In the context of the recent revived debate on the need and ways to modernize the economy and innovative development of Russian society, special attention in expert communities has been paid to the so-called "Asian economic miracle". High rates of economic growth, rapid and large-scale renewal of technologies and infrastructure, which are characteristic at the turn of the XX—XXI century. Asian "tigers " and" dragons": Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong, China and South Korea attract the attention of many researchers seeking to uncover the secret of successful socio-economic development and find role models.1

Keywords: social changes, modernization, South Korea, virtualization, glam capitalism.

Especially impressive, even against the background of other "tigers" and "dragons", looks "Korean miracle". Half a century ago, South Korea was a poor agricultural country with a GDP per capita of $ 70 (1960), without large mineral reserves and not occupying an advantageous position on trade routes, and reached the level of per capita GDP of $ 1.6 thousand. already in 1980 and then rapidly advanced to the top twenty most developed countries, reaching the level of 10 thousand dollars in 1995 and 20 thousand dollars in 2005. At the same time, South Korea's economy is diversified, with a large share of high-tech products in its exports, and information and communication technology (ICT)-based products in terms of export volume it is one of the five world leaders [Tsvetkova, 2012]. The country successfully implements large-scale projects for the development of information and communication technologies and is among the world leaders in terms of the number of Internet users (82 per 100 inhabitants), the level of access to broadband Internet and the intensity of development of mobile communication technologies.

Such a phenomenal economic progress and the transition of South Korea from an economically backward agrarian and war-torn society through intensive and largely forced industrialization to a developed post-industrial society looks like an ideal example that confirms the provisions of the classical theory of modernization [Rostow, 1960; Levy, 1966]. In the 1960s, the military-backed government of President Park Chung-hee proclaimed a program of "homeland modernization" (Han Yong-woo, 2010) and practically imposed new laws on society.

1 See, for example: [Aleksandrov, 2007; Abdurasulova, 2009; Sablin, 2010].

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Western-style institutions that have intensified economic activity and displaced traditional social structures and cultural models.

However, authoritarian modernization was accompanied by an increase in social inequality, the disintegration of traditional social groups, and the pressure of the state bureaucracy on entrepreneurs, workers, and intellectuals. In response to the painful consequences of catching up with modernization, neotraditionalist structures and movements emerged in South Korean society, forming an alternative to those institutions that were supported by the authoritarian state. Instead of broken clan ties, forms of solidarity emerged that transformed industrial corporations, government agencies, and universities into communities whose leaders and most of their members are united by their descent from the same clan, region, educational institution, military unit, and so on. These structures of recruitment and career advancement, which contradict the ideal type of modernization, have become a characteristic feature of modern Korean society and have been called "neofamilist" (new familial) by researchers [Lew, Chang, 1998; Na, 2007] or" pseudofamilist " [Cha, 2000]. Another characteristic trend was the emergence of a socio-cultural and political movement that brought together intellectuals, students, trade unionists, and religious activists who opposed the "external" destruction of Korean culture and the oppression of ordinary people, and turned to traditional arts, religious beliefs, and rituals as an alternative to pro-Western innovations. This broad movement, known as minjoon ("the people"), which ranged from ethnographic research and folklore performances to strikes and civil disobedience, became a serious challenge to the modernization elite in the 1970s and 1980s (Wells, 1995; Koo, 1999).

Traditionally, the dismantling of the military dictatorship regime in the late 1980s and early 1990s, followed by the democratization of political life and economic liberalization, is considered a key stage in the modernization of South Korean society [Kim, 1998; Koo, 1999; Han Yong-woo, 2010]. However, this shift from authoritarianism to liberalism was the result of the successful struggle of those social movements that, in the framework of classical theories of modernization, should be defined as countermodern and neotraditionalist. This contradiction can be resolved by referring to the concept of multiple modernities by S. Eisenstadt (Eisenstadt, 1987; Eisenstadt, 2000). The concept of multiple modernities allows us to avoid the paradoxes associated with the binary scheme of "traditionalism-modernization", and to consider neofamilism and the Minjoon movement not as manifestations of social conservatism and cultural fundamentalism, but as specific models of the trajectory of modernization that is characteristic of South Korea.

Both rigid models of classical modernization theories and more flexible models of multiple modernization theories are ineffective in explaining the trends of the late 1990s and early 2000s. During this period, the economic structures that provided the "Korean miracle" fell into a state of crisis, and the intensive flows of investment, technology, people, information, and goods that went across national borders significantly changed South Korean society. The pluralism of consumption patterns and the growing cosmopolitanism of new generations who take economic well-being and civil liberties for granted do not support the functioning of those social institutions and the reproduction of those cultural practices that developed during the stages of industrialization and democratization. Open, mobile and networked structures in the economy and society are better described and explained using new conceptual tools provided by the theories of globalization and virtualization [Robertson, 1992; Appadurai, 1990; Castells, 1996; Ivanov, 2000].

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The limited nature of the modernization model of society transformation is due to the fact that in this case a single-line directed and continuous trajectory of social changes is assumed. But in South Korea, over the past fifty years, almost every decade there have been sharp turns and fundamentally new trends in all spheres of public life. Therefore, conceptualization and theoretical explanations of social change in South Korea should be based on an empirically obvious and theoretically adequate reconstruction of successive trajectories of changes in the economy, politics, culture, and social structure.

FIVE "ECONOMIC MIRACLES"

In the South Korean economy, we can identify five consecutive phases of the phenomenal growth that has been called the "economic miracle". And each of these five phases is characterized by a specific technological and institutional regime.

