In 1189-1190, during the Third Crusade, the Teutonic Order was founded, one of the organizations of knights who were supposed to protect the Crusaders ' possessions in Palestine. Its name indicates that it was created from knights of German origin. Not receiving an influx of new forces from Europe, the Order at the end of the XII - beginning of the XIII century. dragged out a miserable existence. In the 1920s of the 13th century, Polish princes invited knights of this Order to protect their possessions from the attacks of pagan Prussians. This was the beginning of the creation of a new military power in Europe - the Order State in Prussia. It "became famous" for its particularly brutal, organized "military" exploitation of the enslaved population, and its existence was based on a policy of constant aggression against neighboring countries and peoples. Human resources to supplement the administration and the army were provided to the Order State by the impoverished strata of German knighthood, who were looking for opportunities for elevation and enrichment in its ranks. The Order, as a defender of the faith and a fighter against pagans, relied on the support of all Catholic Europe, starting with its highest institutions - the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation and the papacy, which sanctioned the capture of the Crusaders, and ending with the knighthood of almost all European countries.
With the support of these forces, the Order, which completed the conquest of the Prussians in the 80s of the XIII century and turned into a strong military power, began to increasingly turn the edge of its expansion against neighboring countries and peoples. The chronicler of the Order, Peter Dusburg, wrote in 1283: "The war with the Prussians is over. The war with the Lithuanians has begun. " 1 Castles built by the Crusaders at the mouth of the Neman and in the bay where the river flowed became a springboard for aggression. Initially, it was a question of weakening Lithuania by continuous devastating campaigns (which became the main method of the Order's foreign policy since the conquest of the Prussians). However, the plans of the Order extended not only to the lands of" pagans "- Lithuanians, but also to the lands of " schismatics "(Orthodox) - Belarusian and Ukrainian, which were under the rule of the Grand Dukes of Lithuania from the end of the XIII-beginning of the XIV century. By a grant issued to the Order in December 1337, Emperor Louis of Bavaria gave the Teutonic knights not only "Lithuania", but also "Rus"2 . Even before these plans could be realized, the Crusaders attacked Catholic Poland. By seizing the Pomerania of Gdansk, they cut off the Polish state from the Baltic, and in the west their possessions closed with Brandenburg, through whose lands more and more detachments of German chivalry came to them.
The aggression of the Teutonic Knights, with its characteristic war of annihilation, was met with a natural and growing rebuff from neighboring peoples. For 40 years, the Prussians resisted the onslaught of the Order. A fierce rebuff from the Lithuanians and Belarusians was met by attempts by the Teutonic knights to strengthen themselves in the lower reaches of the Neman 3 . The Poles took up arms, who in the battle of Plovtsy (1331) dealt a serious blow to the Crusader army.
But the forces of the Order's opponents were divided. Polish knighthood then wanted nothing to do with the pagan Lithuanians. The Lithuanian boyars contested the lands of Galician Rus that they controlled from the Polish feudal lords and sought to extend their influence to Northeastern Rus, which led to conflicts between the two countries.-
1 Chronicon terrae Prussiae von Peter von Dusburg. In: Scriptores rerum Prussicarum (SRP). T. I. Leipzig. 1861, S. 146.
2 Preussisches Urkundenbuch. Bd. III, T. 1. Konigsberg. 1944, S. 101.
3 Pashuto V. T. Obrazovanie Litovskogo gosudarstva [Education of the Lithuanian State], Moscow, 1959, p. 416 pp.
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between the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Russian principalities, primarily Moscow. Under these circumstances, the Order continued to strengthen its position. According to the peace of Kalisz in 1343, Poland was forced to recognize the capture of Pomerania by the Crusaders. Their onslaught on the Grand Duchy of Lithuania has sharply increased. In the second half of the 14th century, the Teutonic Order repeatedly targeted not only the border Lithuanian and Belorussian regions, but also the main centers of the Lithuanian state - Vilnius and Troki4 . The main efforts of the Crusaders were then directed at the subjugation of Samogitia. The seizure of this Lithuanian land would have allowed them not only to completely cut off Lithuania from the sea, but also to unite the possessions of the Teutonic Order with the possessions of another, which recognized the supreme authority of the Grand Master, but retained a certain autonomy of the Crusader state in the Baltic States-the Livonian Order, which, having conquered the Latvians and Estonians, threatened Lithuania and theWestern Russia. Using internal conflicts in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which the authorities of the Order in every possible way fomented, in the early 80-ies of the XIV century. The Order has taken serious steps to gain a foothold in Samogitia. The danger to the historical destinies of Poles, Lithuanians, and East Slavic peoples has increased dramatically.
