In the history of late feudal Poland of the XV-XVIII centuries. A special role is played by the problem of its relations and contacts with the Baltic Sea. It is one of the most significant, because these contacts had a huge impact on the formation of economic, social, political relations, as well as the culture of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and its relations with the European world. It also significantly influenced the formation of the foreign policy of the medieval Polish state in relation to its northern (Scandinavian), as well as eastern neighbors (Livonia, the Grand Duchy of Moscow, and later tsarist Russia). Therefore, it has long been a subject of intense interest in Polish historiography and the science of neighboring countries, and the results of research conducted in People's Poland allow us to shed more light on this problem .1
The role of Poland on the Baltic Sea in the 16th century was particularly fully elucidated, both due to the rich material of sources and taking into account the growing importance of maritime affairs in the internal and foreign policy of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The purpose of this article is to summarize the key points of Poland's connection with the Baltic Sea during this period, as well as the main characteristic features of these contacts.
The solid foundation of Poland on the Baltic Sea, at the mouth of its most important river artery-the Vistula-took place already in the middle of the XV century. It was then that the growing economic ties of the central Polish lands with Gdansk, the main port center of Privislinsky Pomerania, which was wrested from the Polish state by the German Order in 1308-1309, were revealed. The Order also held sway in Privislinska Torun, in the ancient Polish Helminsk land, and in Elblong, located in the Prussian lands it conquered. These large commercial cities maintained lively economic contacts with Polish lands and cities. This economic attraction to the mouth of the Vistula River of the Polish lands, which became the necessary rear that supplied grain and forest products to the Prussian cities, was the main factor in the joint struggle of the Polish state and the estates of the Order of Prussia, organized in the so-called Prussian Union, against the parasitic power of the German order newcomers. In 1454, their power was overthrown, and the Prussian estates became subjects of Poland.
As a result of the prolonged Thirteen Years ' War (1454-1466), which ended with the Treaty of Torun, the Polish state
1 For a partial review of the latest Polish studies, see: K. Lepszy, T. Manteuffel, K. Piwarski. Polish Historical Literature on Baltic and Pomeranian Problems (1945-1959). "Poland at the XIth International Congress of Historical Sciences in Stockholm". Warszawa, 1960; for the latest review of research on economic and political subjects, see Sympozjum historiograficzne. Dzieje Polski na morzu". "Zeszyty Naukowe Wydzialu Humanistycznego, Historia", 2. Gdansk, il973.
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once again established in the Baltic Sea. The most important areas at the mouth of the Vistula River, together with Gdansk, Torun, Elblong and the Bishopric of Warmia, came under the direct authority of Poland as the so-called Royal Prussia. It has been granted a number of autonomous rights. Its major cities acquired broad economic privileges and the right to self-government, which gave them, especially in Gdansk, considerable freedom and benefits, mainly due to the right to regulate navigation and carry out forced mediation in trade with foreigners. The eastern part of Prussia with Konigsberg remained under the rule of the German Order, which, however, actually became a fief of the Polish kings, bound by an oath of allegiance and an obligation to provide military assistance .2
Thus, despite the complex system of public-legal relations created in 1454-1466, the Polish state returned to the mouth of the Vistula River and the Baltic Sea, greatly restricting the sovereignty and independence of the German Order's actions. This made possible the further rapid development of economic ties between the central Polish lands, especially with Gdansk, which became the main Polish port and a place of communication with Western European and Lithuanian merchants.
At the end of the 15th century, the Baltic zone was included in the sphere of increasingly intensive trade between Western Europe, which was entering a period of development of manufactories, rapid population growth and the beginning of colonial expansion (Portugal, Spain), and Eastern Europe. The latter has become a necessary supplier of grain and forest raw materials for the economy, especially in the Netherlands, England and the Iberian Peninsula. The place of the Hansa, the former intermediary in this trade, was taken by the Dutch and English, the main consumers or intermediaries in the export of goods from the Baltic zone and suppliers of Western goods, primarily cloth and salt. The main role of the supplier of the West began to be played by Gdansk, which used a wide raw material rear, covering the vast lands of Poland, and partly the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The central role in grain supplies (with a decreasing share of timber) was played by the Privislinsky lands of Poland (with a basin of about 200 thousand square kilometers), from where first the cities, and then the Polish gentry, with the help of Gdansk capital, began to transport grain to the port of Gdansk along with timber and forest products, purchasing a number of imported goods there. Only in the territory of Royal Prussia did the cities retain their main positions in buying grain. Already in 1530, about 17 thousand lasht of grain was exported from the port of Gdansk to the West, in 1557 - 24 thousand, in 1565 - 40,500, in 1583-about 63 thousand lasht (1 lasht is about 2 tons). A more modest role was played by the less conveniently located Elblong, from which only a small amount of grain was exported (in 1565 - 1150 lasht). At the end of the 16th century, about 82% of exports from Poland went through the port of Gdansk and a little more than 7% - through Elblong, while imports to Poland through Gdansk probably covered about 2/3 of all goods delivered. Grain exports from Gdansk accounted for 2/3-3/4 of the total Baltic export via the Sound3 . Up to con-
2 M. Biskup. Zjednoczenie Potnorza Wschodniego z Polska w polowie XV w. Warszawa. 1959; ejusd. Trzynastoletnia wojna z zakonem krzyzackim 1454 - 1466. Warszawa. 1967; "Historia Pomorza". T. 1, cz. 1. Poznan. 1969, str. 710 nn.