The main trend in the 1960s was the growth of export-oriented light industries (textiles, footwear, etc.), which were actively stimulated and regulated by the mercantilist policy of the state. It was during this period that the so-called "economic miracle"began in South Korea. The average GDP growth rate in 1963-1966 was 7.8%, and in 1967-1971 - 10.5%; export growth in 1967-1971. GDP per capita increased from $ 87 in 1962 to $ 293 in 1972; unemployment decreased from 8.3% in 1963 to 4.5% in 1971 [Han Yong-woo, 2010, p. 546; Chang, 2008, p. 654]. The phenomenal economic growth rates were driven by the high competitiveness of Korean products that were promoted to foreign markets, primarily Japanese. The competitiveness of Korean exports was based on purposefully maintaining a low level of production costs. The use of cheap labor in the newly created industrial enterprises was ensured by low prices set by the state for the main food product - rice. The policy of low prices for agricultural products made it possible to keep the low level of wages in factories and at the same time forced the masses of impoverished peasants to leave the countryside for the city and join the ranks of unskilled labor. The government's devaluation of the national currency - the won - by 50%, the introduction of high duties and direct bans on the import of many goods, and the liberalization of imports of semi-finished products for developing industries also contributed to limiting the growth of domestic consumption and increasing the competitiveness of industry in foreign markets [Korgun, 2007, p.170]. The combination of direct support and control of factories by senior government officials has become the pinnacle of the system of measures for the development of export industries. The Government redirected foreign economic assistance and loans from social programs to purchase raw materials and equipment necessary for the developing light industry. An Economic Planning Committee was established to draw up and communicate five-year economic development plans to enterprises. Business plans for business owners were directly dictated at monthly export meetings chaired by dictator President Park Chung-hee.

In the 1970s, the economic growth regime changed: there was a turn to the development of heavy industry (ferrous metallurgy, shipbuilding, petrochemicals, automotive industry, etc.) by the forces of the so-called chaebols-vertically and horizontally integrated and diversified industrial groups owned by family clans, managed on the basis of kinship and community ties and dependent on relations with the state. the ruling elite. For a fraction of fifty

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chaebols accounted for about half of the GNP produced. At the same time, 7 of the 10 largest chaebols came from Yeongnam Province, where top state officials, including dictator presidents Park Chong-hee and Chong Doo-hwan, came from [Shin and Chin, 1989, p. 10; Cha, 2000, p. 479]. Neo-familial ties with the state bureaucracy gave Chaebols access to concessional loans and direct export subsidies, made them an effective tool for economic and social policy, and helped institutionalize corruption by granting favored Chaebols treatment in exchange for loyalty and donations to party funds and government social projects. In the 1970s, the growth rate of GNP remained very high and averaged 10% per year [Shin and Chin, 1989, p. 7]. It was during this period that the structure of the South Korean economy took on the form characteristic of a developed industrial society: the share of industrial production in the national product exceeded the share of agricultural production [Koo, 1991, p. 487].

In the 1980s, a new turn in the trajectory of economic development took place, due to the rapid growth of export-oriented industries in the field of high technologies (microelectronics, consumer electronics) and the formation of a system of labor relations based on an alliance of national capital, the state and official trade unions. Loyalty to the course of catch-up modernization, which required keeping the cost of labor resources low, was achieved by guarantees of lifelong employment for the majority of employees who were ready for full dedication and by reprisals against workers ' activists. The institutionalization of the authoritarian-corporate system of labor relations has led to the fact that neofamilism formed among chaebols and government agencies in the selection of personnel and career advancement has taken root in all sectors of the economy [Na, 2007].

The effectiveness of the authoritarian-corporate system of labor relations in curbing demands for higher wages and better working conditions is confirmed by statistics on labor disputes: in 1986, 276 such disputes were recorded, and in 1987, when the military dictatorship of Jung Doo-hwan was overthrown and basic civil liberties were restored, there were already 3,749 labor disputes [Koo, 2001, p. 159]. The development of new, high-tech industries took place within the structures of the largest industrial conglomerates, which led to an even greater strengthening of their positions in the economy. Hyper-concentration and monopolism in the South Korean economy have reached enormous proportions. The share of the 10 largest companies in GNP increased from 33% (1979) to 54% (1989) over the past decade [Han Yong-woo, 2010, p.555]. South Korea's system of monopolism and protectionism allowed competition in the domestic market only under external pressure. Thus, trade disputes with the United States over dumping prices for Korean consumer electronics and customs barriers to American products led to a loosening of barriers to agricultural imports, and the self-sufficiency rate for grain fell from 86% in 1970 to 48.4% in 1985 [Han Yong-woo, 2010, p. 555].

In the 1990s, late industrialization in South Korea was abruptly replaced by the growth of a "new economy" driven by high-tech production of semiconductors, telecommunications equipment, etc., as well as the liberalization of financial markets, the labor market, and the globalization of Korean companies. The decisive event of this period was the crisis of 1997, which led to the first decline in production after the beginning of industrialization, estimated at 5-7% [Shin and Chang, 2005, p. 411; Kim and Park, 2006, p. 437], to the bankruptcy of many large corporations, including Daewoo, to an increase in the unemployment rate since the beginning of industrialization. 2-2. 5% (1994-1997) to 7% (1998) [Kim and Park, 2006, p. 440]. The crisis has forced the gradual globalization of the previously "closed" Korean economy [Lee, Lee, 2003] to shift from the projects put forward by President Kim Yong-sun to a neoliberal policy, which is based on the terms of granting loans.

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The International Monetary Fund was led by the new President, Kim Dae-jung, who restructured the economy. State regulation was reduced, foreign trade and the financial market were liberalized, state corporations were privatized, chaebols were reformed, whose investment expansion led to huge loan arrears and provoked a financial collapse in 1997. Out of the 30 largest chaebols, 11 disappeared, the rest lost their former "octopus" structure, which previously allowed the parent company to fully control the functioning of the company. networks of subsidiaries and affiliates [Han Yong-woo, 2010, p. 574; Lee, Lee, 2003; Shin, Chang, 2005; Lie, Park, 2006, p. 57]. The dismantling of protectionism also contributed to the creation of more competitive and consumer-oriented markets: while in 1980 30% of product categories had import restrictions and customs tariffs were at the level of 25%, in 2000 these figures were 0.1% and 8%, respectively [Lee, Lee, p. 510].