In this dramatic situation, the first important step was taken to unite the forces of the Order's opponents. In 1385, the Lithuanian Grand Duke Jagiello, who had converted to Christianity along with his Lithuanian subjects, was elected King of Poland .5 Undoubtedly, by undertaking such an action, Polish politicians were thinking of a joint action of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania against the Order. Jagiello (baptised Wladyslaw), when assuming the Polish throne, undertook to return to the Polish kingdom the lands captured by the Crusaders .6 However, almost a quarter of a century passed before the joint action of both states against the Order. One of the reasons for the lack of coordination of actions was the clashes between the Polish and Lithuanian feudal lords over the forms of future unification. The Order contributed in every possible way to the aggravation of these clashes. Only by the mid-90s of the XIV century, when the de facto ruler of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania under the supreme power of Jagiello became his cousin Vytautas, the dispute was settled.
There were other reasons for the delay. In the ruling circles of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, different foreign policy concepts collided. Polish feudal lords and Lithuanian boyars were attracted by plans to expand their borders in the East at the expense of Russian lands. Hence the dilemma characteristic of the pre-Grunwald policy of both states: either a policy of expansion in the East, which implied agreement with the Order and concession to its demands; or a decisive struggle with the Order, which meant peace and political rapprochement with the Russian principalities. The Order took advantage of the hesitation, and not without success at first. One of the milestones on this path was the Polish treaty with the Order, signed in May 1404 in Ratzen. The Order was given Samogitia, recognized the" right " of the Livonian knights to Pskov, in return, the Order willingly promised its support to Jagaila and Vytautas in the conquest of Russian lands, 7 and indeed sent such help. What were the results of the agreements? In the East, faced with the combined forces of the Russian principalities, in a war that lasted more than three years, Vytautas and Jagiello did not achieve significant success. Such a policy caused only a political crisis in their own possessions: in 1408, Yagaila's brother Svidrigailo left for Moscow along with a number of Russian princes, and with him "the boyars of Chernigov and Debryansk, and Lyubut, and Roslavsky"8 . Meanwhile, the Order strengthened its position in Samogitia, establishing its administration there and laying new castles.
4 Lowmianski H. Agresja Zakonu krzyzackiego na Litwg w wiekach XII - XV. - Przeglijd historyczny, 1954, N 2 - 3, s. 357n.
5 This step did not affect the policy of the Order, which continued to call Lithuanians "pagans" in the face of the whole of Europe and to organize new crusades in Lithuania, in which the knighthood of Catholic Europe was widely called upon to participate.
6 Akta unii Polski z Lilwa. Krakow. 1932. N 1, s. 2.
7 Kolankowski L. Dzieje Wielkiego Ksigstwa Litewskiego za Jagielionow. T. I. Warszawa. 1930, s. 83.
8 PSRL. T. 25. Moscow-l. 1949, p. 237.
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In these circumstances, the struggle of views in the Polish-Lithuanian ruling circles led to the victory of political realism. Peace was made with the Russians, and in the spring of 1409 an uprising began in Samogitia with direct support from Vilnius. In the outbreak of war, Poland and Lithuania jointly moved their troops against the Order. The Order of Zhemaytia, taken by surprise, could not hold on. But the Allies were not yet ready for a big war. In the autumn, hostilities were interrupted by a truce, which expired in June 1410. During this time, the parties had to prepare for a decisive clash. The Order associated far-reaching goals with the defeat of the Allies; for example, in the treaty of alliance with the Hungarian King Sigismund of Luxembourg, it specifically stipulated its right to seize Lithuania, Samogitia, and part of the Polish lands .9 However, in Marienburg (Malbork), Danzig (Gdansk) and Konigsberg (now Kaliningrad), it was understood that this goal would not be easy to achieve: for the first time, the Order was openly opposed by the combined forces of its opponents.