3 R. Rybarski. Handel i polityka handlowa Polski w XVI stuleciu. T. I. Poznari. 1928, str. 27 nn.; S. Hoszowski. Handel Gdanska w okresie XV-XVII wieku. "Zeszyty Naukowe Wyzszej Szkoly Pedagogicznej w Krakowie", 1960, 11, str. 31 nn.; A. Maczak, H. Samsonowicz. Z zagadnien genezy rynku europejskiego: strefa baltycka. "Przeglgd Historyczny", 1964, N 2, str. 205 nn.; H. Zins. Anglia a Raltyk w drugiej polowie XVI wieku. Wroclaw. 1967, str. 141 nn.; A. Maczak. Miedzy Gdanskiern a Sundem. Warszawa. 1972, str. 69 nn.; M. Malowist. Wschod a Zachod Europy
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In the central part of the 16th century, the trade balance of Gdansk was positive due to the growth of the commodity mass. Therefore, it became the largest and richest city in Poland and the Baltic zone, with a population exceeding 50 thousand inhabitants.
The trade relations of the Polish gentry with Gdansk had a significant impact on the transformation of Polish agriculture, which in the course of the XVI century was based on the corvee-folvaroch system and serfdom of the peasants, excluding (except for the limits of Royal Prussia) the mediation of citizens in the rafting of grain and forest products and in the purchase of imported goods. Concentrating in its hands most of the trade turnover of Poland and the Baltic zone, the city Council of Gdansk, relying on the medieval privileges of the middle of the XV century, managed, despite the resistance of the Polish gentry, to maintain the forced mediation of the inhabitants of Gdansk in the transactions of foreign merchants with the Polish gentry, receiving significant profits from this. The City Council also continued to exercise control over shipping and maritime affairs, which gave it considerable freedom of contact with the outside world. For the Polish economy of the sixteenth century, trade contacts through Gdansk became a necessary factor in the (one-sided, however) economic development of the gentry and magnates, while clearly neglecting the interests of the peasants and Polish cities. The main political task of the szlachta in the north was to properly ensure and continue this exchange, which was beneficial for them. But it was not interested in a more serious strengthening of the position of royal power in the Baltic Sea, as well as in the entire country, which was entering the period of "gentry democracy".
Effective functioning of Poland's economic contacts with the Baltic Sea and securing its political positions there since the beginning of the sixteenth century has been possible under two conditions: the constant restriction of the independence of the fief of the German Order in Prussia, as well as the restriction of the broad autonomous rights of Royal Prussia and the economic and political privileges of Gdansk. Therefore, the policy of the Polish state under the last Jagiellons - Sigismund I (1506-1548), Sigismund Augustus (1548-1572), as well as Stefan Batory (1576-1586) was aimed at solving these problems in a plan that was more favorable to the economic, political and financial needs of the centralizing Polish monarchy, which interpreted the task as follows: conservation "of the Vistula estuary as the most significant. This policy was influenced, however, by the problem of Lithuania, which since 1501 was under the rule of the Jagiellons, who were also kings of Poland. In 1569, it came to a closer union (Lublin) of both countries. The Jagiellons tried to keep the Russian lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania from being included in Russia, which collected these lands. In this context, in the late 50s of the XVI century. The problem of Livonia arose, which brought new elements and serious complications to Poland's Baltic policy.
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First of all, the problem of vassal Prussia of the Order was brought to the fore, whose rulers - the grand Masters-from the very beginning tried to violate the terms of the Torun Treaty of 1466, and to abolish Polish supremacy, as well as to regain the Pomeranian region at the mouth of the Vistula. These revanchist aspirations became particularly strong in 1498, when a representative of the princely family became Grand Master.
w XIII-XVI wieku. Warszawa. 1973, str. 263 rm.; H. Samsonowich. Le commerce martitime de Gdansk dans la premiere moitie du XVIe siecle. "Studia historiae oeconomicae", t. 9, 1974, str. 54 nn.
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the foreign policy of the Jagiellons-Jan Olbracht and Alexander, absorbed in the military conflict between the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Grand Duchy of Moscow during the reigns of Ivan III and Vasily III for supremacy over the Western Russian lands, made it easier for the Grand Master to avoid taking the oath of allegiance to Poland and, moreover, made it possible to challenging the very essence of the Torun Treaty and bringing the matter to the internationalization of the Prussian problem in 1510. At the congress in Posen, mediated mainly by the ambassadors of the Emperor Maximilian I of Habsburg, the main patron of the German Order and at the same time a rival of the Jagiellons in the struggle for the thrones of Bohemia and Hungary, the basic terms of the treatise were openly questioned also in relation to Pomerania, which called into question the power of Poland at the mouth of the Vistula. Negotiations were interrupted by Sigismund I, but internationalization-Prussia's problems became a fait accompli. 4
The dispute with the Order became even more heated after the election of a representative of another princely family, Albrecht Hohenzollern from the Franconian side branch of the Ansbachs (1511), who was also a nephew of Sigismund I, as Grand Master. Albrecht began a stubborn struggle to weaken Poland's position with the help of Maximilian I, who in 1514 created a grand coalition against the Jagiellons with the participation of the Grand Duchy of Moscow, Denmark and the imperial princes. Its threat led to a meeting between Sigismund I and his brother Vladislav, the Czech-Hungarian King, and the Emperor in Vienna in 1515, and the de facto recognition of the Habsburg rights to Bohemia and Hungary, in return for the formal recognition of the Torun Treaty by the Habsburgs and their abandonment of the Order's problems. However, the grand Master still did not accept, preparing for an armed struggle in alliance with Grand Duke Vasily III of Moscow, who stubbornly fought with Sigismund I for the Western Russian lands. At the same time, in 1517-1522, the latter used a hired privateer fleet, which sailed from the port of Gdansk to the north-eastern waters of the Baltic Sea, to the Gulf of Riga and the Gulf of Finland, blocking the import of goods into the Russian state .5 The conclusion of a truce with Basil III in the autumn of 1522 caused the suspension of actions of Polish privateer crews. Albrecht's belligerent attitude, however, forced Poland to start military operations at the end of 1519. Polish troops invaded the borders of the Order of Prussia. This last Polish war with the Order (1519-1521) was fought with varying success, showing the weakness of Poland's internal structure and royal finances, as well as the resilience of Albrecht. With a new international mediation, the so-called Torun Compromise was concluded on April 5, 1521, which provided for a truce for four years. During this time, the mediators-the Emperor Charles V and the Czech-Hungarian King Louis-had to consider the Torun Treaty. The problem of Prussia, as well as Poland's position in the lower Vistula, was raised again.