The dismantling of the structures that formed the basis of the" economic miracle " followed a slowdown in the average annual growth rate of GNP from 8-10% in the 1970s and 1980s to 5.5% in the 1990s [Hai Yong'u, 2010, p.546]. Despite their successful expansion in foreign markets, Korean manufacturers of high-tech products occupied a subordinate position in global network structures-supply chains, where the owners of patent and brand rights get the maximum benefit. For example, in 1989, Korean firms paid out $ 1.2 billion. to copyright holders for the use of patented technologies [Smith, 1997, p. 750]. In the 1990s, large-scale investments in R & D were made by the state and private businesses in order to move from the so-called "reverse engineering", when the products of world technology leaders were analyzed and copied in detail, to the creation of their own innovative technologies. For the same purpose, networks were created that brought together research centers in Korea and abroad under the auspices of companies such as Samsung (Smith, 1997). The formation of the structures of the "new economy" led to the restructuring of the labor market. Wage growth and improvement of working conditions in new production facilities according to the standards of multinational companies were accompanied by a decrease in the conflict of labor relations and a decrease in trade union membership [Koo, 1991; Koo, 2001, p.159]. At the same time, jobs in the traditional industrial sector, which has lost its attractiveness for South Korean workers, began to be filled by guest workers, whose number increased from 50 thousand (1991) to 250 thousand (1997) [Lee, Lee, 2003, p.511].

In the 2000s, a post-industrial consumer society was formed in South Korea, whose economic growth regime is radically different from the regime of catch-up modernization. With a GDP of more than $ 20,000 per capita in the middle of the decade [Lie and Park, 2006], the transition from a six-day to a five-day working week in 2004, and the growth of consumer loans [Shin and Chang, 2005, p. 418], the South Korean economy has lost the key factor of modernization - type development-low labor costs. human capital in labor-intensive industries. And increased competition from China has created a threat of losing its leading position in the export of traditional industrial products [Cha, 2005; Lie and Park, 2006].

The competitive advantages of the South Korean economy are now linked to the export of culture, a vivid example of which is the Hanryu phenomenon ("Korean wave") - the distribution of commercial products of Korean pop culture in Asian countries: movies, soap operas, music videos, animation, computer games, etc. [Lie and Park, 2006]. Domestic consumption of symbolic or virtual products also contributes to economic growth, which requires the implementation of large-scale projects for the rapid development of digital communications and commerce infrastructure [Lee and Park, 2010, p. 30]. Reconfiguration of the cost-effective-

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These structures continue under the influence of two types of material and symbolic flows crossing the borders of the national economy. Cultural exports are complemented by outgoing flows of technologies, organizational solutions, and brands, for example, when setting up assembly plants in Asia or Eastern Europe. At the same time, there is an outflow of cultural capital: the number of emigrating highly qualified workers, such as computer scientists, financiers, and scientists, doubled in the noughties compared to the mid-1990s [Kim and Park, 2006, p. 453]. Incoming flows are formed by the import of consumer goods of prestigious Japanese, European and American brands, as well as the influx of cheap labor, mainly for the production of similar consumer goods in light industry enterprises and for work in harmful and dangerous industries in heavy industry. By 2005, South Korea employed about 350,000 workers from China, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Bangladesh (Kim and Park, 2006, p. 445).

FIVE POLITICAL METAMORPHOSES

Phases and changes in trajectories similar to changes in the technological and institutional regime of economic growth are also found in the political life of South Korea.

The main trend in South Korean politics in the 1960s was the consolidation and legitimization of the authoritarian state, which made it possible to impose effective economic reforms on weak and passive social groups and local communities. The so-called Second Republic was briefly established after the student uprising on April 19, 1960, which was provoked by electoral fraud and the forced resignation of the first President of the Republic of Korea, Lee Seung-man, but political and economic instability provided a favorable basis for the military coup that was organized and led by General Park Chung-hee in 1961. President Yoon Bo-sung was overthrown, parliament and all political parties were dissolved, and a military dictatorship was established, but a year later Park Jong-hee introduced and approved a new constitution in a national referendum and moved to a formally civil, but in practice - based on the security structures of the regime of managed democracy-the Third Republic [Kim, Koh, 1972; Koo, 1999, p. 57]. The ruling Democratic-Republican Party and the opposition New Democratic Party were formed to run candidates in the parliamentary and presidential elections that were regularly held but invariably ended in favor of the ruling regime. The Third Republic was characterized by electoral manipulation; neofamilist loyalty to the bureaucracy, which was recruited mainly from the Yong Nam region, where Park Chung-hee was originally from; a regime of tension for officials and businessmen involved in the implementation of economic development plans; corrupt mechanisms for placing orders and implementing industrialization projects [Kim and Koh, 1972; Na, 2007].