The Crusaders counted on the assistance of Sigismund of Luxembourg. But, busy fighting the Ottomans and Venice, he could not immediately begin military operations. Therefore, they hoped much more for the help of the Livonian knights. The Grand Master demanded that the Landmaster of the Livonian Order declare war on Vytautas at the end of the armistice and divert the Lithuanian forces by attacking Lithuania. The answer was unexpected. The Landmeister announced in May that he was ready to declare war, but according to early agreements, he could only start military operations three months after the breakup of relations. Since the armistice between the Teutonic Order and its opponents was due to expire in June, such a response effectively meant a refusal. The Grand Master, who received the answer nine days before the outbreak of the war, was enraged and demanded that the Livonian Order return the money and guns lent to him .10 The modern Polish researcher S. M. Kuczynski [11] believes that the main reason for this situation was that after the peace of 1408, the Russian Empire was destroyed. The rapprochement of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania with the Russian lands - the Grand Duchy of Moscow, Novgorod and Pskov-began. In the coming war, these lands essentially took sides hostile to the Teutonic Order, and the Livonian knights in these conditions decided not to interfere in the events.
Now the Order could only rely on the skill of its military leaders. But at the beginning of the military campaign, it was clearly not up to par. In the resumption of hostilities in the summer of 1410, the initiative from the very beginning belonged to the Polish-Lithuanian side. Despite the efforts of the Order's authorities, they failed to penetrate the enemy's military plans. The attacks launched in June from various directions by the troops of both the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania disoriented the military command of the Order, which was forced to refrain from active actions. Under these conditions, Vytautas and Jagiela successfully achieved the goal that they had set for themselves at the first stage of the campaign: on July 2, the armies of both states freely joined forces on the Vistula, north of Warsaw, in the Chervinska region. On July 6, they crossed the Prussian border, and the war unfolded on the lands of the Order.
The Polish-Lithuanian army moved deep into enemy territory, towards Malbork, the capital of the Order .12 Allied troops " all went bad forest doro-
9 Nowak Z. Polityka polnocna Zygmunta Luksemburskiego do roku 1411. Toruri. 1964, s. 98 - 100.
10 Prochaska A. Dzieje Witolda wielkiego ksiecia Litwy. Wilno. 1914, s. 124 - 125.
11 Kuczynski S. M. Wielka wojna z Zakonem Krzyzackim w latach 1409 - 1411. Warszawa. 1980, s. 331 - 332.
12 For more information on the first phase of the war, see Kuczynski S. M. Op. cit., s. 334-368. The Order's archive contains many documents about the war of 1409-1411. Most of them are published in the publication: Codex epistolaris Vitoldi. Cracoviae. 1882. For a review and partial publication of materials not included in this publication, see: Biskup M. Zbadaii nad "Wielka wojna" z Zakonem Krzyzkirn. - Kwartalnik historyczny, 1959, N 3. These documents do not contain any information about the battle itself. Its descriptions are preserved only in chronicles. Among the sources that reflect the point of view of the Order, we should note the continuation of the Chronicle of John Posilge, the official bishop of Pomesania, compiled by an unknown person. The entries here are close in time to events that are presented from the point of view of a party hostile to the Polish-Lithuanian one: the troops of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania-
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They could not find a flat and wide field where they could stop and fight, and there were large and flat fields near the German city of Dubrovnik. " 13 It was to the north of this city, taken by the Allies on the way to Malbork, that the army of the Grand Master of the Order, Ulrich von Jungingen, blocked the path of the Polish-Lithuanian forces. At least a day earlier, the Crusader army was on the field where his opponent's troops were advancing.