Albrecht, however, could no longer receive effective help in the fight against Poland, either from the Empire or the Grand Duchy of Moscow, or from the Livonian and German parts of the Order. The only salvation for him was the secularization of the Order of Prussia and its transformation into a secular ruler, but relying on Poland. However, the state of the Order in Prussia has already undergone a clear process of secularization, becoming like a territorial secular principality from the end of the XV century. Socially, the main role here was played by a group of high German nobles who had arrived from the Empire during the Triennial period.-
4 W. Pociecha. Geneza hotdu pruskiego (1467 - 1526). Gdynia. 1937, str. 30 nn.
5 S. Bodniak. Zolnierze morscy Zygmimta Starego (1517 - 1522). "Rocznik Gdanski". t. 9 - 10, 1937, str. 209 nn.
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the thirty years ' war. Due to the debt for military service to the Order, she received a grant of entire complexes of land holdings. This group did not feel connected to the Crusader power, nor to the Polish state, but gravitated to the grand magistrates who ruled like princes, who attracted them to their court in Konigsberg. This largest port and urban center of the Order of Prussia was connected to the economy of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and its Belarusian lands, not being, like Gdansk, dependent on the Polish agricultural rear. That is why, despite the significant influx of Polish population from the Masovian region (of peasant or small-scale Polish origin), the estates of the Order of Prussia were less closely connected with the Polish economy and population and did not create any program of unification with Poland, as it was in 1454. This circumstance made the task easier for Grand Master Albrecht, who, by a skilful policy of granting land holdings, attracted the major nobles to his side. At the same time, the development of the Reformation in its Lutheran version after 1517. It greatly weakened the position of the Catholic Church and the Order in Prussia, contributing to Albrecht's secularizing aspirations.
Sigismund I's Poland first sought the complete expulsion of the Grand Master from Prussia, rejecting international mediation and preparing for an armed action on the Baltic Sea in early 1525. This point of view was supported by the middle gentry. However, the magnate camp, especially from Southern Poland, on which the conservative king relied, was afraid of the political activation of the szlachta in the event of its convocation to war in the form of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the destruction of the szlachta militia. After all, the gentry sought internal reforms, especially financial ones, which would weaken the material positions of the magnates. Their representatives, led by Chancellor K. Szydlowiecki and Vice-Chancellor P. Tomicki, were inclined to the project of secularization of Prussia, but with the consent and participation of Poland as the suzerain of the Prussian lands. These projects were supported by the King, whose position was further influenced by reports of social and religious movements in the major cities of Royal Prussia, led by Gdansk. At the beginning of 1525, a revolt of the townspeople and the Plebs overthrew the Patrician city council there, making fundamental changes in the city system under the influence of the Reformation. The rebellious Lutheran city of Gdansk, whose importance Sigismund I was fully aware of, in the eyes of this orthodox and conservative ruler could become a potential ally of the Grand Master of the Reformation in the event of war and go over to his side. Sigismund was also disgusted by the negotiations with the estates of the Order of Prussia, which would have to begin after the possible removal of the grand Master-the king's nephew.
In this regard, the proposal made to the king by Albrecht's representatives in Cracow in March 1525 to secularize the Order of Prussia and transfer it as a hereditary Polish fief to Albrecht was kindly accepted by the majority of the royal entourage headed by Chancellor Szydlowiecki. On April 8, 1525, a treaty was concluded between Poland and Albrecht, and on April 10, a public ceremony of swearing in the new secular ruler of Poland, the so-called "Prussian Oath", took place in the Cracow market. The German Order in Prussia was abolished, and its lands passed into the hands of Poland, which transferred them to the fief to Albrecht and his legitimate male descendants, and after them to the descendants of his three brothers. After the extinction of their direct line descendants, the Prussian fief was to return under the direct authority of the Polish king, and there was no provision for inheritance along the Brandenburg (Elector) Hohenzoller line-
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It was also essential to ensure Poland's influence on the internal affairs of the Prussian Principality, especially by guaranteeing its princely subjects the right to appeal to the Polish King. The Duke was also obliged to provide armed assistance to the King in the event of war for the preservation of the provisions of the Cracow Act and to participate in the court service as a senator of the Kingdom of Poland.
The Krakow Act of 1525_g. was previously evaluated in Polish historiography mainly negatively, since it did not eliminate Albrecht from princely Prussia, which made it possible in the future to intercept it by the Hohenzollern elector line and increase it in the XVII - XVIII centuries. the dangerous militaristic Kingdom of Prussia - the main culprit of the partitions of Poland. The assessments that have appeared in Polish historiography in recent times are already more restrained: historians try to consider the significance of the Cracow treatise in the context of the conditions of that era. They recognize that Polish politicians have chosen the concept of immediate protection of Poland's interests in the Baltic Sea by eliminating the still dangerous Order and the influence of external factors (the papacy and empire) on the Prussian lands as a result of the creation of a secular vassal principality. It is also strongly emphasized that the Cracow Treaty " linked princely Prussia with Poland more firmly than the Torun Treaty previously linked the Order. All remnants of the ecclesiastical authority and the former papal supremacy were eliminated (it was still recognized by Poland in the treaty of 1466). Albrecht became Poland's lenny without any reservations, depending on her in military and judicial matters. Only Poland was to be his mainstay against the inevitable counter-measures of the Papacy, and especially of the Empire, and of the German or Livonian branch of the Order.