In the 1970s, there was a sharp turn towards the establishment of the dictatorial Yushin ("renewal, revival") regime, which ended the managed democracy of the initial period of Park Chung-hee's rule and formed an expansive state that invaded all segments of society with modernization projects and created dependent clientele structures instead of an absent civil society. Amendments made to the Constitution in 1969 allowed President Park Chung-hee to be re-elected in 1971 for a third term, after which he effectively carried out a coup, dissolving the parliament and all parties, introducing the 1972 Constitution and forming the autocratic regime of the so-called Fourth Republic. Under the new constitution, presidential elections were held by members of the new parliament - the "National Unification Council", a third of the parliament's deputies, and judges at all levels -

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from municipal to national, they were appointed by the President. The ruling regime tolerated only a loyal quasi-opposition, brutally suppressing serious opponents, as was the case, for example, in the case of the abduction and arrest in 1973 of Kim Dae-jung, who was an opposition candidate in the 1971 presidential election [Shorrok, 1986]. Political parties functioned only as electoral coalitions and neo-familial networks of support for their leaders, without becoming permanent structures with a specific ideology. Experts estimate that there were up to 160 such quasi-parties in South Korea during the Yusin period (Steinberg and Shin, 2006, p. 518). In the public sphere, concentration and centralization were implemented, similar to the hyper-concentration of Korean business structures. Only three newspapers that were actually controlled by the government were distributed nationwide, an official trade union association was established, and semi-voluntary social assistance organizations dependent on the state bureaucracy were organized - public interest Corporations and the Movement for a New Community, which pursued a policy of modernizing municipalities and villages [Kim, 2008].

Faced with sporadic protests from workers, students, and religious activists, Park Jong - hee's autocratic regime escalated its crackdown by introducing special decrees-emergency laws that circumvent parliament-that banned any criticism of the Yushin constitution, anti-government petitions, and student organizations. Judging by the downward trend in the number of protest actions [Chang, 2008, p. 655], the decree period (1974-1979) was the time of the greatest effectiveness of the state in preventing open discontent. However, it was during this period that the Minjoon movement consolidated and transformed from a populist ideology of intellectuals who represented the common people as victims of state and corporate exploitation and bearers of authentic Korean culture, to a real subject of organizing acts of civil resistance by underground student and trade union groups, religious and local communities (Wells, 1995; Koo, 1999, pp. 58-60; Chang,1999). 2008].

During the 1980s, there was a turn from the tightening of the authoritarian regime to the crisis of the dictatorship, which lost its legitimacy and could not cope with the strengthening of opposition movements. The end of the Yusin regime came on October 26, 1979. when President Park Chung-hee was assassinated by the chief of the intelligence agency during violent protests and clashes between workers and opposition activists and the police. In the face of a split in the ruling elite, General Jung Doo-hwan launched a coup d'etat in December 1979 and used troops to suppress resistance, culminating in the May 1980 uprising in Gwangju, where, according to various estimates, between 200 and 3 thousand residents were killed [Shorrok, 1986, p. 1203; Choi, 1991, p. 1203]. 176]. The events in Gwangju were followed by a tightening of the dictatorship: thousands of dissident journalists, teachers, trade unionists were arrested and dismissed, trade union activities were banned, and control over the press was established. Special police units were formed from members of the city's gangs to fight demonstrators, opposition party leaders were again arrested, and Kim Dae-jung even received a death sentence, which was later overturned under pressure from the United States. By introducing a new constitution, becoming president and forming a new parliament, where the Democratic Justice Party he created took the place of the ruling one, the leader of the military junta, Chung Doo-hwan, created a regime called the Fifth Republic.
The establishment of a new dictatorship led to the radicalization of the student movement, which turned to anti-government propaganda among workers, organizing riots in universities and seizing corporate offices and foreign missions [Choi, 1991]. Members of some student groups have even moved to demand unification with North Korea on the basis of the far-left that prevails there

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juche2 ideologies and self-immolations. Despite the crackdown on Minjoon nationalist movement activists and pro-democracy opposition leaders, the anti-dictatorial forces consolidated, forming the Anti-Dictatorship Movement in 1984. United People's Movement for Democracy and Unification of the Country-a coalition of 23 organizations representing banned trade unions, intellectuals, peasant groups, dissidents from Catholic and Protestant communities. The most prominent opposition politicians, Kim Dae-jung and Kim Yong-sam, led the New Democratic Party and won the support of 40% of voters in the 1985 parliamentary elections.In 1986, the National Alliance for Constitutional Reform, a coalition of five opposition organizations, was formed [Shorrok, 1986, p. 1206, 1210]. The Democracy Movement, which became more nationalistic and less intellectualistic in the 1980s, was supported by the middle classes, who during the years of Park Chung-hee and Chung Doo-hwan gained material independence and a relatively high level of education, and began to tire of a regime that demanded self-restraint, discipline, and loyalty in the name of state prosperity.

The rise of the student protest movement in June 1987 was supported by mass street marches and strikes. Under the dual pressure of the People's movement and the U.S. government, Chung Doo-hwan agreed to constitutional reform [Kim, 1998; Koo, 1999; Shin, 2000]. Direct presidential elections were restored, his term of office was reduced from 7 to 5 years, and multi-party membership was guaranteed. Thus, the Sixth Republic was created, and Roh Dae-woo 3 (a former general and associate of Chung Doo-hwan) was elected president in 1987. The new president began liberalizing political life, and in order to stabilize state institutions during the transition period, he authorized the creation of a new party in power - the Democratic Liberal Party, which united the pro-government Democratic Justice Party and the opposition New Democratic Party and the Democratic Unification Party of the Country, just founded by Kim Yong Sam (Steinberg and Shin, 2006). The resulting mega-party controlled two-thirds of the seats in Parliament and was able to maintain a moderate pace of expansion of civil liberties.

After the democratic breakthrough of the late 1980s, the trajectory of political change changed. Democratization during the 1990s was the result of a compromise between the old elite and the counter-elite, and therefore was gradual, moderate, and accompanied by the preservation of the political culture inherited from authoritarian regimes, which is characterized by temporary parties-neo-familial coalitions in support of charismatic leaders, corrupt ties of politicians with business groups, and the dominance of conservative media. The surge in civic engagement has led to a reduction in the number of political actors.