What forces did both armies have before the decisive battle? We do not have precise data to answer this question 14 . One thing is certain: the Order has gathered all its forces and opened its coffers wide to recruit mercenaries. Only one of the Order's books of accounts records salary payments for 5,750 people who were hired for the Order's service before the Battle of Grunwald .15 But, in addition to mercenaries, thanks to the appeals of the Order, large detachments of "guests" arrived in Prussia - knights who were equipped at their own expense, who came here in search of loot and knightly laurels won in the fight against pagans. As part of the crusader army, there were detachments of knights not only from Meissen, Westphalia and the Rhineland, but even from Switzerland, "who came to the aid of the Master of Prussia and the Order as their own dependents"16 . The compiler of the Bykhovets Chronicle was not so far from the truth, writing that the magister went to war "with the entire German Empire"17 . But most importantly, the Order tried to squeeze maximum strength out of its own subjects: where data are preserved, it is clear that individual Prussian cities put up a contingent several times larger in size than during other military campaigns .18 For the decisive battle, a contemporary wrote, the grand master gathered all his forces, "leaving all the land and all the castles" without military leaders or garrisons .19
Accurate in calculations, the French chronicler Gilbert de Lannois noted that after Grunwald, the weakened Order put up 21 thousand horsemen and a lot of infantry in 1413 for the war with the Poles and Lithuanians. In 1410, the Order's army was expected to exceed these figures significantly. Given the above, we can trust the information in the documents that told about the funeral services for the dead on the part of the Order: they mentioned the figure of 18 thousand 20 .
go to him - the armies of the Gentiles. Other chroniclers who wrote on the territory of Prussia have preserved brief records of the war and the battle (all relevant texts are collected in the publication: SRP. T. III. Leipzig. 1866). On the Polish-Lithuanian side, the earliest and most reliable source is the so-called Cronica conflictus Wladislai regis Poloniae cum cruciferis. Anno Christi, 1410. Poznan. 1911 (edition with facsimile reproduction of the original). Unfortunately, this description of the war, compiled in the wake of events in the King's chancellery, has come down to us in a strong abridgment made by an unknown cleric who used it as material for a sermon on the anniversary of the victory at Grunwald. The full text of the Cronica conflictus was available and widely used in his Chronicle, which was published in the second half of the 15th century. Jan Dlugosz. However, he did not use the text of this source mechanically, but reworked it under the influence of the reports of his patron, Bishop Zbigniew Olesnicki of Krakow, who treated Lithuanians and Orthodox Christians with great hostility. Hence the tendency in his narrative to attribute the main credit for the victory at Grunwald to the Polish army (a description of the war and battle is placed at the beginning of Book XII of the Chronicles: Joannis Dlugossii seu Longini canonici Cracoviensi opera omnia. T. XIII. Cracoviae. 1877). Modern Russian translation: Dlugosz J. The Battle of Grunwald. Moscow-L. 1962. The opposite trend can be noted in the story "Chronicles of Bykhovets", which reflects the legends about the battle that existed among the aristocracy of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the XVI century. Along with the unreliable ones, this story contains a number of important and accurate information that is not available in other sources (see Kuczynski S. M. In-formacje tzw. latopisu Byshowca on "Wielkiej wojnie" lat 1409-1411. In: Studia z dziejow Europy Wschodniej X-XVII w. Warszawa. 1965). Cf. also: PSRL Vol. 32, Moscow, 1975; Russian translation: Chronicle of Bykhovets, Moscow, 1966.
13 Chronicle of Bykhovets, p. 79.
14 Kuczynski S. M. Spor о Grunwald. Warszawa. 1968, s. 66.
15 Ekdahl S. Kilka uwag o ksigdze zoidu Zakonu krzyzackiego z okresu "Wielkiej wojny" 1410 - 1411. - Zapiski historyczne, 1968, N 3.
16 Dlugosz Ya. Uk. soch., pp. 93-95.
17 Chronicle of Bykhovets, p. 78.
18 Kuczynski S. M. Spor о Grunwald, s. 86.
19 SRP. T. III, S. 314 - 315.
20 Jahrbiicher Johannes Lindenblatts oder Chronik Johannes von der Posilie, Officials zu Riesenburg. Konigsberg. 1823, S. 257 - 258.