The treaty also provided for the transfer of direct power over Prussia to Poland as a result of limiting the circle of Albrecht's successors. Therefore, the Cracow Treatise became the next stage in strengthening Poland's position on the Baltic Sea. It was also a success due to the fact that it insured Royal Prussia much better, that is, the Vistula estuary, which is very important for the Polish state. However, this was conditional insurance, since it required strict adherence to the letter of the treaty, especially in the part concerning the Brandenburg line of Albrecht's heirs .6 Polish policy in the second half of the sixteenth century lacked consistency on this issue, however, due to the expansion to the northeast, in the direction of Livonia. Initially, the fief of Prussia was located in the circle of real political and legal influence of Poland, and Duke Albrecht, who was threatened by the actions of the empire, behaved as a loyal fief. At the same time, he failed to secure influence in the internal affairs of Poland, because he was not allowed to participate in the sessions of the Senate and the election of a new king. He also failed to secure support for his son Albrecht Friedrich as a candidate for the Polish throne. An indicator of Albrecht's dependence on Poland was the sending of royal commissions to Konigsberg in 1566-1568, which brought order to the internal relations of the Principality, which were disrupted by the conflict between the old duke and the estates .7 But over the fate of princely Prussia weighed the Livonian policy of Poland Sigismund Augustus and Stefan Batory.
6 M. Biskup. Geneza i znaczenie holdu pruskiego 1525 roku. "Komunikaty Mazursko- Warminskie", 1975, N 4, str. 407 nn.; "Historia Pomorza". T. 2, cz. 1. Poznani 1976, str. 169 nn.
7 A. Vetulani. Lertno pruskie. Od traktatu krakowskiego do smierci ks. Albrechta 1525 - 1568. Krakow. 1930, str. 123 nn.; S. Dolezel. Das preussisch-polnische Lehns-verhaltnis unter Herzog Albrecht von Preussen. Koln-Berlin. 1967, S. 117 nn.; J. Mallek. Nowe spojrzenie na politykg Prus Ksiazecych wobec Polski za czasowksigcia Albrechta (1525 - 1568). "Komunikaty Mazursko-Warmiriskie", 1975, N 4, str. 425 nn.
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The policy of the Polish state in relation to Royal Prussia proved to be much more consistent and effective, leading to a stronger connection between them and to the protection of the Vistula estuary. The main obstacle here was the complex socio-economic structure and the peculiar structure of the Prussian shire, guaranteed by the act of incorporation of Prussia in 1454. In social relations within Royal Prussia, the dominant influence of the magnate group with a mixed ethnic appearance (German, Old Prussian and Polish), as well as the merchant patriciate of the three major urban centers - Gdansk, Torun and Elblong-was marked out, with the growing and decisive predominance of the former. Prussian magnates based their positions not so much on their land holdings, but mainly on the lease of royal estates (starostv). The middle and small Prussian nobility, mostly of Slavic (Polish-Kashubian) origin, was ruined as a result of the Thirteen Years ' War and for decades did not play any political role. This alignment of social forces was reflected in the organs of estate representation of Royal Prussia-the Prussian Council and congresses of estates. In the former, the absolute preponderance was held by service magnates and representatives of large cities. They exerted a decisive influence on the other members of the congresses of estates - the middle nobility and representatives of smaller cities. Participation of the nobility in congresses.it depended, however, on the decision of the Prussian Council and was not guaranteed by law. The Prussian Council, on the other hand, sought to secure its own position by emphasizing the specifics of the structure of the Prussian shire in comparison with the rest of the Polish crown lands. The Prussian Council did not take part in the sessions of the Crown Sejm and in deciding the question of taxes for the whole of Poland, establishing (at most) special taxes, which were collected by a special Prussian sub-council. The Council also fought to guarantee the granting of lucrative old manors to local (so-called citizens), or" Prussians", while resisting the transfer of these estates by the king to his subjects from other crown lands. However, these were aspirations not of an ethnic nature (ensuring the interests of the German element), but of a particular class, aimed at protecting the rights of their land in their medieval sense. The Prussian Council also advocated its own Prussian coin, which was minted in the mints of major cities and differed from the royal coin in its sample, value and name. In the large Prussian cities, especially in Gdansk, the royal power had a rather limited influence due to the extensive privileges they received. Gdansk refused even the right to appeal to the royal court against the judgments of its courts and considered itself the sole administrator in the field of regulating navigation and managing the coast, still not allowing direct contacts of Polish gentry and citizens with Western European merchants when concluding transactions .8
This state of affairs, which limited the real power of Poland over the lands and cities along the Lower Vistula, had to change as a result of the policy of centralization, which the royal power began immediately after 1466. This policy was aimed first of all at limiting the excessive autonomous rights of the Prussian shire, and then at involving it in general Polish affairs through the participation of the Prussian estates in the work of the crown Diet. The goal of this policy was also to achieve greater influence in large cities.
8 K. Gorski. Problematyka dziejowa Prus Krolewskich. "Zapiski Historyczne", 1963, N 2, str. 159 nn.; "Historia Pomorza". T. 2, cz. 1, str, 45 nn.
