The article consists of two parts. In the first one, using a number of arguments and facts, it is emphasized that although modeling, as an important area of economic research, is developing very intensively, forecasting the world economy is at best still more an art than a science, since in the modern Economy, which is based more on equilibrium rather than non-equilibrium systems, crises and crises are poorly identified. bifurcations. Nevertheless, the author in his medium-term forecast, based on a model that uses a number of stable-inertial characteristics, made an attempt to forecast the growth of the economies of the East, West and Russia for the next decade. The second part of the article provides a critical analysis of an interesting and at the same time provocative book by two Russian Orientalists, which for the first time in the Russian scientific literature on eight major modern civilizations provides scenario options for the development of the world community for the entire XXI century; a number of demographic and resource characteristics are predicted on the basis of model developments; the experience of effective reforms as a means of ensuring accelerated modernization is analyzed.

Keywords: modeling, forecasting, bifurcation, disequilibrium, medium-term forecast, East, West, Russia, scenario variants, model developments, accelerated modernization.

The monograph published in 2012 by two well-known Russian Orientalists, A.V. Akimov and A. I. Yakovlev, is a rather original and bold experience of a comprehensive interdisciplinary comparative predictive study of the development of the main eight modern civilizations of the world during the XXI century. In many respects, the study complements the recent forecast developments of Russian scientists [Strategic Global..., 2011; Sadovnichy, Akaev, Korotaev, Malkov, 2012].

Predicting the future is a rather ungrateful thing, and even more so for the distant future, since it is not easy to make the reader believe that the authors of the forecast have convincing, well-tested methods for recognizing prospects and can foresee different scenarios, bifurcations, the number and scale of which are even greater the further we move away from the present.

I would first like to focus on my own assessments of the problems and prospects of economic development in the East and West, the possibilities of modeling and forecasting them. Despite many economic and socio-cultural achievements over the past two centuries since the beginning of modern economic growth, the tension in the economy remains high.

page 5
it remains significant in the world. There is an accumulation of instability and excessive conflict caused to a large extent by the aggravation of a number of economic, social, environmental and other problems. According to experts, by 2050, famine and drought will move 200 million migrants, which is an order of magnitude more than the total number of refugees in 2010. It is estimated that the number of nuclear Powers could double by about this time. There is no point in justifying the danger of nuclear proliferation. I will only note that, answering the question previously asked by the great physicist E. Fermi, why people still, as far as we know, have not met any extraterrestrial civilization, the American scientists I. Shklovsky and K. Back in 1967, Sagan was given a mathematical answer: no nuclear civilization can survive for more than 100 years - the societies that make up it are mutually destroyed. Thus, they made an assumption, I hope very approximate, about a possible (under unfavorable circumstances) "singularity point" for the Earth-2045 (see: [Morris, 2011, p. 601, 607, 613-614; World Development Indicators, 2012, p. 384]).

The fact that a world connected by capital and trade has a bright future was discussed by many exactly one hundred years ago, on the eve of the great world catastrophe — the First World War (Morris, 2011, p.607). Meanwhile, the percentage of people who died on our planet as a result of various conflicts and social violence, which doubled in the XIX century compared to the level of the XVI-XVIII centuries, increased two to three times in the last century compared to the year before (calculated from: [Davydov, 2007, p. 34; Onwards and Upwards, 2009]). Although a number of supranational institutions were created after the Second World War, the world needs much more sophisticated global regulators that work on a multilateral basis, have greater international weight and are able to ensure the full implementation of international contracts (see: [Russia in a semi-centric world, 2011, p. 56, 65; Attali, 2011]). This is very important, because after the beginning of deregulation of the global economy in the mid-1970s, the intensity of financial and economic crises in the world, depending on the method of calculation, increased 4-6 times compared to the first post-war decades (see [Stiglitz, 2011, p.269; Rodrik, 2011, p. 109]). Global markets, no matter what ultra-liberal economists say about their ability to adequately absorb information and have an optimizing effect on the economy (the efficient market hypothesis of E. Fama), in reality have a low efficiency, because markets respond mainly to short-term profits. As for the theory of equilibrium, it is, according to many well-known economists, based on weak foundations.