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Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania also gathered their main forces to the battle site. From the list of detachments (banners) in the allied army, it can be seen that both Jagiello and Vytautas brought with them troops not only from the Polish, Belarusian, Lithuanian, and Russian territories located relatively close to the Order (Smolensk region), but also from Ukrainian lands: the Polish army had banners of the Galician land, Kholm region, and Podolia, in Lithuanian - Kievskaya, Kremenetskaya, Starodubskaya 21 . Since the size of the territory and the number of inhabitants of the Polish Kingdom and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania significantly exceeded the Order, this sometimes led to the conclusion that the Allied forces were greatly outnumbered. A number of circumstances, however, speak against this assumption. First, the Allies did not have the huge external support that the Order enjoyed. The Polish army included, it is true, mercenary detachments and volunteers, but all of them (both volunteers and mercenaries) came from Silesia, the Polish land that was then part of the Czech Kingdom, as well as from the Czech Republic itself, which was thus the only country in Catholic Europe that provided assistance to the Order's opponents. . Joining the ranks of the Polish army, the Czechs and Silesians acted contrary to the wishes of the Czech King Wenceslaus IV, who, in an effort to preserve the throne of the Holy Roman Empire, clearly supported the Crusaders in the war that began.
Chroniclers of the Order and chroniclers of Western European countries who were influenced by them wrote about a huge army of Tatars who participated in the war on the Polish-Lithuanian side, led by the "Tatar emperor"himself23 . In reality, it could only be a small detachment of Jalal ad-Din, the son of Tokhtamish, who at that time found shelter at Vytautas, having been defeated in the fight against Edigei .24 The Allies also received help from the Moldavian ruler, but this was a small detachment, numbering 800 people .25 It is also significant that if the Order was able to gather all its forces at Grunwald without fear of an attack from the other side, the Allies could not afford it. Dlugosz directly indicates that part of the Polish troops remained on the southern border to protect themselves from the attack of the Crusader ally Sigismund of Luxembourg .26 A considerable part of the troops of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania continued to guard the borders with the Livonian Order and the Golden Horde.
Thus, although the Allies had, apparently, a numerical advantage of 27, it could not be overwhelming and in an open field battle was compensated by the advantages of heavily armed knight cavalry, while troops from the Ukrainian lands of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania had lighter weapons. One thing is certain: tens of thousands of people participated in the battle on both sides. Consequently, the Battle of Grunwald was one of the largest battles of the medieval era.
The morale of the parties was also different. The mercenaries and "guests" who arrived with the Order's army were eager to seize the spoils, and the Prussian cities and knights were burdened by the despotic power of the Order and did not feel a fervent desire to fight for its interests. In the other camp, Poles, Lithuanians, Belarusians, Ukrainians and soldiers of the Russian Smolensk region were united by the desire to repel the aggressor, who had long and cruelly ravaged their lands, and did not hide plans to dismember and enslave neighboring states and peoples. And this could not but affect the outcome of the battle that unfolded.
21 Dlugosz J. Uk. op., p. 89. Cronica conflictus also mentions when describing the battle "banner of the Galician land" (s. 27).
22 Dlugosz Ya. Uk. soch., pp. 88-90. As part of one of these detachments of Hetman Jan Sokol, Jan Zizka took part in the Battle of Grunwald (ibid., p. 134).
23 SRP. T. HI, S. 7, 314 - 315, 405 - 407, 413, 453 - 455.
24 Grekov B. D., Yakubovsky A. Yu. Zolotaya horda i ee padanie [The Golden Horde and Its Fall], Moscow, 1950, pp. 398-400.
25 Codex epistolaris Vitoldi, App. XXXVII, p. 1064.
26 Dlugosz Ya. Uk. soch., p. 63.
27 "The Prussian army was inferior to the Polish army both in knightly strength and in the number of banners" (ibid., p. 90).