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Prussian cities led by Gdansk. This aspiration was supported by the Polish szlachta, which at the beginning of the 16th century was united mainly around J. Laski, the Crown Chancellor and later Archbishop of Gniezno, and interpreted Royal Prussia as an integral part of the crown lands, in which all Polish subjects should have equal rights to occupy positions in the state apparatus and receive land grants; and vice versa, residents of the royal Prussia Prussia - the same rights in the rest of the lands of the Polish state. These aspirations were supported by the middle Prussian nobility, who sought to win political rights for themselves despite the resistance of magnates and large cities. This was also helped by the internal conflicts that divided the patriciate and the townspeople, especially in Gdansk and Elblong, and caused, in particular, by the slogans of the Lutheran Reformation (after 1520), which undermined the existing system of government. There were also sharp conflicts between Gdansk and the Pomeranian nobility on the basis of the city's judicial competence. This gave Sigismund I an opportunity in 1526. to interfere in the internal affairs of the Prussian shire, primarily with the help of the local nobility and even magnates, frightened by the anti-Patrician uprisings in Gdansk and Elblong9 . The king then issued the "Prussian constitutions" in the submissive city of Gdansk, which provided the local nobility with participation in the voivodeship sejmiks, which elected ambassadors to the congress of estates. The latter thus became a general sejmik with guaranteed representation of the middle nobility. By the same regulations, the Prussian coin was equated with the crown coin in terms of weight and sample (the final implementation of this reform was influenced, in particular, by the advanced economic views of N. Copernicus as one of its participants, who represented the Warmian Chapter). In Gdansk itself, the preponderance of the patriciate was somewhat limited by the creation of a permanent representation from the citizens. It also guaranteed the right to appeal the judgments of the courts of large cities and noble courts to the Prussian Council and to the King. In the big cities, the positions of the royal representatives (burgraves) were strengthened.
The establishment of 1526 was only the first stage of strengthening ties between the crown lands and Royal Prussia and did not satisfy the camp of the Polish gentry, who sought to attract "Prussians" to participate in the meetings of the Sejm and pay taxes for the defense of the country. Already in 1530, an attempt was made during the Sejm in Cracow to eliminate the differences in the structure and laws between Poland and Royal Prussia. However, the ambassadors of the Prussian estates did not give in to the pressure of the unifying demands of the Lasky camp. Their partial implementation depended again on the position of the Prussian nobility, which still sought to gain broader political rights despite the resistance of magnates and large cities. Their resistance to the unification demands coming from Poland was also aroused in the middle of the sixteenth century by the question of the so-called execution of estates, that is, the revision of grants made after 1504 by the royal elders, which were now to be returned to the royal treasury. The resolution of the Crown Diet of 1563 on the revision of land grants also in Royal Prussia, despite the resistance of magnates and large Prussian cities, was implemented in 1565 with the support of the local nobility. The return of part of the estates strengthened Sigismund Augustus ' position in relations with the Prussian magnates and made it easier to complete the business with the achievement of a closer union of Royal Prussia with Poland. This happened in 1569, during the Sejm in Lublin, which implemented the Polish-Lithuanian union. It was then that the king forced the Prussians to-
9 M. Bogucka. Walki spoleczne w Gdansku w XVI wieku. "Szkice z dziejow Pomorza". T. 1. Warszawa. 1958, str. 388 nn.; H. Zins. W krggu Mikolaja Kopernika. Lublin. 1966, str. 96 nn., 146 nn.; "Historia Pomorza". T. 2, cz. 1, str. 97 nn.
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I want to take a seat in the embassy hut and the Senate, emphasizing that "all of you are Poles (that is, subjects of the kingdom), although you live in Prussia." From then on, the Prussian Shire sent its ambassadors to the Crown Diet. Its decisions on taxes were also extended to Royal Prussia, its general Sejmik could only formally approve them, and the Prussian podskarbiy, which continued to operate, could collect taxes. The process of polonization of the local nobility, as well as the Prussian magnates, who adopted the customs of the gentry, accelerated. The moment that further accelerated this process was the extension to the Prussian nobility of the jurisdiction of the judicial tribunal in Piotrkow Tribunal, which in 1585 became the court of appeal for the sentences of the General Sejmik 10 .
Thus, while preserving some institutions of self-government, Royal Prussia, thanks to the" parliamentary union " of 1569, became one of the Polish provinces, which in terms of its financial and administrative-judicial institutions was similar to other provinces of the Polish Kingdom. This strengthened and strengthened its position in the Baltic Sea. However, even in the future, a significant role was played in Royal Prussia by large cities that tried to fully preserve their former medieval rights, and especially Gdansk, which was becoming increasingly stronger both economically and financially. He tried to evade the centralizing measures of the royal power, which in the middle of the XVI century began to manifest themselves also in the sphere of navigation and the navy.
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This was due to the problem of Livonia and the desire of Sigismund Augustus to take actions at sea, directed from 1558 against the so-called Narva navigation, that is, trade contacts with Yarva, which was taken by Ivan IV and was a strong competitor of the Livonian ports, which from the end of 1561 were under the fief of Poland and Lithuania . To disrupt the Narva navigation, the king organized the dispatch of several privateer ships in the spring of 1561. Their captains received written permission to recruit teams, arm them, and act against ships sailing to ports that were under the rule of Russia, and before 1568, even Sweden as its ally. The king stipulated for himself the right to a tenth of the spoils. These privateer ships, with mixed crews of Germans, Scandinavians, Kashubians and Poles, operated from the port of Gdansk, but sailed under the Polish flag with the image of an eagle and an armed hand with a sword. They were the first Polish armed force that was completely independent of Gdansk in the Baltic Sea. Therefore, their actions from the very beginning caused discontent in Gdansk, which feared reprisals from the aggrieved Baltic states. To regulate the actions of privateers, the king in 1565 appointed special commissioners, who also granted the right to try sailors and captains who were in the service of Poland. Under the influence of complaints from residents of Gdansk, in 1567 the operational base of privateers was moved to a small port in Puck, and the supervision of them was taken over by the Gdansk castellan and Prussian podskarbiy J. Kostka.
