context of the worsening situation in the Balkans [DDF, 1946, vol. XI, № 503].

It seemed that the foundation of the future agreement was laid, but von Bulow was not very enthusiastic about the newly opened negotiations between the powers, and in December 1908 refused to act as a direct initiator of the signing of the agreement. It is worth noting that the end of 1908-the beginning of 1909 was the highest point in the development of the Bosnian crisis: its participants increasingly spoke about the inevitability of war [Vinogradov, 1964, pp. 114-116]. Perhaps it was at this time that Berlin finally realized the need to use the successfully developing situation to settle relations with the French, another such opportunity could not have been presented.

⁷ The Casablanca incident was finally settled in October 1909 at an arbitration hearing at The Hague Tribunal, which made a compromise decision: to recognize the guilt of the Germans who helped deserters of other nationalities, and the illegality of the use of force by the French to protect their citizens who were allegedly in danger [DDF, 1946, vol. XI, № 544].

2*

The participants of the "Union of Moroccan Mines"had a decisive influence on the change of mood in Berlin. As early as the beginning of December 1909, W. von Schoen stated that this syndicate could act as an instrument of Franco-German rapprochement [Edwards, 1963, pp. 504-505]. In late December 1908 and early January 1909, representatives of the Union, together with French industrialists, organized a conference in Paris, where they openly declared their readiness to cooperate in Morocco and expressed hope for the earliest conclusion of a Franco - German agreement [Edwards, 1963, p.506]. Eventually, financial and industrial interests interested in the Sultanate pushed their governments to sign the agreement.

The results were not long in coming. At the January 6, 1909 meeting between Cambon and von Schoen, the parties discussed the subject of a future agreement: economic cooperation between the Germans and the French in Morocco in exchange for recognition of the prevailing political influence of the latter in it. On January 27, 1909, von Schoen informed Cambon that Germany agreed to accept the agreements reached during the joint meetings and use the draft proposed in 1907 as the basis for a future agreement [DDF, 1946, vol. XI, № 507, 596].

Thus, the combination of the international situation and domestic circumstances in Morocco created a favorable atmosphere for the signing of the Franco-German agreement on February 9, 1909 (Delonche, 1916, p. 318).

Both sides declared their commitment to the Algeciras Act and declared their goal to "prevent mutual misunderstandings." Germany recognized "France's special political interests in Morocco" and " pledged not to interfere with these interests." France, for its part, promised to support the integrity and independence of the Moroccan State and guaranteed Germany's economic equality in commercial and industrial activities in Morocco. The Contracting Parties also announced that "they will facilitate the joint participation of their citizens in any actions that they wish to undertake."

The agreement was supplemented by secret letters from Cambon and von Schoen. Cambon's letter stated that the Germans would no longer hold positions in Morocco that were of a political nature, and that the French side would have advantages in future joint ventures. In a reply letter, von Schoen expressed his agreement with these proposals [Delonche, 1916, p. 318].

The news of the signing of the Franco-German agreement caused a mixed but expected reaction in European capitals. So, in the British Foreign Office, he was met with a rather cold reception, saying: "We have abandoned our claims in Morocco in order to promote the establishment of the French there. But it was not our intention to retreat before the Germans. Meanwhile, the French are making rapid concessions, which we would be able to resist, and therefore we will probably soon move to a more active participation in Moroccan affairs, where our trade in some ports is stronger than the French " [AVPRI, d. 2758, 1908-1909, l. 61]. At the same time, British Foreign Secretary E. Gray noted that the Franco-German agreement does not guarantee Berlin's non-interference in Moroccan affairs in the future [DDF, 1946, vol. XII, No. 1]. Such responses had a completely logical explanation: the warming of Franco-German relations and the willingness of its ally to make concessions to one of its main rivals in favor of economic interests were contrary to the fundamental principles of the Entente.

In St. Petersburg, mindful of the treacherous position of the French during the Bosnian crisis, they were sure that this agreement went beyond the borders of Morocco, ⁸ and that those who agreed to it would not be able to do so.-

⁸ In particular, the letter of 19.02.1909 to the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Ambassador in Paris A. I. Nelidov hinted that during the Franco-German negotiations the question of the Baghdad Railway was simultaneously raised and that the French intended to cede to the Germans in order to get Morocco. However, these suspicions turned out to be groundless [AVPRI, d. 2758, 1908-1909, l. 21].