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On the morning of July 15, the Crusader troops, lined up in battle order, stood on the field between the settlements of Tannenberg and Grunwald. Meanwhile, the Allied forces (on the right wing was the army of the Kingdom of Poland, on the left-the Grand Duchy of Lithuania) were in no hurry to start the battle, not yet moving forward from the forests surrounding the valley. At this moment, the Grand Master's heralds came to Yagaila and Vytautas with an unusual statement, which is why it is noted in all the main sources about the battle 28 . "Most Serene King! The Grand Master of Prussia, Ulrich, sends you and your brother two swords, as an encouragement to the coming battle, so that you and your army may join the battle immediately and with more courage than you show, and not hide any longer, dragging out the battle and hiding in the woods and groves. If you think the field is too narrow for you to deploy, then Master Ulrich of Prussia... I am ready to retreat as far as you want from the level field occupied by his army. " 29 And following the arrival of the heralds, the Crusader troops actually retreated. According to the rules of war adopted at that time, this was a challenge bordering on an insult, which, according to the logic of events, should have been followed by an immediate action of the Allied troops against the Crusader army.
And so it happened. According to a consensus of 30 sources, the troops of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania were the first to start the battle. They had to find out what was hidden behind the" knight " challenge of the master. Back in the 16th century, the compiler of the Bykhovets Chronicle was told that on the future battlefield, the Crusaders "dug holes and covered them with earth so that people and horses would fall into them." The Lithuanian cavalry that attacked fell into these pits. Here one of the military leaders who had land in Podolia, Prince Ivan Zhedevid, died,"and many more people were greatly harmed by those pits." 31 Thus, already in the first phase of the battle, the Crusaders, with the help of treachery, caused significant damage to the left wing of the Allies. This affected the further course of the battle. Detachments of "guests" who wanted to meet the "pagans"rushed against the Lithuanian army, 32 and the troops gathered in Prussia began to fight with the banners of the Polish army, striking them, according to Dlugosz, "from a higher place." "When the ranks came together, there was such a noise and roar from the breaking of spears and blows on armor, as if some huge structure was collapsing... Foot stepped on foot, armor bumped against armor, and spear points were pointed in the faces of enemies... At last, when the spears were broken, the ranks of both sides and the armor with armor were so close that they made a terrible noise under the blows of swords and axes impaled on shafts, such as hammers make on anvils, and people fought under the pressure of horses. " 33
For an hour, neither side could succeed. Then, under the onslaught of the Crusaders, who were approached by fresh forces, the left wing of the Allies began to " retreat and finally turned to flight... The enemy cut down and captured the fugitives, chasing them for miles... The fleeing people were so terrified that most of them stopped fleeing only when they reached Lithuania."34 Despite the definiteness and categorical nature of Dlugosz's judgments, this part of his story has long been doubtful, since it was in contradiction with the data of other sources. Hence the long-running dispute about the nature of the actions of the left wing of the Allied army in the Battle of Grunwald .35 It was only relatively recently that an important source was discovered that finally confirmed the correctness of Dlugosz's critics. Already after Grunwald, one of the Order's superiors warned the Magister that in a new battle, the enemy would be defeated.-
28 SRP. T. III, S. 316; Cronica conflictus, s. 22.
29 Dlugosz Ya. Uk. soch., pp. 98-99.
30 Ibid., p. 101.
31 Chronicle of Bykhovets, p. 79; from the reports of Dlugosz, it can be concluded that the Crusaders put stakes in such pits and covered them with straw (Dlugossii J. Opera omnia. T. XIII, s. 295, 304).
32 Cronica conflictus, s. 25.
33 Dlugosz Ya. Uk. soch., p. 101.
34 Ibid., p. 102.
35 Overview of the discussion: Kuczynski S. M. Taktyka walki skrzydla litewsko- ruskiego w bitwie pod Grunwaldem. In: Studia i materialy do historii wojskowosci. T. X, cz. II, Warszawa. 1964.