In the first year of liberalization, after the declaration on constitutional reform of June 29, 1987, civic activity was very high: immediately after the lifting of the ban on the creation of trade unions, 4 thousand organizations emerged [Koo, 1999]. 89% of voters participated in the 1987 presidential election, 76% in the 1988 parliamentary election. The 1990s are characterized by a decline in activity: turnout in the presidential elections was 82% (1992) and 81% (1997), in the parliamentary elections-72% (1992) and 65% (1996) [Kim, 2005, p. 199]. Former dissidents Kim Yong-sam (1993-1998) and Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003), who successively became presidents, sought to preserve traditional political institutions after the end of the military dictatorship: they continued the practice of creating parties as temporary election projects in the personal interests of politicians.-

2 Self-sufficiency, self-reliance.

3 Since the spelling of Korean names in Russian is not brought to a single standard, different variants of this name can be found in the literature, including Ro Tae Wu and No Taeu.

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They used the style of personal decision-making and the rhetoric of mobilizing the people to solve national problems (such as the promotion of the doctrines of globalization of the Korean economy and culture). Although Kim Yong himself authorized the arrest and conviction of former military dictatorship leaders Chung Doo-hwan and Roh Dae-woo in 1993, he later commuted their sentences and granted them amnesty.

In the noughties, there was a tendency to liberalize the conservative political culture and form a new political agenda, which included environmental issues, leveling the development of regions, searching for a new basis for national identity, cultural rights of minorities, etc.For example, the number of environmental organizations in South Korea doubled at the beginning of the new century. In 1997, there were 89 of them, and in 2001 - 175; the number of articles mentioning environmental movements in national newspapers increased almost twenty - fold: in 1990, there were 60, in 2000-more than 1 thousand. [Kern, 2010, p. 878-879]. This turn in the direction of public debates and movements is associated with the arrival of a new generation of political activists to the leadership positions, whose strength was shown in the election campaign of President Roh My Hyun 4 (2003-2008) and during the parliamentary elections in 2004, when about half of the seats were won by deputies under 50 years of age [Lie, Park, 2006, p. 60-61; Kern, 2010]. The Open Party that came to power, more commonly known as the partyUri, who sought to implement the anti-Elitist projects of her leader, Noh Myung-hyun, who initiated the repeal of the national security law introduced after the Korean War, as well as the investigation of the old establishment's ties with the Japanese colonial administration, limiting the influence of the three main conservative newspapers, democratizing private schools, moving the capital from Seoul, etc. This led to a culture war-like approach to the key issues of the South Korean political system, and provoked a campaign to impeach him, which did not lead to the removal of the president, but contributed to the activation and consolidation of the neoconservative opposition [Cha, 2005; Lie and Park, 2006].

The shift in political culture towards the values and practices of new generations is particularly noticeable in the contrast between the continuing decline in traditional political participation and the dramatic rise of new forms of political activism. 73% (2002) and 63% (2007) participated in the presidential elections, and about 60% (2000 and 2004) participated in the parliamentary elections (Kim, 2005, p.199; Han Yong - woo, 2010). At the same time, young activists are creating Internet-based networks, such as the Nosamo Young Liberals movement, named after a candidate in the 2002 election. Noh My Hyun [Lie, Park, 2006; Lee, Park, 2010], or the Creative Party of former entrepreneur Moon Kook Hyun, who came in fourth place in the 2007 presidential election. In the second half of the decade, the rhetoric of creativity and the use of new information and communication technologies were adopted by all major political parties, including the neoconservative Grand National Party, whose candidate Lee Myung-bak won the presidential election in 2007.

FIVE "CULTURAL REVOLUTIONS"

The overall transformation of South Korean society's culture has gone through phases and twists in sync with the economic and political shifts that have taken place over the past half-century.

In the 1960s, modernist cultural models were introduced into the traditionalist cultural environment, which was disintegrated by the Japanese colonial period.

4 In some sources, his name is written as Ro My Hyon.

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the regime and the Korean War. The doctrine of "modernization of the motherland" proclaimed by President Park Chung-hee was embodied in the sphere of culture in the form of planting Western-style substitutes for traditional rites and ceremonies, which were declared retarding attributes of backwardness. An important tool of the cultural policy of authoritarian modernization was the code of family rituals introduced by law in 1969, which regulated such key events in the life of Koreans as weddings, funerals, honoring ancestors, and celebrating the 60th anniversary [König, 2000, p.558-559]. Another component of the Westernization of South Korean culture at that time was the mass conversion to Protestantism, which the political and business elite treated favorably, perceiving the non-traditional religion for the country as a carrier of rational and progressive values, models, and institutions.

In the 1970s, a trend emerged in South Korean culture that interrupted the progressive movement of authoritarian modernization. There was a growing tension between the normative order supported by the modernist ideology of the state and neotraditionalism, which emerged from two sources: the everyday practices of most Koreans, which combined elements of urbanized work and everyday life with elements of Confucian ceremonies and shamanistic rituals, and the ideological constructs of the Minjun movement activists. Park Chung-hee's regime continued to cultivate the slogans of "progress and enlightenment", and in order to better implement the official ideology, compulsory "civic morality" classes were introduced in schools in 1972. At the same time, there was increasing pressure on those cultural models that were considered archaic and reactionary. For example, the Government carried out the "movement for a new village" campaign, which was modernizing in its orientation and repressive in its methods, during which adherents of traditional religious cults were arrested.