However, in all foreign policy, the French will go along with Germany, and therefore with Austria-Hungary, which will bring them closer to the Triple Alliance. In St. Petersburg, they even spoke out in favor of breaking with the failed Entente [Ignatiev, 1962, p. 53]. In turn, Spain, an ally of the French in all Moroccan affairs, reacted extremely negatively to this agreement. Seeing it as a violation of the interests of his country, the head of the Spanish cabinet A. Maura demanded a special "triple" agreement and soon initiated Franco-Spanish-German negotiations, intending to get his part of the Moroccan sultanate. He believed that in this way the Spaniards would be able to "tame the appetite of the French colonialists" a little [DDF, 1946, vol. XII, No. 225].

On the whole, the Franco-German declaration met with no serious objections from the interested Powers. In fact, it gave more advantages to the French side: without making any territorial concessions, having eliminated their main competitor, the French could now victoriously complete the submission of the sultanate to their power. As the French press wrote at that time:" From now on, the goal of a stable international position of the Sherif Monarchy was achieved, and the peaceful and consistent nature of the French actions in Moroccan affairs was also recognized by Germany " [AVPRI, d.2758, 1908-1909, p. 86].

Moreover, this declaration "put aside the specter of the constant danger of a collision with Germany over Morocco hanging over Paris" [AVPRI, d.2758, 1908-1909, l. 21]. In this regard, it is very symbolic that the German side expressed the desire that the French representative in Morocco, Regnault, should inform M. Hafid about the agreement. Thus, he declared to the Moroccan ruler that he could no longer count on German support in his conflicts with France. The latter, as the text indicated, did not claim political rights in this part of the African continent and was content with economic privileges.

Assessing the nature of this agreement, we can say that if it had been signed in 1907, then the intentions of the Germans really would have looked exclusively commercial. By 1909, however, the situation was different: the crisis in the Balkans had muddled Germany's maps. Ensuring freedom of action in the Balkans to its ally, Austria-Hungary, and undermining the Entente forces in this region turned out to be much more important tasks at that time than solving the Moroccan question that had faded into the background. Not abandoning their idea of fighting for world domination, remembering the diplomatic fiasco in Algeciras, the Germans regarded the Bosnian crisis as a favorable factor in weakening Russia's influence in the Balkans. Wanting to play on the internal contradictions between the Entente member countries and knowing that the French political circles are striving to assist Germany in the peaceful settlement of the Balkan events, Wilhelmstrasse considered it more appropriate to concede on a private issue in order to preserve the main line of its foreign policy. Thus, the neutral position of the French was actually secured by the Germans at the cost of an apparently unfavorable agreement for them, and the sense of national pride gave way to cold calculation. It is no accident that in Russia this agreement was called a "contract of sale": everything that was assigned to one of the parties in it was paid for by the other [AVPRI, d. 2758, 1908-1909, l. 52].

Although the document signed in 1909 was a temporary agreement, it went beyond the scope of a private problem. It can rightly be called a landmark event in the history of the development of both the Moroccan question and the international life of the period under review. Its signing made it possible to reach a compromise in relations between the two powers - not just serious competitors in Morocco, but belonging to opposing blocs. Objectively, the agreement was the logical conclusion of the conciliatory tendencies that emerged in the politics of both European states after 1906, and the Moroccan issue itself was resolved in the way that it should have been.

sought by the French government. It can be said that the agreement was the result of a deliberate plan to align France's political aspirations with Germany's economic interests.

An interesting pattern was observed in Franco-German relations in Morocco in 1907-1909. The frequent clashes between the two powers on Moroccan soil over various issues, although they further deepened the contradictions and intensified the struggle for their interests, in practice each new event pushed the conflicting parties to look for ways of compromise and brought them closer to an agreement. Thus, the dynamics of Franco-German relations around Morocco were sinusoidal in nature. After Algeciras, intense rivalry "on the ground" resumed, the subsequent attempt at a diplomatic settlement was unsuccessful, but culminated in the creation of the "Union of Moroccan Mines". A new aggravation caused by the civil war and the Casablanca incident ended with the conclusion of the 1909 agreement. Having temporarily smoothed out the sharpness of contradictions, it nevertheless did not completely eliminate the Franco-German hostility around the Moroccan sultanate, and a year later the powers clashed again, which provoked the beginning of the Second Moroccan crisis. This meant that the agreement did not change the very essence of the foreign policy of the two powers: Franco-German relations developed within the framework of further polarization of the world and increasing antagonism between the Entente and the Triple Alliance.

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