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Opponents can deliberately cause several units to flee in order to cause heavy cavalry formations to break up, just as they did in the great Battle. 36 The significance of this testimony lies primarily in the fact that it confirms "from the opposite side" the description of the actions of the Lithuanians, which was given by an unknown Pole, the author of"Cronica conflictus". After all, he writes that when the Lithuanians began to retreat, the Crusader detachments, " believing that they had already won a victory, dispersed [by withdrawing] from their banners, breaking the order of their detachments."
Breaking the battle formation that gave it the power to strike, the heavy cavalry cavalry left the field for a swampy and rugged area, where all the advantages were on the side of the Lithuanians and Belarusians who were used to operating in such conditions. "Then, "continues the Cronica conflictus," when they wanted to return to their men and banners, surrounded by the king's men (as the chronicler calls all the troops subordinate to the supreme authority of Jagiello-B. F.), they were captured or killed by the sword. " 37 Only a few of these units managed to get back. The skilful maneuver was forced and, of course, risky, and it was already undertaken after, in the words of the Cronica conflictus, "many people were killed on both sides" and some part of the Lithuanian army could actually take flight. But the main forces of the left wing remained on the battlefield and managed to inflict significant damage to the Crusaders.
In his story, Dlugosz contrasted the behavior of the Lithuanian army with the actions of three Smolensk regiments, which, unlike other detachments, did not retreat, continuing the battle with the Crusaders. "Although under one banner they were cruelly cut down and their banner trampled into the ground, yet in the other two detachments they emerged victorious, fighting with the greatest bravery, as befitted men and knights, and finally joined the Polish troops." 38 Why didn't they withdraw with the entire army of the Grand Duke of Lithuania? There is no direct information, but the answer is suggested by the general situation on the battlefield: the withdrawal of the Lithuanian troops, although it brought certain benefits, was also fraught with serious danger. Pursuing the retreating cavalry of the Crusaders could go to the rear of the troops of the right wing. It was precisely this danger that the Smolensk regiments prevented by "joining the Polish army". In a difficult moment for the Allied army, "the Smolensk regiments adjacent to the Polish army on the right firmly occupied their assigned place and, despite heavy losses, provided protection for the Polish regiments from the flank attack of the knights"39 . This made a big difference to the overall outcome of the battle.
Meanwhile, the battle on the right wing flared up with increasing force. Here the troops of the Polish Kingdom fought with the Crusaders. The main object of the crusaders ' attack was the large banner of the Cracow land, over which the banner with the main emblem of the state - the white eagle-rose. The Crusaders apparently believed that the Polish king himself was fighting under this banner, and his capture would decide the outcome of the battle .40 The moment came when the banner fell to the ground under the enemy onslaught. A desperate fight ensued at the banner: "A select detachment of the bravest knights stood around it with their chests, protecting it with their bodies and weapons," and the enemy was repulsed 41 . Apparently, the situation was restored by some of the reserves thrown into battle, under the onslaught of which the Order's troops began to slowly withdraw .42
This did not go unnoticed in the Crusader camp, and the Grand Master, coming to the conclusion that all the Allied forces were already engaged, decided to strike a decisive blow. He still had a significant reserve at his disposal (16 banners, almost a third of the Crusader army), which was to decide the outcome of the battle with a massive attack. Convinced that the enemy's forces were exhausted, the magister and the chief dignitaries of the Order stood at the head of the knights going into battle. The battle continued
36 Ekdahl S. Die Flucht der Litauer in der Schlacht bei Tannenberg. - Zeitschrift fur Ostforschung, 1963, Hf. 1, S, 16 - 17.