In response to the aggressive modernization policy pursued by the elite, opposition-minded intellectuals began to cultivate an appeal to traditional rituals, music, dance, theatrical performances, popular leaflets, etc.With the help of traditional genres of folk culture, one cross - cutting theme developed-the struggle of ordinary Koreans against injustice and foreign influences. This socio-cultural movement originated initially in the Jeolla region, which was systematically oppressed by the ruling elite, most of whom came from the Yeongnam region, where the lion's share of investment was directed. A sense of social disadvantage as a leitmotif of the new movement made it popular throughout the country, and this neotraditionalist and clearly opposed to the authoritarian regime movement was called "people's" (minjoon) [Shorrok, 1986, p.1207]. The leaders of the Minjoon movement, in contrast to the official vision of Korea as a country burdened with the historical burden of poverty and backwardness, undertook a reconstruction of Korean history as a continuous struggle of the people against oppression, the main milestones of which were the uprising of 1894., anti-Japanese demonstrations in 1919, movement against occupation in 1945-1946, movement against dictatorship in 1979-1980.

The Minjoon dissident movement has been under pressure from the authorities, but it has developed the images, symbols and rhetoric that have become the basis for modern South Korean cultural identity. In the 1980s, elements created by opposing forces - the modernizing elite and neotraditionalists - formed a relatively homogeneous national culture that combined economic nationalism with neo-Confucianism and neo-Familism. In the official description of the country's development, there was a turn from understanding culture in terms of the "old/new" juxtaposition to a new vision based on the "western/own"distinction. The concept of national culture as consisting of Western "hardware" and Confucian "software equipment" has become fashionable.-

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cookies" (software) [Koh, 1996]. On the basis of this new doctrine, a policy of preserving and promoting cultural heritage was actively implemented [Konig, 2000, p.560], which, in the perspective of the transition to post-industrialism, was perceived by the elite not as an obstacle to technological and economic development, but as its resource.

Neo-Confucianism, as an ethical doctrine that emphasizes the value of hierarchy, ritual, intellectual pursuits, and self-improvement only in the name of belonging to a community [Cha, 2000], did not help attract members of traditional communities in the initial period of industrialization and quickly turn them into effective workers for the newly created factories. However, the same neo-Confucian principles were in full compliance with the rules of interaction in the offices of large corporations and government agencies, in the classrooms of schools and universities. Therefore, in the general process of institutionalization of various religions in South Korea, which was characteristic of the 1980s, when many religious organizations with various social functions emerged, the creation of neo-Confucian academies received official state support. Neofamilism as a practice of selecting employees and their career advancement based on kinship, friendship, and community ties [Lew and Chang, 1998; Na, 2007] avoided forming social groups and social mobility according to the norms typical of mass societies of the industrial period of development. However, neofamilism has become constructive with the transition from mass organizations to network structures of post-industrial society, as it contributes to the creation and maintenance of social networks.

A key role in the formation of South Korean national and cultural identity was played by the largest international event for the country - the Olympic Games in Seoul (1988), in preparation for which huge material and human resources were directed to the creation and reconstruction of many cultural objects, where the presentation of South Korean culture unfolded.

In the 1990s, in South Korea, the idea of consolidating national culture was replaced by a postmodern culture with its characteristic consumption, cosmopolitanism and eclecticism. The value orientations that dominated the mass consciousness in the previous decades: economic well-being and public safety, began to give way in the value hierarchy to post-materialism, focused on human rights, self-expression, and environmental conservation [Kern, 2010]. The removal of restrictions on consumer imports led to an increase in the Americanization of the South Korean mass culture market, and after the removal of half a century of ideologically motivated restrictions on the import of Japanese books, magazines, films, television series, etc., Japanization also emerged. A number of experts interpreted the dominance of foreign designs and images in South Korean mass culture and the willingness of most consumers to submit to the dictates of fashion in a postmodern way as the development of new tools for practices that retain their neo-Confucian spirit [Kim, 2003].

Another example of the paradoxical mixing of ultramodern and traditional in South Korean culture is the simultaneous mass departure of urban residents to the countryside during the holidays. Urbanization has occurred rapidly in just two generations. The share of the urban population reached 50% in 1976, reached 75% ten years later, and reached 85% by the mid-1990s. At this rate of population movement to the cities, South Korean citizens mostly remained villagers by many habits, their attachment to rural roots is manifested in ritual trips to their homeland to the graves of their ancestors [Cha, 2000, p.476-477].

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, a new turn in the transformation of South Korean culture took place: from a recipient culture that maintained a balance between modernization and traditionalism, it turns into a culture of generating global flows (material and symbolic) and networks. For a new generation of Koreans

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a high standard of living and a strong national identity are taken for granted, and advancement as a new value orientation is on the agenda. In work, this orientation leads to the fact that the culture of individual achievements and career has replaced the culture of loyalty and lifelong hiring. In consumption, the focus on advancement is manifested in a craze for prestigious global brands and changing the image through intensive cosmetic procedures, in gadgetomania-obsession with mobile devices. Lifestyle-from shopping to watching TV news and communicating with loved ones, to participating in virtual communities and cultivating computer games-has become its meaning. However, the most striking expression of the new state of culture and value orientation towards advancement was the so - called "Korean wave" (Hanryu)-the global distribution of films, television series, pop music, animation, computer games, and youth fashion samples created in South Korea (Lie and Park, 2006).

FIVE" REINCARNATIONS " OF THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE

South Korea's social structure has gone through five phases of transformation over the past half-century, as well as its economy, politics, and culture.

In the 1960s, the main trend was the collapse of the traditional agrarian society, when as a result of intensive industrialization and urbanization, the primary sector (agriculture, fishing, etc.) lost its dominant position in the employment structure, and the extended family was replaced by the nuclear one. If in 1960 79.5% of workers were employed in the primary sector of the economy, and only 5.4% in the secondary sector (mining and manufacturing), then in 1970, respectively, 50.4% and 14.3%. In traditional society, the extended family, which served as an economic unit, was both a group of relatives and a labor collective. Therefore, as early as the late 1950s, 30.9% of the labor force was made up of unpaid workers-younger members of such traditional families, while the share of employees was only 21.6%. In 1970, the share of unpaid family workers and employees was already 26.2% and 30%, respectively (Hong, 2003, p. 41). A key role in the transformation of the social structure at that time was played by the migration of a huge number of young men and women from villages to cities, where they worked in textile and shoe factories and, in isolation from their parents ' families, created nuclear families in an urban environment.