10 J. Mallek. Proba likwidacji odrgbnosci Prus Krolewskich w roku (1530. "Acta Universitatis Nicolai Copernici", Historia, IX, Torun, 1973, str. 154 nn.; W. Odyniec. Dzieje Prus Krolewskich 1454 - 1772. Warszawa. 1972, str. 109 nn.; "Historia Pomorza". T. 2, cz. 1, str. 356 nn.
11 J. Jasnowski. Mikolaj Czarny RadziwiH (1525 - 1565). Warszawa. 1.939; W. Czaplinski. Stanowisko panstw skandynawskich wobec sprawy inflanckiej w latach 1558 - 1561. "Zapiski Historyczne", 1963, N 3, str. 379 nn.
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However, already on March 24, 1568, Sigismund Augustus created the Maritime Commission , the first special agency in the history of Poland for maritime and shipping issues, headed by Kostka as its chairman. The commission also included Stefan and Jan Loitz, wealthy merchants and bankers from Szczecin. The Maritime Commission was supposed to ensure the real exercise of the power of the Polish king at sea, more specifically-to make more effective the fight against Narva navigation, which could not be stopped. The Commission was removed from the judicial jurisdiction of Gdansk, although it should have been located in that city. Her jurisdiction also included the trial of privateers. The king guaranteed the commission financial resources, transferring to it the income from some castles and Prussian lands, as well as from the trade in forest products from the royal estates. Finally, the commission had the right to buy and sell domestic and foreign goods (this should have been handled by Loitz) 12 . The creation of the Maritime Commission was regarded by Gdansk as a hostile act directed against its supremacy in Baltic navigation. Already in June 1568, near Gdansk, a group of royal sailors clashed with several of his rural subjects, which was immediately used by the city council. He illegally arrested 11 sailors and executed them, despite the protests of the royal Commissioners. The royal vessels were fired upon as they entered the port of Gdansk, and one of them sank.
This was a clear violation of royal sovereignty and was therefore considered an insult to His Majesty. Sigismund Augustus appointed a special commission headed by Bishop S. Karnkowski of Wroclaw, which included Kostka. The commission went to Gdansk, which, however, did not let it into its walls. As a result, the city was found guilty of rebellion and insulting the king and summoned to the royal Court, the Lublin Sejm, in 1569. Representatives of Gdansk were taken into custody there, and it was decided to send the Karnkowski commission back to Gdansk. Under the influence of the embassy hut, the competence of the Maritime Commission was expanded, and it was emphasized that it was transferred to regulate all the affairs of the Polish coast. It was also decided that the commandant of the fortress of Liatarnya (Vistula) in Gdansk should take the oath of allegiance to the King to the members of the commission from now on. The location of the command of the Polish ships was again moved to Gdansk, which was forbidden any excesses against the Polish privateer teams.
As early as the end of 1569, the Karnkowski commission again went to the humiliated Gdansk, which studied in detail the city's privileges and announced the so-called Karnkowski statutes. They emphasized the King's supreme rights to the sea and the regulation of navigation. They also emphasized royal rights in Gdansk, obliging the commanders of the garrisons in Gdansk and Latarna to take an oath of allegiance to the King and the Kingdom of Poland. The statutes guaranteed the right to appeal to the Royal Courts. The City Council of Gdansk, fearing the rapprochement of the commissars with the opposition burghers, was forced to take an oath on these statutes at the Warsaw Sejm (July 20, 1570), thereby obtaining the king's pardon .13
All this strengthened Poland's position in the Baltic Sea, and as a result, the Maritime Commission, which, although not for long, actually performed the functions of the Polish Admiralty and the Maritime Department. In addition to regulating the recruitment and dispatch of privateers and the division of production, it
12 K. Lepszy. Dzieje floty polskiej. Gdansk. 1947, str. 92 nn; S. Bodniak. Polska a Baltyk za ostatniego Jagiellona. Kornik. 1946, str. 60 nn.
13 J. Pirozynski. Na drodze do gdanskiej deprekacji. Sprawa Gdanska na sejmie 1570 r. "Rocznik Gdanski", t. 31, 1971, str. 5 nn.
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She also supervised navigation in the port of Gdansk. However, since 1568, privateers ' actions were directed not only against Narva navigation, but also against Denmark, which opposed Polish supremacy in the Baltic Sea. Poland established at that time friendly relations with Sweden of Johan III Vasa. Under these circumstances, Sigismund Augustus sought to strengthen the foundations of Polish naval power by starting to create a "stable armada", or his own military fleet modeled on the Danish and Swedish ones. Preparations for this began as early as 1569, and the following year in Elblong, a port center that was more friendly to the king's plans, with the help of Venetian specialists, the Maritime Commission began construction of the first Polish galleon - a large two - masted sailboat with a displacement of 400-600 tons, along with two small vessels. Until 1572, the galleon was not fully completed, and the death of Sigismund Augustus in the same year interrupted further work. This ship was partially destroyed in 1577, during the Danish-Gdansk attack on Elblong, and finally dismantled in 1586-1587. [14 ]
The Maritime Commission itself ceased its activities in the field of maritime protection in 1571, when the king personally assumed jurisdiction over privateers, transferring them to Pärna. During the activity of the commission (1568-1571), about 16 Polish vessels operated annually in the Baltic waters, and most of all in 1571 - 20. They were armed with cannons, and their teams with hand-held firearms and edged weapons. Although they managed to capture about 115 ships, mostly merchant ships, in 1561-1571, they did not interrupt the Narva navigation, which turned out to be too difficult for them .15
The considerable successes of the Polish royal power at the mouth of the Vistula, which resulted in de facto control of Baltic shipping while limiting the overgrown rights of Gdansk, did not last long due to the obvious resistance of the merchant patricians who ruled the city, who did not want to come to terms with the situation that had arisen. To this end, he used the situation after the death of Sigismund Augustus in 1572 and the disagreement among the gentry when choosing one of his successors to the Polish throne in 1576 - Stefan Batory or Emperor Maximilian II of Habsburg. Gdansk steadfastly supported the second candidate, and then demanded that Batory confirm his previous privileges, which would mean eliminating the Karnkowski statutes and the possibility of royal interference in the internal affairs of the city. This eventually led to a formal war between Batory and Gdansk, which was punished for high treason. The City Council of Gdansk was forced to act under pressure from the citizens, especially the guilds, who wanted to limit its power and were afraid of increasing the financial burden in favor of the royal treasury. The city received the support of Denmark, which was still hostile to Poland's strengthening position on the Baltic Sea and even planned to take over the port of Gdansk. Batory stopped bringing goods from Poland to Gdansk, directing all Vislin trade through Elblong and allowing direct trade contacts of the szlachta with foreign merchants there. Despite the defeat suffered by the Gdansk troops on land in the spring of 1577, the siege of the city and the attempt to capture Lyatarni were not successful.