The Nobel Prize-winning Chicago economist R. Lucas, who in 2003 declared that "macroeconomics has succeeded: its central problem of preventing depression has been solved", in 2009, answering Elizabeth II's question about the viability of this science, admitted that economic theory cannot adequately predict crises [Kau, 2011; Rodrik, 2011, p. 157; Caballero, 2010, p. 85, 101]. As X pointed out. Davies (Director of the London School of Economics in 2003-2011), "price movements that models predict should occur once in millions of years have been observed several times a week over the past five years" (Davies, 2012).

Economists who want to make their models as elegant as mathematics itself are often known to make unrealistic assumptions, such as about rational players who have (almost) complete information and operate in practically efficient markets. As the well-known American stock analyst N. Taleb points out, economists should pay more attention to non-equilibrium processes rather than equilibrium ones, since extreme events occur more often. By the way, according to available calculations, over the past 50 years, half of the profits on the world stock markets have been received in 10 days [Balatsky, 2010, p. 90; Coy, 2009; What Went Wrong..., 2009] (see graphs 1, 2).

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Schedule 1

Dynamics of the S&P composite index, 1941-43=10

The chart is based on data from: Economic Report of the President. Washington, D.C., 2012, p. 428-429; Markets Overview (http://www.bloombcrg.com/markets), accessed 11.15.2012.

Schedule 2

Annual stock market volatility ratio, according to S&PCI, %

Calculated from Graph 1.

Meanwhile, the volatility of stock markets, judging by the annual change in the S&P composite index, has increased many times in recent decades (in 1980-2012, compared with 1950-1979, four times, in 2001-2012, compared with 1950-1990, 13 times).

Since it is "shortsighted to look too far ahead" in many components of world development, except perhaps demographic development (here I agree with W. Churchill), I myself have limited my work to a medium-term forecast. The calculation based on the forecast was made and tested according to the data of major countries of the world for the 2000s using very important and, which is no less valuable in the forecast, stable-inertial characteristics-

page 7
growth statistics - the initial level of per capita income (which is generally known) and the estimated average rate of investment over the period. Taking into account the initial state of the economies, including the developed countries (WGS) (a high level of debt and at the same time the imperative need to update the production apparatus to overcome the trend of depressive-slow growth), as well as the estimates of its expected change published in international and country development strategies, we can get the necessary idea with some more confidence, than for a number of other determinants of growth.

Z = 2.7 - 0.13Yo + 0.19М, adj. R-squared = 0.79, (0.01) (0.04), where Z is the average annual GDP growth rate ( % ), and Yo is the per capita GDP in PPP in US dollars. at the beginning of the period; M - the average rate of capital investment, 2005, PPP 2005,%. Calculated based on international statistics, the most important of which were: [National Accounts...; New Purchasing Power..., 2008, p. 8-10]. The coefficient of determination is quite high, and the main parameters are statistically significant at the level of less than 5%.

Using this simple model, calculated three years ago [Melyantsev, 2010, pp. 164-166], we can assume, as a first approximation, that over the next decade the average annual growth rate of the global product (without adjusting for its quality) will be 3-4%, i.e., it will be lower than in the 2000s. 1 But taking into account the growing influence of developing countries (PC), it is likely to be higher than in the 1980s and 1990s (including in the WG - a maximum of 2-2. 5%, and in the PC, including the so-called transition economies-no more than 5-6%). As a result, during 2009-2020, a certain castling will occur: the share of RGS in global GDP will decrease from 52-53% to 42-43%, PCs (and transition economies, excluding the Russian Federation) will increase from 44-45% to 54-55%, and the share of the Russian Federation will remain at the level of 3%.

It seems that progress in the modern world, which is rapidly shrinking due to the increased power of communications and the intensity of socio-cultural interactions, will largely depend on whether it can move from the previous paradigm of development, which has been operating for thousands of years, based mainly on greed, fear, and irresponsible self-confidence, 2 to a more stable one, let's call it the its competitive-contract model, where the social connectedness and cohesion of people (the so-called social cohesion)3, without suppressing the individual's creativity, as often happened in traditional and totalitarian societies, will, I would like to believe, play an increasingly important role.