In the 1970s, the main trend was a sharp social stratification in the context of the formation of an industrial society and a stratification pyramid was formed, in which 70-75% of the population were in the lower layer [Han Yong-woo, 2010, p.548; Hong, 2003, p. 45]. The poor, who made up the overwhelming majority of South Korean society at that time, were rural residents, whose products were actually expropriated due to low prices, and low-paid workers in urbanized industrial zones, who put up with difficult working and living conditions. In the 1970s, from 20 to 30% of the urban population consisted of migrants from villages who settled in makeshift shacks on the outskirts of Seoul and other industrial centers, where huge blocks of squalid housing without basic amenities were created [Na, 2004, p. 142].

The weakening and even destruction of many of the social ties characteristic of traditional society in such a short time was compensated by the development of neofamilism relations, which restructured the "imported" organizational structures into specific Korean forms of maintaining social solidarity and social mobility. The network structure of social mobility, which was carried out on the basis of kinship, community ties, acquaintances at school, university or military service, has become a distinctive feature of the catching-up modernism.-

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lectures in Korean [Na, 2007]. The role of neofamilist relations in structuring South Korean society can be judged from the following data: 21% of the top management positions in chaebols were held by relatives of the owners, 11 of the 25 largest corporations were owned by people from Yeongnam Province, and 33% of the top managers in these 25 companies were from the same region (Shin and Chin, 1989).

In the 1980s, South Korean society was transformed into an urbanized and stratified society, where a relatively large middle class was formed and civil associations (professional, cultural, religious, etc.) emerged.The size of the middle class at that time can be estimated at approximately 35-40% of the population. The growth of the middle class was mainly due to an increase in the number of small business owners and qualified white-collar professionals (managers and professionals) in cities. While in 1970 skilled white-collar workers and small business owners accounted for a combined 13% (6%+7%) of the labor force, in 1985 they were already employed in the United States. 23% (11%+12%) [ Koo, 1991, p. 485, 488]. If we add to the number of professionals and managers low-skilled "white-collar" office workers, whose wages, working conditions and living conditions significantly rose above the poverty line at that time, then this component of the labor force amounted to about 16-18% in the mid-1980s [Koo, 1991; Hong, 2003]. The core of the middle class that emerged in the conditions of a developed industrial society was formed by white-collar workers Chebolov [Na, 2007], where most of the jobs were created at the appropriate level, personnel were selected and career advancement was carried out in the spirit of neo-familism, and a standard lifestyle of corporate employees was cultivated.

In the 1990s, the stratification system shifted from pyramid-shaped to bell-shaped with a dominant middle layer, the majority of which no longer belonged to the "old middle class", i.e. entrepreneurs, but to the "new class" - professionals and managers. With the transition to a post-industrial type of development in South Korea, for the first time in half a century, the share of people employed in industry decreased rather than increased, from 27.6% of those employed in the economy in 1990 to 20.6% in 2000 [Hong, 2003, p.41]. At the same time, after the weakening of the authoritarian state's control over the economy, there was a sharp rise in wages. In 1988, wages increased for blue-collar workers (manual laborers) by 22.6%, for white-collar workers by 11.9%, and in 1989, wages increased by 18.8% and 15%, respectively.3% [Koo, 1991, p. 497]. Higher wages and better working conditions led to a decrease in the activity of the labor movement: in the early 1990s, trade union membership fell by half [Koo, 2001, p. 159]. Relatively high-paid employees with low qualifications have reached the standard of living typical of the middle class. In total, the middle strata made up about 50% of the population, and the new middle stratum formed by families of managers and professionals - 25% [Hong, 2003; Chung, 2005].

The rise in living standards for most of the decade has not been accompanied by an adequate improvement in the quality of life. The stratification of South Korean society in terms of living conditions was manifested in the growing housing problem. Despite the mass construction program launched during the reign of Jung Doo-hwan (since 1983), by 2000 23% of households continued to live in cramped conditions and without the necessary comfort, there were still settlements of thousands of "vinyl huts" of laborers on the outskirts of industrial centers [Na, 2004, p.141-142].

After the Asian financial crisis of 1997, there was a shift towards greater flexibility in the employment structure, which in the 2000s led to greater social polarization: the growth of the upper segment of the middle stratum, the" falling out " of the middle stratum of the mass of people whose incomes were reduced due to lower wages, the transition to part-time employment, the devaluation of the national currency; the layer that was updated during

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account for the influx of foreign workers. The system of lifelong employment, which was formed during the period of authoritarian modernization, was weakened as a result of neoliberal economic reforms dictated by the International Monetary Fund. If in 1995 58% of employees worked in full-time employment, then in 2000 it was already 48% [Lee, Lee, 2003, p. 511; Kim, Park, 2006, p. 443]. The income gap between the wealthiest 20% of the population and the poorest 20% has grown from 4 to 5 times [Kim and Park, 2006]. When the main mass of the middle layer was" blurred " and for the first time since the 1970s, a huge number of people who had permanent jobs but were below the poverty line appeared, a supernova of the middle layer grew from 2% in the early 1990s to 5% in the zero years (Hong, 2003, p. 45).managers and highly paid specialists from post-industrial segments of the economy.