Batory also created a small military flotilla that operated according to the principles of the time of Sigismund Augustus. She operated under the command of E. Weicher from the port of Puck (9 vessels). However, due to co-
14 A. Kleczkowski. Rejestr budowy galeony. Krakdw. 1915; S. Bodniak. Polska a Baltyk, str. 107 nn.; J. M. Malecki. Elblaska galeona Zygmunta Augusta w Swietle ostatnich badan. "Rocznik Elblgski", t. 5, 1972, str. 93 nn.
15 S. Bodniak. Polska a Baltyk, str. 154.
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the resistance of the Polish gentry did not have enough money for a more serious deployment. But even these modest Polish naval forces in the Baltic Sea were immediately rebuffed by Denmark, whose ships, supported by privateers equipped with Gdansk, began to control the Gulf of Gdansk in the spring of 1577. Therefore, Batory intended to create a military flotilla of 10 ships in Elblong. It was even planned to dig the Vistula Spit to facilitate the passage of ships from Elblong to the open waters of the Baltic and operate them in the Gulf of Gdansk, mainly for the blockade of Gdansk itself. In the end, the royal secretary P. Klochevsky managed to create a flotilla of 6 ships in Elblong at the end of the summer of 1577, which was supposed to operate on privateer principles, since the sailors and soldiers were on the royal payroll, and the ships were hired for an appropriate fee .16 They were not, however, used for military operations, and during the surprise attack of Danish and Gdansk ships on the port of Elblong on September 16, 1577, they were taken away. Batory gave up further struggle with Gdansk and, in fact, with Denmark, also renouncing his intentions to keep the fleet and rule in the Baltic Sea. Its sole purpose was only to restore supreme power over Gdansk. He wanted to direct all the forces of the Polish state to fight for Livonia,and then against Turkey. Therefore, the king agreed to conclude a treaty with Gdansk, abolishing the punishment and confirming the city's privileges in December 1577. This was already a great achievement for Gdansk, which was also striving for the final elimination of the Karnkowski statutes. In the end, in 1585, at the cost of financial concessions from the city, they were canceled by the king, although without the consent of the Sejm. He also promised that he would not create a privateer fleet, and confirmed the monopoly of the Gdansk intermediary in trade between all who came to this city .17 This was the decisive success of Gdansk, which had practically regained its former monopoly position. Plans to establish a real Polish presence in the Baltic and a stronger connection between Gdansk and the Crown Lands were thwarted, both by the city's resistance and financial strength, and by Danish opposition. The decisive influence, however, was the problem of the struggle for Livonia, which detracted from Poland's initial successes in the lower Vistula.
The obvious result was the consolidation of a part of the Polish gentry's conviction in the correctness of striving for the exercise of real supreme power in the waters of the Baltic. In the period of the first kingless reign after the death of Sigismund Augustus (1573), the understanding of maritime problems is clearly manifested in Polish journalism. It found its fullest expression in the well - known statement of the long-term adviser to the deceased king, J. D. Solikovsky: "Whoever has a state on the sea and does not use it, will allow it to be snatched away from him, depriving himself of all benefits and incurring all losses, from the free becomes a slave, from the rich-a beggar""
* * *
In the sixteenth century, the problem of Livonia played a significant and complex role in shaping Poland's relations with the Baltic Sea and in the struggle to gain a stronger position there.
16 K.. Lepszy. Stefan Batory a Gdansk. "Rocznik Gdanski", t. 6, 1932, str. 82 nn.; ejusd. Dzieje floty polskiej, str. 148 nn.; M. Bogucka. Op. clt, str. 420 nn.; A. Tomсzak. Piotr Kloczewski, organizator flotylli Stefana Batorego w Elblggu. "Rocznik Elblgski", t. 5, 1972, str. 123 nn.
17 E. Cieslak, With Biernat. Dzieje Gdanska. Gdansk. 1969, str. 143 - 144.
18 "Pibnia polityczne z czasow pierwszego bezkrolewia". Krakow. U906, str. 479; K. Lepszy. Dzieje floty polskiej, str. 144.