* * *

In the book by A.V. Akimov and A. I. Yakovlev, the forecast horizon covers the entire XXI century. True, this is three times narrower than in A.V. Akimov's book published in 2008, where the forecast is given until 2300 [Akimov, 2008], but it is much broader than in most foreign forecasts published recently, which, as a rule, cover a horizon of no more than 20-50 years.

The specific approach to forecasting of A. V. Akimov and A. I. Yakovlev consists in a combination of quantitative resource-demographic and qualitative multiscenes.-

1 As K. Rogoff (a Harvard professor and author of serious research on the history and current state of global finance) recently remarked in an interview, when speaking about the prospects for the global economy: "It's gonna be worse before it gets better."

2 From our point of view, a purely anthropocentric approach to the global evolution of mankind is methodologically incorrect. As many scientists, including L. L. Chizhevsky, have shown, natural, climatic, and cosmic effects play a significant role, and at certain stages of development - a key role [Chizhevsky, 1995].

3 American historian and anthropologist Ya. Morris noted that "change is caused by lazy, greedy, terrifying people looking for easier, more profitable and safer ways of doing things" [Why the West Rules..., 2010, p .92].

page 8
The aim of the study is to analyze long-term perspective trends in the development of the most important civilizations of the world with an assessment of the prospects and problems of reforming and modernizing their economic and socio-political systems based on existing experience.

Speaking about the positive aspects of the work of A.V. Akimov and A. I. Yakovlev, I will first focus on the most successful section, in my opinion. Following the established tradition of making scenario forecasts of world development (see: [Russia and the world in 2020, 2005; The World after the Crisis..., 2011; Shapiro, 2009; Friedman, 2010; Friedman, 2011; Asia 2050..., 2011; The World Bank and PRC, 2012; Global Trends 2030..., 2012 et al.]), the authors developed one of the most impressive packages of world scenarios for the current century - 31 for the 8 main modern civilizations they identified.

The positive aspects of the author's approach are also associated with points that seem controversial. This is primarily a civilizational approach. Dividing countries into eight civilizations (European, Orthodox, Chinese, Japanese, Indian, Islamic, African, and Latin American [Akimov and Yakovlev, 2012, p. 24-25]) is quite risky for the entire current century (which was already marked by very turbulent events in the first decade). In the Russian Federation ("Orthodox civilization"), the share of Muslims (10-15%) is comparable to the share of church-bound Orthodox (15-20%), and the number of the former is growing at a faster pace. Europe, if some parameters of the current population dynamics are preserved, may, as noted in a number of publications, turn into "Eurabia" before the end of the century, and the United States - "Latin Americanization". Islamization of the African continent is gaining momentum. By 2010, the proportion of Muslims in sub-Saharan Africa was slightly less than a quarter, and over a third in the continent as a whole (see [The World Factbook, 2012; Belokrenitsky, 2010]).

The scenarios proposed by the authors are summarized in four macro scenarios: "Convergence of Civilizations", "The West retains leadership"," Leadership moves to the East and South", and" Struggle for Resources " (Akimov and Yakovlev, 2012, p.153). Thus, a very wide range of possible options for the development of the world and its constituent civilizations in the current century is presented.

One of the most intriguing, in my opinion, is the third macro scenario "Leadership moves to the East and South", which includes the following scenarios as components: "Western Man - an endangered species", "Europe - a Russian village", "Extinction and Disintegration" for the Orthodox civilization, " Japan - China's junior partner"Evil Neighbors", "Souring of Japan", "China's struggle for world leadership", "Successful catch-up development of India and the struggle for world leadership", "New Islamic industrial countries" for Turkey, Malaysia, Iran, Indonesia, "Catching up development of Africa and partnership with Latin American civilization", "Catching up with the development of Africa with a multi-vector orientation", "Catching up with the development of Latin America and the struggle for influence on African civilization".

The optimistic scenario of "Convergence of Civilizations", which is well described by the authors, seems quite likely [Akimov and Yakovlev, 2012, pp. 119-121, 148-151]. An important factor in this process can be considered the fact that foreign trade between civilizations is growing at a faster pace. According to British economists, in recent decades, the average annual growth rate of foreign trade between developed and developing countries (10.8%) has been more than doubled, and between developing countries, which represent the majority of civilizations, almost four times (17.6%) more than between developed countries (4.5%) [World in 2050, 2013, p. 231].