37 Cronica conflictus, s. 26.
38 Dlugosz Ya. Uk. soch., p. 102.
39 Karaev G. N., Korolyuk V. D. To the 550th anniversary of Grunwald. battles. - Voprosy istorii, 1960, N 7, p. 98.
40 Dlugosz J. Uk. op., p. 88; Kuczynski S. M. Wielka wojna, s. 401.
41 SRP. T. III, S. 316; Dlugosz Ya. Uk. soch., p. 104.
42 Kuczynski S. M. Wielka wojna, s. 402 - 403.
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It was already six o'clock, and the turning point of the battle was approaching. The Crusader attack was again directed at the place where the Crusaders believed the king was. But at this very moment Jagiello and Vytautas brought their reserves into battle: the Poles on the one hand and the Lithuanians on the other struck at the master's army. Streams of cavalry rushing towards each other collided. And in this decisive battle, the elite forces of the Order, " surrounded from everywhere, were defeated and crushed, almost all the soldiers who fought under the sixteen banners were killed or taken prisoner." The master and a number of other dignitaries of the Order were killed. The Crusader troops began to withdraw from the battlefield. Seeing the change in military happiness, the detachments of "guests" began to lay down their weapons. The banner of the Polish Helminsk land captured by the Crusaders went entirely to the Polish side, led by its cornet. Part of the Order's troops went into a stampede 43 .
In the further course of the battle, the knight's cavalry no longer participated. However, from Dlugosz's account, it can be concluded that the battle itself did not end there. Most of the Order's soldiers who fled the battlefield "sought protection in the Prussian wagon train at the camp." A serious attempt was made to organize resistance there, which follows from the words of the chronicler "they were killed" (i.e., they met the enemy with weapons in their hands)44 . The Polish historian S. Inglot successfully explained the scantness of chroniclers ' information about the battle's epilogue . The infantry, consisting of people of "vile rank"46 , who did not know the rules of chivalry and sought only one thing - to destroy the enemy, moved to storm the camp. If the knights who pursued the enemy knights, on the orders of Jagiela, "avoided slaughter" and, without using weapons, brought the prisoners "unharmed, without violence or mutilation" 47, then the picture was different in the camp. "Everyone in it died by the sword." "At this place," the source says, "more corpses were seen than [those killed] in the entire battle." 48 Thus, the Order's troops, broken in a mounted battle, were destroyed by armed Polish, Lithuanian, Belarusian, Ukrainian and Russian peasants. In the camp, the victors found wagons with chains, which the crusaders expected to chain the prisoners .49
The Order's army practically ceased to exist: most of it was destroyed, and a significant number of soldiers were captured. The winners got the baggage train, artillery, and battle banners of the Crusaders (51 captured banners were delivered to Krakow, the rest were sent to Vilnius).50 . In the battle, not only almost all the main ranks of the Order were killed or captured, but also the governors of the districts - komtur (except for one who did not participate in the battle). The defeat was devastating. The Order was never able to recover from the blow, despite the fact that the politicians of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania failed to fully take advantage of the fruits of the victory. In subsequent clashes with its neighbors until 1525, the year of the Order's liquidation, it fought only to maintain its position. The threat of aggression from the German feudal lords against the Poles, Lithuanians, and Eastern Slavs was eliminated for a long time.
In the historical tradition of these peoples, the battle of Grunwald, which took place 575 years ago, has entered not only as a symbol of courage and heroism in the struggle for their native land against foreign invaders, but also as evidence that when peoples unite to repel the aggressor with common forces, to defend their freedom and independence, they achieve victory.
43 For this decisive moment of the battle, see: Dlugosz J. Uk. op., pp. 104-107; Cronica conflictus, s. 27-28. The continuation of the Posilge chronicle (SRP. T. III, S. 316) speaks about the participation of the Lithuanians in the attack on the Magister's army.
44 Dlugosz Ya. Uk. soch., p. 108. B Cronica conflictus (s. 28) it is even more definitely indicated that those who took refuge in the camp tried to create a protection around themselves from carts.
45 Inglot S. Udzial chtopow w obronie Polski. Lodz. 1946, s. 21.
46 About people of "ignoble rank", or simply peasants, as part of the Polish army, there is direct evidence of documents from the Order's archive (Biskup M. Op. cit., s. 686, 699, 703 - 704, 709).
47 Dlugosz Ya. Uk. soch., p. 109.
48 Cronica conflictus, s. 28.
49 Dlugosz Ya. Uk. soch., p. 108.
50 Ibid., p. 157; Dlugosz J. Banderia Prutenorum. Warszawa. 1958; Chronicle of Bykhovets, p. 80.
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