An important factor in the transformation of the social structure in the 2000s was the demographic transition: the birth rate fell, the population began to age, and a large number of women of fertile age shifted their life strategies from marriage and childbirth to education and professional careers [Lie and Park, 2006; Han Yong-woo, 2010]. Demographic shifts in the transition to a post-industrial society began to affect the change in the tender structure of employment. In the 2000s, there was a defeminization of industrial production, where 30-40 years ago the exploitation of cheap female labor was the main source of profit, and the feminization of office work began, which led to the fact that more than half of South Korean clerks are women [Hong, 2003, p.43-44]. Demographic transition and the movement of workers to positions in post-industrial segments of the economy create a shortage of labor in the remaining industrial industries, which is compensated by the influx of migrants who are intensively exploited, discriminated against, but gradually integrated into the system of the host society.

TIGER'S PATH FROM CATCH-UP MODERNIZATION TO VIRTUALIZATION AND GLAM CAPITALISM

The analysis of the trajectories of changes in the economy, politics, culture, and social structure allows us to see that classical modernization theories are applicable only to the period of rapid economic recovery, the so-called "take-off" (Rostow, 1960), which occurred in the 1960s. When interpreting the social changes that occurred in the 1970s and 1980s, when the industrial market economy and political democracy were combined with neo-familism and neo-Confucianism, the concept of multiple models of modernization is relevant, which makes it possible to distinguish a specifically South Korean type of modern society. The processes of change characteristic of the turn of the XX-XXI centuries no longer fit into the framework of various, but still national models of development. When many transnational models of an open, pluralistic, networked society have been adopted by South Korea from outside, and at the same time many such models have been created in South Korea and adopted by other countries, the concept of globalization makes it possible to build a more convincing model of change.

However, some of the trends in the identified changes in the economy, politics, culture, and social structure in the last phases are more correctly explained not by the fact that national structures and interactions are replaced by transnational ones, or local ones by global ones, but by the fact that real structures and actions are replaced by virtual ones.

Virtualization of social institutions occurs when the creation of images and maintenance of electronic communications become more important than material production and face-to-face interactions [Ivanov, 2000]. Intensive product sales

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and financial flows form post-industrial markets, where not real things are traded, but images — images and brands. Virtualization of goods, organizational structures, and financial transactions is becoming a rational strategy for market competitors. In this context, virtual reality serves as a model for the new economy of brands, networked enterprises, financial derivatives, and consumer loans. The economic shift from the industrial "Korean miracle" to the post-industrial "Korean wave" clearly confirms this process.

When competition becomes particularly high in markets that are saturated with brands and images and in public arenas, virtualization moves into the development phase of glam capitalism [Ivanov, 2007]. It is replaced by the logic of glamour, which now sets strategies and technologies for creating competitive advantages. Since the 1930s, glamour has been a very specific lifestyle, since the 1970s an aesthetic form (glam rock), but now glamour has become the rationality of a supernova economy. Glam capitalism occurs when manufacturers in a super-competitive market must charm (in English to glamour) consumers and when goods and services must be aggressively beautiful in order to intensively attract target audiences. The value creation process is now more about trends than brands, not only in the fashion and showbiz industries, but also in high-tech industries and the financial sector.

Glam-intensive products provide higher-than-average growth rates in the luxury, hospitality, fashion, beauty, and other industries.The logic of glam capitalism is clearly evident in these transindustries, each of which combines enterprises that are very different in products and technologies, but the same in terms of value creation methods. For example, the production of a car, a phone, and a leather bag all end up in the same transindustry if they are glamour - intensive products from Porsche, Vertu, and Louis Vuitton. Companies in an effort to create trends and become a trend form the structures of the glamorous industrial complex (GIC), connecting manufacturers, designers working in the fashion industry, and consumers-trendoids. GPC "blurs" the usual boundaries between brands and creates trans-branded products. GPC "blurs" the line between the firm and its market and exploits not employees, but creative consumers.

The logic of glam capitalism in South Korean society began to gain strength in the mid-1990s, when the "unprecedented social significance" of external beauty noted by experts began to seriously determine the direction of consumerism development, strategies for forming media images, and consumer strategies for following fashion [Nelson, 2000; Kim, 2003, p. 104]. The rhetoric of glamour, which includes the motives of luxury, eroticism, exoticism, brightness, showiness, and creativity, is actively used by South Korean advertising to promote products as objects of desire, whether it is traditional soju vodka as an accessory for advanced youth or shopping centers as tourist places with "magic charm". The entertainment, fashion, and hospitality industries became central to the cultural and economic expansion that became known as the"Korean wave."

Having made design and creativity of management decisions their priorities, the largest South Korean companies are actively creating GPC to promote such trans-brand products as Samsung-Armani communicators, LG-Prada or Hyundai-Prada car. South Koreans themselves note that in their country, the propensity for brightness and showiness in consumption, for following media images and for creating trends is more noticeable than in Western Europe and North America.5 These examples are enough to prove the effectiveness of the logic of glamour in the South Korean economy and culture of the early twenty-first century. In politics, the logic of glamour is represented by a new generation of politicians and activists who have made creative organizational design and ICT the basis of political strategies. In the social structure, the main effects of the growth of glam capitalism are the "erosion" of the traditional

5 This conclusion is based on the author's personal observations and conversations with participants of the Russian-Korean seminar held on November 24, 2011 at the Hankuk University of Foreign Languages in Seoul.

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It also increases the share and social influence of entrepreneurs and professionals whose income, lifestyle and prestige are associated with the creation of virtual productions and glamorous products.

A review of the trends of social change in South Korea over the past half-century leads to the conclusion that it is necessary to clearly see the sharp changes in trajectories and contrasts between different phases of transformation of the structures of South Korean society. Today, Russia cannot benefit from the experience of the "Korean miracle" of the 1960s and 1980s, since the main resources of catch-up modernization 6 were exhausted by the Soviet Union by the end of the 1950s. The current experience of South Korea shows that new development trajectories should be discussed not in terms of historical industrialization, and not in terms of the concept of modernization corresponding to this phase of development, but taking into account the context of globalization and virtualization using appropriate theoretical models.

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