The considered optimistic scenario, if you think about it, can work, despite the existing and incoming threats and risks, if the most important social and economic actors of the analyzed civilizations (elites, active population, state) and, possibly, TNCs see this as a benefit for themselves, will make intensive efforts for this perspective, realizing that the most important social and economic actors of the analyzed civilizations (elites,active population, state) that, firstly, many peoples have a lot in common in their system of values (the authors have well justified this, based on the works of

page 9
Schedule 3

Dynamics of the human development index in developed countries (RG), developing countries (PC) and the world as a whole (RG in 2010 =100)

Calculated from: [Melyantsev, 1996, p. 61, 145; Melyantsev, 2004, p. 36-37; Melyantsev, 2009, p. 206; World Development Indicators, 2012, p. 22, 86-88, 130, 214-216].

American psychologist M. Seligman [Akimov, Yakovlev, 2012, p. 119]). Secondly, in the two-thirds of the century that has passed since the Second World War, most of the civilizations considered by the authors have become significantly closer in a number of important economic and socio-cultural characteristics of development. In particular, according to our calculations, the relative gap between developed and developing countries (RG and PC, respectively) according to the Human Development Index (HDI), which has been growing for a long time and reached a four-fold value in 1950, decreased in 1980 to a three-fold value and by 2010 to a 2.5-fold size 4.

The Human Development Index (HDI) is calculated as the geometric mean of relative indicators of per capita GDP (in PPP 2010), the average life expectancy from birth, and the level of education of the adult population (for 1000-1800 years estimated by literacy, for 1800-2010 - by the average number of years of study). HDI for groups of countries and the world as a whole is weighted by population size.

At the same time, speaking about the correlation between the power and potentials of civilizations and the problems of their interaction, it should be borne in mind that the absolute gap between RG and PC grew more than threefold in terms of GDP per capita in 1950-1980, 1.6-1.7 times in 1980-2012, and one and a half times in terms of HDI, respectively and in 1980-2010 - 1.2 times.

The dynamic schemes of transitions from one scenario to another proposed by the authors provide considerable food for thought [Akimov and Yakovlev, 2012, p. 4]. 132-133, 135, 137, 140, 145, 147]. Of course, they can't represent all possible combinations of transition patterns. But they can encourage the reader to calculate more or less acceptable scenarios (taking into account the risks, losses and gains for different subjects and objects in the "big chess game").

Unfortunately, the book by A.V. Akimov and A. I. Yakovlev does not link the proposed scenarios to more or less certain periods from the hundred-year forecast horizon. It turns out that we have, as it were, a removed total, a cumulant that is very remote

4 In terms of per capita GDP, the relative gap between developed and developing countries initially increased from 6.3 to 8.4 times in 1950-1980, then dropped to 5.5-5.6 in 2012, i.e. reached a lower value than in 1950 (calculated from Graph 4).

page 10
Schedule 4

Dynamics of the absolute gap in GDP per capita (in US dollars, PPP 2010) between developed countries (WG) and developing countries (PC)

Note. Data for 2012 is preliminary.

Calculated from sources to the graph. 3, as well as from: [The IMF..., 2012, p. 190, 194].

from the present. In this regard, the remark of Morgan Stanley expert Ruchir Sharma that "the strong point of current economic forecasting is to predict such a distant future that no one can call you to account" seems very accurate [Sharma, 2013].

The book also does not provide even a rough estimate of (a) the likelihood of the development options considered, and (b) the impact of the determinants taken into account.5 This reproach can be made not only to the authors of this book, but also to a number of authors of foreign publications devoted to scenario research of the future (but not to all of the authors I know). However, if the authors of this book continue to work on the project, conduct intensive surveys of experts, and organize a series of substantive discussions, it will be possible to develop even approximate, but more reasonable and, perhaps, mutually conditioned estimates of the vectors and driving forces of the future for civilizations, echeloned in time.