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above, it influenced all the events that took place at the mouth of the Vistula, as well as the decision on the question of princely Prussia. The opinions of historians of People's Poland on these issues underwent a serious metamorphosis, getting rid of the previously expressed unconditional approval of the policy of Sigismund Augustus and Stefan Batory, aimed since 1557 at strengthening the supremacy of Poland and Lithuania over the mouth of the Western Dvina (Riga) and Estonia by ousting Russia, as well as Denmark and Sweden. It is now generally accepted that the seizure of Livonia as a result of the collapse of the Livonian branch of the German Order in 1558-1561 was in the interests of Lithuania, whose magnates sought to secure their interests in the mouth of the Western Dvina with its main port - Riga - for the export of agricultural products and timber. Sigismund Augustus ' Poland, having assumed sovereignty over Livonia, which was remote from it, in 1561, gained power over foreign peoples and took upon itself the protection of a very far-flung inheritance from stubborn and strong opponents, while extending the eastern border of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth by 1,200 kilometers .19 These were sharply negative factors that should have burdened and really burdened the state of affairs in the north-west of the Polish state. After all, the struggle for Livonia unfolded at its first stage-from 1558 to 1582, absorbing the forces of Poland and Lithuania both on land and at sea (as mentioned above) and draining the finances of the royal treasury, especially during the war of Poland, Denmark, Sweden and Russia in 1563-1570, interrupted decisions of the Congress of Szczecin in 1570,20 and the war of Batory with Russia (since 1577). It ended in 1582 with a truce with Moscow, concluded in Yama Zapolsky and confirming the supremacy of Poland over most of Livonia with Riga, Pärnu and Tartu (Dorpat). However, in Northern Estonia, the influence of Sweden was strengthened, which then moved on to strike at all the Livonian lands and collect the fruits of its many years of efforts and Poland's struggle with Russia.
Polish researchers, now correctly assessing all the serious negative consequences of Poland's intervention in Livonia's affairs, draw attention to the fact that it was, however, caused by economic considerations - concerns about the decline in the commercial role of the port of Gdansk due to the growing competition of the port in Narva, which in fact persistently attracted Western European merchants. Polish political circles clearly feared that the Russian authorities ' interception of other Livonian ports, led by Riga, could undermine the importance of Gdansk (and Elblong)altogether21 . Even if these concerns were partly exaggerated, they do clarify the complexity of Poland's political motivations, which entangled itself in a difficult and fraught Livonian event also in the name of preserving the role of its Privislin port centers.
The involvement of Poland in the difficult affairs of Livonia already at the first stage had a negative impact on the problems of the lands more closely connected with it, that is, princely Prussia. Already in 1563, Sigismund Augustus, in return for the support of the Elector of Brandenburg in the question of Livonia, agreed to allow the Brandenburg (Elector) line of Hohenzollerns to inherit in princely Prussia .22 Thus, one of the most important points of the Cracow Act of 1525 was undermined, and the expansive Brandenburg dynasty gained ground
19 W. Czaplinski. Polityka morska Polski w XVI i XVII w., str. 31.
20 S. Bodniak. Kongres szczecinski na tie baltyckiej polityki polskiej. "Prace Krakowskiego Oddzialu Polskiego Towarzystwa Historycznego", 1929, N 3. W. Czaplinski. Pokoj szczecinski 1570 r. "Zapiski Historyczne", 1972, N 2, str. 45 nn.
21 S. Bodniak. Polska a Baltyk, str. 141 - 142; W. Czaplinski. Polityka morska Polski, str. 32.
22 K. Piwarski. Dzieje Prus Wschodnich w czasach nowozytnych. Gdansk. 1946, str. 20 - 21.
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to seize power over the Baltic Sea (and in Konigsberg-after the death of the only descendant of Albrecht, the sick Albrecht-Friedrich). The problem of Lysonia also had a serious negative impact during the Batory period. In 1577, in preparation for the struggle to seize it, despite the opposition of the estates of princely Prussia, who sought the appointment of a Polish governor, he agreed to transfer custody of the sick Albrecht - Friedrich to Margrave George Friedrich, the last of the descendants of Albrecht's brothers from the Hohenzollern - Ansbach line, in exchange for significant financial subsidies. George Frederick cleared the way for the transfer of power in princely Prussia to the Hohenzollerns of Brandenburg, which became an accomplished fact at the beginning of the seventeenth century. 23 Consequently, even in this case, the fief of princely Prussia turned out to be the price of supporting Poland's ultimately futile struggle for distant Livonia.
* * *
Thus, the balance of Polish policy on the Baltic Sea in the sixteenth century is somewhat confused, although there is no doubt that it is dominated by assets. These include, first of all, the strong revival of economic relations between the central and northern Polish lands with the Baltic Sea and Western Europe, which influenced the remarkable development of the Port of Gdansk and partly of Elblong. The next important positive point is the secularization of the Order of Prussia and the creation of the fief of princely Prussia, which is highly dependent on Poland. Positive results also include the success of Poland's centralization efforts in relation to Royal Prussia in the lower Vistula and its more complete inclusion in the circle of general Polish affairs, with clear trends towards strengthening Poland's real supremacy over the port of Gdansk and in matters of Baltic navigation. Poland's presence in the Baltic waters is also a positive development, first highlighted by the implementation of the so - called dominium maris (power at sea), the organization of a privateer fleet on behalf of and by order of the King, and the creation of the Maritime Commission, Poland's first maritime affairs agency.
The negative aspect of this broader Polish presence on the Baltic Sea is the unresolved issue of complete subordination of Gdansk and the elimination of its excessive medieval privileges. The economic and financial potential of the city here prevailed over the centralizing aspirations of the Polish rulers, who, however, did not have serious support in this regard from the middle gentry and magnates who were not interested in strengthening the royal power. A negative aspect was also the news about the admission of the Hohenzollerns of Brandenburg to the succession in princely Prussia, which indicated a real threat to the Vistula estuary in the future. These phenomena were associated with Poland's activation in Livonia and its preoccupation with the protracted struggle with Russia and Sweden for power over the lower reaches of the Western Dvina. Correctly assessing the complex motives of Poland's actions in Livonia as protecting the position and economic importance of the Privislin ports, it should be emphasized that the problem of Livonia detracted from Poland's achievements in the north-west Pomeranian-Prussian region, which is most important and vital for it, and became the cause of further complications and failures in the future. 24
23 Ibid., str. 48 nn.
24 See G. Labuda. Polska granica zachodnia. Tysigc lat dziejow politycznych. Poznan. 1971, str. 96.
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