The monograph thoroughly analyzes a number of important, but, we emphasize, traditional resource factors for the future growth of civilizations (demography, land, irrigation, fertilizers, energy). For a number of them, the forecast estimates given for the entire XXI century, in invariants, generally seem reasonable. We are talking, for example, about a significant advance of the Indian, Islamic and African civilizations of other civilizations in terms of population by 2100 [Akimov and Yakovlev, 2012, p. 63, 65].

These estimates, in contrast to a number of recently published predictive studies, which do not always disclose the methods of obtaining their data, are based on methods justified by the authors (see: [Akimov and Yakovlev, 2012, chapter 2, appendix]). However, these methods are somewhat controversial in nature.

5 These estimates are made by experts in a number of reputable studies. (See: [Global Risks..., 2013, p. 171].

6 The text is most likely a typo: instead of 2100, 2010 appears twice [Akimov and Yakovlev, 2012, pp. 63, 65].

page 11
But are there any perfect tools for effective forecasting?7. Methods of population forecasting, as far as I understood, did not adequately include the repeated statistical and mathematical procedure of "playing with the past" to identify the so-called coefficient drift. Forecast estimates for resources are largely obtained by extrapolation using standard constants of specific resource consumption that developed at the beginning of this century. But is such a procedure fair for a future in which, as one of the wise ones said, it is quite possible that "the only one constant is change"?

The resources in question undoubtedly play and will continue to play an important role in the development of civilizations. But they still have a decisive impact mainly at the stage of pre-industrial and at the initial stages of modern economic growth, when material production occupies a dominant position in the gross product.

GDP, as the authors rightly point out (and not only they), is not the best indicator. But, having abandoned it [Akimov and Yakovlev, 2012, p. 10], they did not offer anything better in return as a forecasting tool (object), in fact, in their research they limited themselves to analyzing a part of the material-material product (which is even less than that of Lyndon Larouche, who developed the concept of a physical product for a long time).

Meanwhile, the world economy has recently been rapidly "dematerializing" (see Table 1). 1), and it is very likely that this process will continue in the current century.

Table 1

Dynamics of employment patterns in developed countries, developing countries, and the world as a whole, %

Sector

1500 g.

1800

1950

1980

2010

Developed countries 1

Agricultural industry

80

66

24.9

8.5

3.7

Industry and construction

10

17

34.8

36

22.4

Service sector

10

17

40.3

55.5

73.9

Developing countries 2

Agricultural industry

80

77

71

62

39.5

Industry and construction

10

10

12.6

18

22.1

Service sector

10

13

16.4

20

38.4

In the whole world

Agricultural industry

80

75

59.8

51.5

34

Industry and construction

10

11

18

21.5

22.1

Service sector

10

14

22.2

27

43.9

Share of global employment

Developed countries

20

17

24.3

19.6

15.3

Developing countries

80

83

75.7

80.4

84.7

Note 1. Western countries and Japan. 2. Countries in the East (excluding Japan) and the South, as well as countries with economies in transition.

Compiled and calculated by: [Bairoch, 1997, t. 1, p. 597; t. 2, p. 189; t. 3, p. 740; Maddison, 1998, p. 69; Global Employment Trends, 2012, p. 98-99; World Development Indicators, 1998, p. 52, 60; Mirovaya ekonomika: global'nye tendentsii, 2003, pp. 529-538; Msliantssv, 1996, pp. 110, 161].

7 Nevertheless, the forecasts of some influential organizations are estimated (with unclear use of a number of constants and not fully justified assumptions) (see: [PwC. World in 2050, p. 18-20; World in 2050, 2013, p. 237; Looking to 2060..., 2012, p. 8-9, 20]).

page 12
The share of the tertiary sector in employment increased globally from 22-23% in 1950 to 27% in 1980 and 43-44% in 2010, including in poor and middle-income countries-from 16-17% to 20% and 38-39%, and in GDP-from 50-52% in 1950, respectively to 54-55% in 1980 and 72% in 2010, and from 34-36% to 39-40 and 54-55%. Based on the data presented, the average annual growth rate of the service structure of employment and production in the global economy increased 2.5-4 times in 1980-2010 compared to the first post-war decades. At the same time, the contribution of the tertiary sector to the growth of the global gross product in 1980-2010 exceeded two-thirds (compiled and calculated from: [World Development Indicators, 1998, p. 178-182; 2012, p. 216-220; Melyantsev, 2013, p. 15-17]).

The resource factors discussed in this paper are just some of the most important ones. There is no question about the role (assessment of the contribution) of such significant resources as human, real and financial capital, information, knowledge to the future world development (see: [World Economy and International Relations, 2012, section II]), and finally, trust in society (and a number of others). At the same time, we note that, according to available data, the volume of information and knowledge in the world has been growing in recent decades at a rate that is an order of magnitude higher than that of fixed capital [World in 2050, 2013, p.315].

Although non-Western civilizations have already almost overtaken Western countries in terms of GDP (in PPP terms), in 2010 Japan and the United States were 2.6 and 3.2 times higher than India and China in terms of national wealth, respectively, while having a qualitatively different, post-industrial structure (see Graph 5). It is noteworthy that the volume of human (intellectual) capital of the United States, which is being increased not only by the efforts of Americans, but also due to the impressive immigration of minds, exceeds the total volume of national wealth (in all three elements) of Japan, China, India and Russia. In the latter, unfortunately, the share of intellectual capital is, firstly, less than in other countries of the "five", and, secondly, due to the raw material nature of the economy and the chosen development strategy, it does not tend to grow, which limits the possibility of its effective integration into the advanced echelons of the world economy of the XXI century.

Although institutions and economic growth may (in the long run) be mutually causal, a number of Russian and foreign studies have shown that strong institutions are a key factor in explaining the successes and failures of nations and civilizations [Rodrik, 2007; Ferguson, 2011; Morris, 2011; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012; Strategy for Modernizing the Russian Economy, 2010; Popov, 2011]. If more than half of the population in the Scandinavian countries had confidence in public institutions in 2012 (which largely reduced transaction costs), only a third in the EU-27 as a whole, then in the Russian Federation, unfortunately, only a quarter of its residents [The Secret of Their Success, 2013].

The resource ingredients of growth considered in this paper are mostly extensive in nature. It is rather strange, however, to build a forecast for the twenty-first century after two centuries of modern economic growth, relying mainly on them.

Although the contribution of total resource efficiency (total factor productivity, TFP), ultimately related to STP, to global GDP growth is still below half (in 1980-2010 1/3, including in PC¼, in RG-over 2/5, see Graph 6), in the ultra-long term it tended to grow (from less than 1/10 in 1000-1800 to about 1/4 in 1800-1950 and almost 2/5 in 1950-2010 [Melyantsev, 2013, p. 25-26]). It would be logical to assume that, barring a series of extraordinary catastrophes, the growth of TFP will be the fundamental determinant of global growth in the current century. The authors recognize, of course, the role of innovation and STP ([Aki-

page 13
Schedule 5

Total volume and proportions of total national wealth distribution,

PPP, $ 1 trillion 2010

Note. N, K, N - shares in the structure of the wealth of natural resources, physical and human capital.

Calculated from sources to the graph. 3 and 4, as well as by: [Global Economic Prospects, 2011, p. 4; Where Is the Wealth..., 2006, p. 171-174].

Schedule 6

World-wide: average annual growth rates of aggregate factor productivity (TFP) and its contribution to

GDP growth, %

Source: [Melyantsev, 2013, p. 26].

Notes. 1. Calculated by the formula: y = a . 1 + (1-a) k + r, where y, l, k n r are the average annual growth rates of GDP, employment, fixed capital, and aggregate factor productivity. 2. The contribution of SPF to GDP growth is calculated by the formula: i = r/y,%. 3. The average elasticity of GDP change for labor force (a) and capital (1-a) is taken equal to 0.8 and 0.2 in 1000-1800, 0.7 and 0.3 in 1800-1950, and 0.65 in 1950-2010, respectively and 0.35.

page 14
mov and Yakovlev, 2012, p. 12], but, unfortunately, for unknown reasons, insufficient attention is paid to this factor in the forecast.8
In the last two chapters of the book, devoted, as the title suggests, to the process of modernization in the world, it is worth noting the classification of socio-political reforms carried out in the last three centuries in a number of countries of the world, taking into account their most important characteristics: causes and origins, initiator, preparatory period, reform program, position of the bureaucracy, social support of reforms stages, price of reforms, success or rollback [Akimov, Yakovlev, 2012, pp. 167-171, 241-246]. These materials are useful, but it would be nice to add many others, so that the picture of modernization is more complete, it would be necessary to more clearly identify patterns of success and failure, add exceptions to the rules, discussion points, and identify some options or imperatives for "breakthrough" for lagging countries, nations, and civilizations.

In a number of sections of the work, which, by the way, is very heterogeneous in terms of elaboration of texts, one can clearly feel the idealization of conservatism, tradition (in the text of Tradition), and originality without giving any convincing arguments [Akimov and Yakovlev, 2012, pp. 203, 206]. The values of Orthodoxy are extolled [Akimov and Yakovlev, 2012, p. 115], but it is not clear what type, what era.

There are obvious contradictions in the book. Chapter 2 shows that without globalization, a significant part of the population of poor countries would not survive. In another part of the paper, it is argued that the process of globalization "drags all countries and peoples more or less into the vortex of a whirlpool..." [Akimov and Yakovlev, 2012, p.114]. The authors should have agreed on their theses.

The statement about the decline of the Western model of development [Akimov, Yakovlev, 2012, p. 202, etc.] is true, but only partially, and largely exaggerated [Melyantsev, 2009(2)]. There are statements about the so-called undeveloped South [Akimov and Yakovlev, 2012, p. 117]. But the South is different. And a significant part of what is commonly called the South is the engine of modern global economic growth, including India, Brazil, South Africa and, of course, China.

Many theses in the paper are not proven. For example: why did the authors decide that economic changes are purely linear in nature [Akimov and Yakovlev, 2012, p. 21]? Should national pride be contrasted with ... possession of a powerful car [Akimov, Yakovlev, 2012, p. 19]?

Little is written about Russia in the main text of the work. In fact, the authors proposed only one scenario - "extinction and decay" (Akimov and Yakovlev, 2012, pp. 130-131). Of course, this is not excluded. But not everything is so clear. I am far from idealizing the modern Russian growth model (see [Melyantsev, 2012]), but let's agree that so far, however, with a good price environment for hydrocarbons exported by the Russian Federation, the rate of its economic growth (in 2000-2012), although in a trend and decreased, but still was on average several times higher than in the whole WG. The country has accumulated considerable gold and foreign exchange reserves, and its debt is relatively small [World Development Indicators, 2012, p. 210-216, Global Economic Prospects, 2013, p. 2].

8 The authors ' concerns about the depletion of some resources are understandable. But only partially. I recall that about a third of a century ago, when the work of the Club of Rome was being actively discussed, a French researcher remarked that excessive fears about the lack of resources are akin to those that economists might have had if they lived in the Stone Age and could have feared that they would not have enough silicon to produce stone products. axes.

There are a number of pessimistic scientists abroad, including Prof. N. Roubini and R. Gordon, who, in particular, believe, figuratively speaking, that the "sunny days arc over" (sunny days are over), and its pace will slow down [Gordon, 2012]. But, as noted in one of the very solid analytical developments, a significant part of the scientific community in Western countries does not share such pessimism [PwC. World in 2050, 2013, p. 4].

page 15
As for preserving the values and ideals of the pagan (?) If the authors [Akimov and Yakovlev, 2012, p.130, 211-213] denounce consumerism, then it is not clear why this means death for Russia, but, say, not for the PRC, India, and the United States; the last (USA) more than two hundred years have largely built their market economy on this basis.

In general, the results of the study (and I do not exclude future research on this project, taking into account the comments made and taken into account) may be useful for international experts, business analysts involved in the development and implementation of long-term development strategies, teachers, graduate students and students interested in the problems of the world economy, security and politics. The implementation of such projects on an ongoing basis, involving specialists in the West, East and Russia, is very important both for adequate diagnostics of current and prospective development processes, as well as for identifying, preventing and mitigating crises, searching for favorable alternatives, opportunities and effective tools for managing the development of society.

list of literature

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